>There is no point in using machines other than enriching their manufacturer and enabling fraud. This is a shortsighted take. To be clear, "machines" can fall

>There is no point in using machines other than enriching their manufacturer and enabling fraud. This is a shortsighted take. To be clear, "machines" can fall anywhere from direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines where people vote on touchscreens with no paper record, to optical-scan machines that process Scantron-style bubble-in paper ballots. The latter is a really good option because you get all the security and usability benefits of paper with the speed of machine counts. That's especially important in jurisdictions that do ranked-choice voting (like Alaska) or places with very long and complicated ballots (like California). If you don't trust the scanner, then a risk-limiting audit [1] will detect discrepancies between what the machine says and what the paper ballots say. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk-limiting_audit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk-limiting_audit