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Where I'm from, votes are hand counted by committee of multiple people in each voting district and anyone else can come and observe the process. You can't comm
by progbits 3y ago
Where I'm from, votes are hand counted by committee of multiple people in each voting district and anyone else can come and observe the process.
You can't commit large scale fraud this way. And the results are available within 12 hours of the closing thanks to massive parallelism.
There is no point in using machines other than enriching their manufacturer and enabling fraud.
- the_snooze 3y ago>There is no point in using machines other than enriching their manufacturer and enabling fraud. This is a shortsighted take. To be clear, "machines" can fall anywhere from direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines where people vote on touchscreens with no paper record, to optical-scan machines that process Scantron-style bubble-in paper ballots. The latter is a really good option because you get all the security and usability benefits of paper with the speed of machine counts. That's especially important in jurisdictions that do ranked-choice voting (like Alaska) or places with very long and complicated ballots (like California). If you don't trust the scanner, then a risk-limiting audit [1] will detect discrepancies between what the machine says and what the paper ballots say. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk-limiting_audit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk-limiting_audit
- pivo 3y agoEven better than an RLA is a full machine recount from a different company to the one that recorded the votes in the first place. RLAs typically only count a small percentage of the total ballots, while a full machine Audit will count all ballots. I'm biased because this is what the company I work for does, but I think it's hard to argue that not counting all ballots is as good as counting all ballots.
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