3 ms·
For software, I don't think it's all that impractical. You could cryptographically verify that the factory firmware is signed and valid, and if it isn't then y
by freedomben 3y ago
For software, I don't think it's all that impractical. You could cryptographically verify that the factory firmware is signed and valid, and if it isn't then you re-flash it before reselling. This should be (and often is) a standard practice for "refurbished" goods. Even at a small scale you should already have the means of verifying the software/firmware loaded on the device because you don't want to ship a broken product. Using that to verify should generally speaking be fairly easy to do.
For hardware it does get a little more difficult, but if the attacker isn't allowed to run their own (modified) version of the firmware/software, then such attacks are very, very difficult to do. You would want to design your product in such a way that you can check the storage/flash contents without having to trust the product to self-report, otherwise a modified software build could easily lie to the verifier about it's hash.
So for most use cases, both hardware and software are mitigated substantially by verifying the software build.
An important note here is that it doesn't need to require distrusting the user. Of course modern tech companies love to distrust the user because it gives them substantially more control over how their product is used, so the "security" justification of using anti-tamper technologies is highly attractive to them.