10 ms·
The reasons this site recommends disabling certain algorithms are, to say the least, very specualtive. Just to give two examples: It recommends disabling diffi
by hannob 3y ago
The reasons this site recommends disabling certain algorithms are, to say the least, very specualtive.
Just to give two examples: It recommends disabling diffie hellman with 2048 bit. There isn't even the slightest evidence that any attack might be possible on that size. It's just based on some policy recommendations that convert DH size to key strength and it ends up being below 128 bit.
It recommends disabling HMAC-SHA1. Now, SHA1 is not collission resistant. But HMAC is not affected by this weakness. Therefore there's no real risk.
Generally, OpenSSH has already improved algorithm security quite a lot over the years and everything that is remotely close to a real attack is disabled by default.
- Helmut10001 3y agoIs there a negative effect of applying these recommendations? On another note, this helped me solve a an issue [1], where I could not disable some weak HMAC algorithms. [1]: https://unix.stackexchange.com/q/758814/380381 https://unix.stackexchange.com/q/758814/380381
- ahoka 3y agoSlower (as in less bandwidth and larger latencies) connection, using more CPU. Not sure if that makes any difference if you don’t use it for a tunnel or open a tons of connection for some reason.
- ahoka 3y agoI think the logic (there’s a link to an opinionated article they base their recommendations on) is the same as with TLS1.3, why wait until something gets broken? It selects a few safe choices and disables everything else. You don’t usually need to support more than two different algos, as you usually control both the server and the client.