29 ms·

I disagree. The same could be said for client side scanning child pornography. This is about the potential capacity for abuse where there was not capability pre

I disagree. The same could be said for client side scanning child pornography. This is about the potential capacity for abuse where there was not capability previously.

threeseed 3y ago
Apple owns the firmware. They could enable 24/7 recording, lie to the OS about what is happening and trickle the data back server-side within harmless iCloud requests. It would be pretty much undetectable. And the point of CSAM client-side is that it is more secure and private than them doing it server-side.
- eimrine 3y ago
  > CSAM client-side is that it is more secure and private than them doing it server-side. What can be more insecure and not at all private than scanning user files using user's computer resources? Server-side scanning is impossible if E2EE.
- FloatArtifact 3y ago
  The difference is there is no not choosing to use client-side scanning. I could choose not to use apple cloud services for photos and therefore not participate in server side scanning. Essentially, client-side scanning assumes everybody's guilty until proven innocent. It's a slippery slope for scanning local content. Today the admirable goal of eliminating child pornography and maybe tomorrow FBI most wanted list, then pretty much anybody in the criminal system. Not to mention the political implications. You see this as a simple trusting apple because they have complete control over the OS/Hardware. I see this as a culture shift that goes beyond trusting any particular company that fundamentally erodes privacy.
  - FabHK 3y ago
    Apple's plan was to scan only those photos going into iCloud on the client, so that they can send them to the server e2e encrypted. That is strictly better for privacy than scanning them in the cloud, as other providers do. Of course, they could lie and scan everything, but as others pointed out, they could do that already anyway.
    - cassonmars 3y ago
      They _do_ do that anyway for iCloud. The E2EE support was inherently better, as it significantly reduced the decrypted content exposure to Apple. The uproar over the feature and Apple’s relenting on the implementation resulted in no E2EE as the default. Allegedly advanced data protection does do E2EE for iCloud Photos though. I can understand the good intentions playing out poorly and being ripe for abuse.
      - shuckles 3y ago
        Apple confirmed they down scan iCloud for unwanted content, and it's pretty obvious doing that would be a huge privacy risk, and it's very debatable whether that actual risk is worse than the theoretical risk of scope creep in on-device assisted scanning.
- ProfessorLayton 3y ago
  While generally true, battery, storage, and cellular data are not unlimited, so 24/7 surveillance couldn't go undetected for very long — at least not yet.
brookst 3y ago
Wait, what? Client-side scanning is offensive and objectionable, but it has much less potential for abuse. None of us have any idea if and how cloud scanning responds to ad hoc requests from anyone. As much as I oppose client-side scanning, having a single global hash database makes it much harder for a company to do special favors without anyone knowing.
- FloatArtifact 3y ago
  Well, no one has any idea of how ad hoc requests are made to turn on your phone when it's off. Logically, if someone's intentionally turned off their phone they desire it to be off.
  - arcticbull 3y ago
    You're going to be really unhappy when you hear about IME and PSP.
    - kube-system 3y ago
      Or, on the topic of cell phones: baseband firmware.
      - shuckles 3y ago
        It's really surprising how people end up making absolutist claims about privacy while demonstrating very little understanding of the threat model posed by modern smartphones.
        FloatArtifact 3y ago
        > It's really surprising how people end up making absolutist claims about privacy while demonstrating very little understanding of the threat model posed by modern smartphones. Would you mind expanding upon that?
        3y ago
raverbashing 3y ago
"potential for abuse" As opposed to opening the phone, plugging the cable, doing whatever you want and shrink-wrapping again? (which is easy) "Oh but it's wireless" It's through the wireless charging mechanism. That makes the whole difference

I disagree. The same could be said for client side scanning child pornography. This is about the potential capacity for abuse where there was not capability previously.

threeseed 3y ago

Apple owns the firmware. They could enable 24/7 recording, lie to the OS about what is happening and trickle the data back server-side within harmless iCloud requests. It would be pretty much undetectable. And the point of CSAM client-side is that it is more secure and private than them doing it server-side.

eimrine 3y ago
> CSAM client-side is that it is more secure and private than them doing it server-side. What can be more insecure and not at all private than scanning user files using user's computer resources? Server-side scanning is impossible if E2EE.
FloatArtifact 3y ago
The difference is there is no not choosing to use client-side scanning. I could choose not to use apple cloud services for photos and therefore not participate in server side scanning. Essentially, client-side scanning assumes everybody's guilty until proven innocent. It's a slippery slope for scanning local content. Today the admirable goal of eliminating child pornography and maybe tomorrow FBI most wanted list, then pretty much anybody in the criminal system. Not to mention the political implications. You see this as a simple trusting apple because they have complete control over the OS/Hardware. I see this as a culture shift that goes beyond trusting any particular company that fundamentally erodes privacy.
- FabHK 3y ago
  Apple's plan was to scan only those photos going into iCloud on the client, so that they can send them to the server e2e encrypted. That is strictly better for privacy than scanning them in the cloud, as other providers do. Of course, they could lie and scan everything, but as others pointed out, they could do that already anyway.
  - cassonmars 3y ago
    They _do_ do that anyway for iCloud. The E2EE support was inherently better, as it significantly reduced the decrypted content exposure to Apple. The uproar over the feature and Apple’s relenting on the implementation resulted in no E2EE as the default. Allegedly advanced data protection does do E2EE for iCloud Photos though. I can understand the good intentions playing out poorly and being ripe for abuse.
    - shuckles 3y ago
      Apple confirmed they down scan iCloud for unwanted content, and it's pretty obvious doing that would be a huge privacy risk, and it's very debatable whether that actual risk is worse than the theoretical risk of scope creep in on-device assisted scanning.
ProfessorLayton 3y ago
While generally true, battery, storage, and cellular data are not unlimited, so 24/7 surveillance couldn't go undetected for very long — at least not yet.

brookst 3y ago

Wait, what? Client-side scanning is offensive and objectionable, but it has much less potential for abuse. None of us have any idea if and how cloud scanning responds to ad hoc requests from anyone. As much as I oppose client-side scanning, having a single global hash database makes it much harder for a company to do special favors without anyone knowing.

FloatArtifact 3y ago
Well, no one has any idea of how ad hoc requests are made to turn on your phone when it's off. Logically, if someone's intentionally turned off their phone they desire it to be off.
- arcticbull 3y ago
  You're going to be really unhappy when you hear about IME and PSP.
  - kube-system 3y ago
    Or, on the topic of cell phones: baseband firmware.
    - shuckles 3y ago
      It's really surprising how people end up making absolutist claims about privacy while demonstrating very little understanding of the threat model posed by modern smartphones.
      - FloatArtifact 3y ago
        > It's really surprising how people end up making absolutist claims about privacy while demonstrating very little understanding of the threat model posed by modern smartphones. Would you mind expanding upon that?
        3y ago

raverbashing 3y ago

"potential for abuse" As opposed to opening the phone, plugging the cable, doing whatever you want and shrink-wrapping again? (which is easy) "Oh but it's wireless" It's through the wireless charging mechanism. That makes the whole difference