6 ms·

One thing the pandemic certainly has shown is just how dangerous an otherwise unremarkable animal virus can be if it gains the ability to infect humans. Simply

One thing the pandemic certainly has shown is just how dangerous an otherwise unremarkable animal virus can be if it gains the ability to infect humans. Simply because nobody has a pre-existing immunity it gains enormous advantages in its ability to spread compared to similar viruses that are already endemic. I think previous candidates for new pandemic viruses did mislead us as those never got far enough to become a true pandemic. Those were scarier than SARS-CoV2 by lethality, but were manageable by the usual epidemiological tools. Now we've also seen how a virus can spread that is far more contagious, and how we are unable to stop such a virus. What I found scary about SARS-CoV2 is just how much it improved between variants. It didn't have any special features like influenza to increase its potential there. It simply had the numbers, enormous amounts of hosts to evolve in. So potentially any virus that is able to spread as far initially could be able to evolve in a similar manner. I think avoiding many if not most gain-of-function experiments is a reasonable lesson to learn from this pandemic.

xracy 3y ago
> I think avoiding many if not most gain-of-function experiments is a reasonable lesson to learn from this pandemic. Help me out, I don't see the thread of logic from your previous points...
- fabian2k 3y ago
  Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV2 if leaked. We now know more about the potential consequences of such a leak, we have a full-blown pandemic as a benchmark. If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk.
  - shadowgovt 3y ago
    Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an animal-jump, baed on research done on corpses retrieved from the arctic circle. H1N1 was an animal jump. HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump. If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump, that's still three deadly natural pandemics that we want this research to be able to prevent in the future.
    - sterlind 3y ago
      Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
      - chaostheory 3y ago
        Humans would need less animal contact. To end this, you’d have to end the animal agriculture industry. I am not a vegan.
      - kosievdmerwe 3y ago
        I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers.
        cbsmith 3y ago
        > I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. You have a very limited imagination. ;-) I assure you that extensive research into biological (not involving viruses), chemical, and nuclear weapons... and really a wide variety of weapons research is easily more dangerous. There's plenty of opportunity in other areas like materials science, genetics, etc., as well. > If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers. Now you'll want to have an ultra-secure means of transporting highly dangerous biological samples, not to mention research teams & observers, at very high speeds to the middle of a desert. Are you sure you've improved the risk profile?
        Wowfunhappy 3y ago
        I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all.
  - cbsmith 3y ago
    > If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk. You're saying that without regard to the measure of risk, or what risks exist if we don't do those experiments.
    - whythre 3y ago
      What risk could possibly be worse than a global pandemic? That seems to be what gain of function research purports to be studying to prevent- and in this case it appears that the research virus caused the very thing it was supposed to (indirectly) prevent.
akira2501 3y ago
> Simply because nobody has a pre-existing immunity There is good evidence that those who had SARS-CoV-1 had immunity that covered SARS-CoV-2. This immunity lasted for more than a decade. > What I found scary about SARS-CoV2 is just how much it improved between variants. Perhaps a leaky spike only vaccine was a particularly bad choice and the extent to which it drove these variants is not clear. There is additional debate amont the "virologist" community about this specific outcome. > most gain-of-function experiments I simply do not trust for profit drug companies to do this work. I certainly don't trust governments to do it either. Further, the idea that we can correctly estimate how nature is going to perform and then front run those outcomes in the laboratory is entirely insane and is explicitly anti-science.
- dist-epoch 3y ago
  > There is good evidence that those who had SARS-CoV-1 had immunity that covered SARS-CoV-2. That is a tiny tiny number of people, measured in thousands at most.
  - akira2501 3y ago
    > That is a tiny tiny number of people, measured in thousands at most. Does that somehow prevent you from getting them to express those antibodies and then cloning them?
- cbsmith 3y ago
  > I simply do not trust for profit drug companies to do this work. I certainly don't trust governments to do it either. But you trust nature to do this work? ;-) > Further, the idea that we can correctly estimate how nature is going to perform and then front run those outcomes in the laboratory is entirely insane and is explicitly anti-science. Well, this eliminates a great deal of research areas completely outside virology. Climatologists aren't needed. Seismologists aren't needed. Meteorologists become largely irrelevant. Much of cancer research, forestry, etc. isn't needed. Certainly no need to take measures for forecasted hurricanes or tsunamis. We do just fine estimating how nature is going to perform and identifying what to do in anticipation of it. There's a lot of variables involved, so we don't always get it exactly right, but we sure do a lot better making forecasts and reacting to them than when we don't.
dist-epoch 3y ago
During SARS-Cov2 the flu basically disappeared because of all the masks and hand sanitizer, given that the flu is much less contagious and harder to spread. That gives me hope regarding H1N1, if it happens, we might be able to keep it under control.
- Wowfunhappy 3y ago
  We'd also be able to develop a vaccine much more quickly. We're very good at making flu vaccines because we do it every year. That's why we had a 2009 "swine flu" vaccine within a few months.

xracy 3y ago

> I think avoiding many if not most gain-of-function experiments is a reasonable lesson to learn from this pandemic. Help me out, I don't see the thread of logic from your previous points...

fabian2k 3y ago
Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV2 if leaked. We now know more about the potential consequences of such a leak, we have a full-blown pandemic as a benchmark. If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk.
- shadowgovt 3y ago
  Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an animal-jump, baed on research done on corpses retrieved from the arctic circle. H1N1 was an animal jump. HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump. If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump, that's still three deadly natural pandemics that we want this research to be able to prevent in the future.
  - sterlind 3y ago
    Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
    - chaostheory 3y ago
      Humans would need less animal contact. To end this, you’d have to end the animal agriculture industry. I am not a vegan.
    - kosievdmerwe 3y ago
      I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers.
      - cbsmith 3y ago
        > I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. You have a very limited imagination. ;-) I assure you that extensive research into biological (not involving viruses), chemical, and nuclear weapons... and really a wide variety of weapons research is easily more dangerous. There's plenty of opportunity in other areas like materials science, genetics, etc., as well. > If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers. Now you'll want to have an ultra-secure means of transporting highly dangerous biological samples, not to mention research teams & observers, at very high speeds to the middle of a desert. Are you sure you've improved the risk profile?
        Wowfunhappy 3y ago
        I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all.
- cbsmith 3y ago
  > If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk. You're saying that without regard to the measure of risk, or what risks exist if we don't do those experiments.
  - whythre 3y ago
    What risk could possibly be worse than a global pandemic? That seems to be what gain of function research purports to be studying to prevent- and in this case it appears that the research virus caused the very thing it was supposed to (indirectly) prevent.

akira2501 3y ago

> Simply because nobody has a pre-existing immunity There is good evidence that those who had SARS-CoV-1 had immunity that covered SARS-CoV-2. This immunity lasted for more than a decade. > What I found scary about SARS-CoV2 is just how much it improved between variants. Perhaps a leaky spike only vaccine was a particularly bad choice and the extent to which it drove these variants is not clear. There is additional debate amont the "virologist" community about this specific outcome. > most gain-of-function experiments I simply do not trust for profit drug companies to do this work. I certainly don't trust governments to do it either. Further, the idea that we can correctly estimate how nature is going to perform and then front run those outcomes in the laboratory is entirely insane and is explicitly anti-science.

dist-epoch 3y ago
> There is good evidence that those who had SARS-CoV-1 had immunity that covered SARS-CoV-2. That is a tiny tiny number of people, measured in thousands at most.
- akira2501 3y ago
  > That is a tiny tiny number of people, measured in thousands at most. Does that somehow prevent you from getting them to express those antibodies and then cloning them?
cbsmith 3y ago
> I simply do not trust for profit drug companies to do this work. I certainly don't trust governments to do it either. But you trust nature to do this work? ;-) > Further, the idea that we can correctly estimate how nature is going to perform and then front run those outcomes in the laboratory is entirely insane and is explicitly anti-science. Well, this eliminates a great deal of research areas completely outside virology. Climatologists aren't needed. Seismologists aren't needed. Meteorologists become largely irrelevant. Much of cancer research, forestry, etc. isn't needed. Certainly no need to take measures for forecasted hurricanes or tsunamis. We do just fine estimating how nature is going to perform and identifying what to do in anticipation of it. There's a lot of variables involved, so we don't always get it exactly right, but we sure do a lot better making forecasts and reacting to them than when we don't.

dist-epoch 3y ago

During SARS-Cov2 the flu basically disappeared because of all the masks and hand sanitizer, given that the flu is much less contagious and harder to spread. That gives me hope regarding H1N1, if it happens, we might be able to keep it under control.

Wowfunhappy 3y ago
We'd also be able to develop a vaccine much more quickly. We're very good at making flu vaccines because we do it every year. That's why we had a 2009 "swine flu" vaccine within a few months.