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Empty box is opened in front of multiple witnesses Voter comes along, name ticked off list of registered voters -- "this person has voted" Voter given stamped

by ta1243 3y ago

Empty box is opened in front of multiple witnesses Voter comes along, name ticked off list of registered voters -- "this person has voted" Voter given stamped piece of paper with candidates on in front of multiple witnesses. Voter marks an X next to a name on a paper, folds paper, showing stamp, puts in a box in front of multiple witnesses Box fills and is then sealed in front of witnesses. Number of votes inside (from the ticking the list) written on. Box is then transferred to counting place. Box is unsealed at counting location in front of multiple witnesses Papers counted to confirm they have a stamp and the number of papers matches the number of votes on the box and accompanying paperwork Papers transferred to counting table in front of multiple witnesses Papers counted in front of multiple witnesses Any confusing ballots set aside to discuss between candidates and the adjudicator If the vote is close papers are recounted Winner announced. This works fine with elections with a turnout measured >30 million people in the UK, which means it works fine for the largest election in the US (California presidential election). So it's secure, scalable, and cheap At what point can you commit fraud to a scale where the effort to do it returns more than the effort to campaign for a few more votes?

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FrenchyJiby 3y ago
I'll note that France has a slight variant on that, where it's assumed that any identifiable marker of the ballot could reveal a voter's identity, bad in case of blackmail like "vote for X, and show it by having a stripe at at the top, or I [do bad things to family], I'll be checking the ballots"). To avoid this, no markers, but all possible votes are pieces of paper with printed text, grab N>2, go in the booth, put in one in an envelope. This way your vote and any other vote look identical, and vote is voided in case of any identifying mark (even weirdly bent paper etc). No stamp needed, just number of votes/envelopes.
- ta1243 3y ago
  Much larger problems with voter intimidation in the UK through the postal vote system. I've been to several counts in the UK, spotting a specific ballot, even if you know which box it's in, is impossible. You've then got to be able to enforce that enough to make a difference. You'd have to have a unique mark for every person (at least at every station) you're trying to enforce, one that can be quickly spotted by one of about 5 people you can get at the verification stage. Even then there's no guarantee you didn't just miss it. Sure, you can write "WANK" next to everyone you don't like, and that's great, but again the number of votes you could affect in this way would be a tiny number.
the_snooze 3y ago
>This works fine with elections with a turnout measured >30 million people in the UK, which means it works fine for the largest election in the US (California presidential election). Not necessarily. California will literally have dozens of contests on the same ballot. Here's last year's non-presidential ballot in San Francisco. There are about 24 contests on this, and this doesn't appear to list ballot measures, a California favorite. It's impractical to hand-count California ballots under the procedure you describe given how very long they are. https://voterguide.sfelections.org/en/november-8-2022-election-ballot https://voterguide.sfelections.org/en/november-8-2022-electi...
jeltz 3y ago
In Sweden there are not separate places for the first count. The votes are counted once at the polling station and then moved and count again centrally by hand.

by ta1243 3y ago

deleted 3y ago

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FrenchyJiby 3y ago

I'll note that France has a slight variant on that, where it's assumed that any identifiable marker of the ballot could reveal a voter's identity, bad in case of blackmail like "vote for X, and show it by having a stripe at at the top, or I [do bad things to family], I'll be checking the ballots"). To avoid this, no markers, but all possible votes are pieces of paper with printed text, grab N>2, go in the booth, put in one in an envelope. This way your vote and any other vote look identical, and vote is voided in case of any identifying mark (even weirdly bent paper etc). No stamp needed, just number of votes/envelopes.

ta1243 3y ago
Much larger problems with voter intimidation in the UK through the postal vote system. I've been to several counts in the UK, spotting a specific ballot, even if you know which box it's in, is impossible. You've then got to be able to enforce that enough to make a difference. You'd have to have a unique mark for every person (at least at every station) you're trying to enforce, one that can be quickly spotted by one of about 5 people you can get at the verification stage. Even then there's no guarantee you didn't just miss it. Sure, you can write "WANK" next to everyone you don't like, and that's great, but again the number of votes you could affect in this way would be a tiny number.

the_snooze 3y ago

>This works fine with elections with a turnout measured >30 million people in the UK, which means it works fine for the largest election in the US (California presidential election). Not necessarily. California will literally have dozens of contests on the same ballot. Here's last year's non-presidential ballot in San Francisco. There are about 24 contests on this, and this doesn't appear to list ballot measures, a California favorite. It's impractical to hand-count California ballots under the procedure you describe given how very long they are. https://voterguide.sfelections.org/en/november-8-2022-election-ballot https://voterguide.sfelections.org/en/november-8-2022-electi...

jeltz 3y ago

In Sweden there are not separate places for the first count. The votes are counted once at the polling station and then moved and count again centrally by hand.