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They literally just refused to recognize the aboriginal population in the constitution or to give them a voice in parliament three days ago.

by vGPU 3y ago

Affric 3y ago
Mate, you need to stop commenting on matters you have no idea about. The current Australian government has spent half of its term burning all of its political capital on attempting to get the Voice to parliament up and move the objectives of the Uluru statement forward. They fumbled the execution but they couldn't have made a greater effort.
- justinclift 3y ago
  > but they couldn't have made a greater effort. Hmmm. To me it seemed like they spent a whole bunch of effort on marketing, but didn't want to spend the effort on actually figuring out the details of their proposal first. And if they can't be bothered to work out the full and complete details of a change to our constitution (up front), in order for people to make an informed choice... then there's no way they were actually serious about wanting to change things. Or they were just er... tripping. Seems more like it was just a political stunt / bullshit for some (unknown) reason. :( --- I was living in the UK when the government there did similar for Brexit. It was heavy on slogans and marketing, but they'd not even bothered to work out the details of what they were proposing. And we've seen how well that went (extremely poorly). :(
  - NoPicklez 3y ago
    No hate at all, but I am curious what the "full and complete details" might have looked like? I've heard that a lot and it seems like it differs person to person of what would've been sufficient.
    - justinclift 3y ago
      Yeah, they never bothered to drill into the exact details of what they intended to do. Kind of an important thing when they're wanting to change laws.
      - NoPicklez 3y ago
        Again, what details? My understanding is that the constitution doesn't include much detail. The details of which are legislated thereafter.
    - Affric 3y ago
      Full and complete details is bulldust but a good tactic by the no campaign. What they needed to do was release enough of a proposal to convince 50% + 1 of 4 of 6 states and the whole country to vote yes. There is no fixed amount but the proposal didn't fail because of a conspiracy. It failed because it was an ill-conceived change and an ill-conceived campaign.
  - Affric 3y ago
    > didn't want to spend the effort on actually figuring out the details of their proposal first. This is an over simplification. > can't be bothered > there's no way they were actually serious about wanting to change thing > Seems more like it was just a political stunt / bullshit for some (unknown) reason. You're assuming malice. If you want some serious analysis from someone who has worked in electoral politics and won campaigns that have been called unwinnable... well, you're here. It all comes back to the Uluru statement (published in 2017 during the term of the previous government, who did nothing). Perhaps most importantly this line: > We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution. [1] Change to the constitution = referendum. I won't go into the details of why it was thought by the authors of the Uluru statement was necessary but it distills down to democratic legitimacy. Theoretically: Demanded by the people, unable to be erased without the will of the people. If you want further details you shouldn't be reading a Hacker News comment. But from this the referendum was necessary for the government to act on the Uluru statement. Initially support for the voice was polling well. From here the government had to figure out the question to put to Australian electors in a referendum. Australian politicians are well aware of the electorate's resistance to constitutional change. To give the best chance of success they looked back to previous referenda to determine what an optimal strategy might be like. The two referenda that were considered most important by the campaign were the 1967 Aboriginals referendum and the 1999 Republic referendum. The 1967 referendum got up. Easily. It was a source of inspiration for many (I daresay all) involved in the Voice referendum. [2] The 1967 referendum was for the voice to remove the words "other than the aboriginal race in any State" [3] from the constitution with regards to Commonwealth government power and a clause about counting Aboriginals in the census. The view amongst the modern campaigners was that the referendum succeeded because the law was viewed as racist and the Australian people were ready for equality; the past is more nuanced than that. The referendum got up because it was pure equality before the law of the Commonwealth government. Australians didn't do it because they abhorred racism, it succeeded because it resonated with the values of a large cross section of society. Conservatives, Liberals, Fabian Socialists, Communists. This broad coalition had a myriad of reasons they all came to the same answer. "Could the voice have a similar path?" was not a question asked. It was viewed entirely with hindsight. In the minds of the yes campaigners the 1967 referendum was Australians abhorred by racism in the constitution. The 1999 referendum has a lot of myth built around it in the myth of Australia's educated class. A view developed amongst the campaign that part of the reason the referendum failed was that the model was defined when a majority of Australians would support a republic but there was no majority for a single model. This is to some extent true. A view that also exists is that the less popular model was chosen deliberately by Prime Minister Howard to doom the referendum's to failure. This combined with an (internal)acknowledgement that Australians might be uneasy about a voice that was truly independent of Parliament led to them proposing a constitutionally mandated but parliamentary defined Voice. This would also allow the voice to change and grow as needed. I will put forward to readers that the 1999 referendum failed not because a model was defined or because it was sabotaged but because Australians looked at what was on offer and plainly did not believe that there was material benefit to voting yes. These twin illusions combined with the high in principle support of the voice would cloud the judgement of the yes campaign. They assumed that Australian society viewed itself as structurally racist in its organisation but not the electorate (I agree with the view but don't believe that a majority of Australians view it that way). They also assumed that people would see the value of the voice, prima facie. So, they went ahead, no model defined, sure they would win largely based on good will that they incorrectly believed was very solid. This led to them exposing their Achilles heel: they had no easy to communicate argument for the voice nor anything a voter could look at. They couldn't explain what it was going to be. They couldn't explain why it needed to exist. They couldn't explain why it needed to be in the constitution. Once the campaign you have called (on the taxpayer dime) is afoot it you would essentially be admitting you think you are going to lose to change the terms and the themes of your campaign. The only way you can really do it is with some kind of external event rocking the system. For the opposition this was a good opportunity to let the government get itself enough rope and then torch a lot of their political capital. Never interrupt your opponent when they are making a mistake. Some of the voices inside the Labor party who were a bit further from the campaign and had clearer sight of it did try to urge the campaign to change tack before the starting gun. They were told their suggested changes would be seen as cynical and retreating. The Uluru statement authors and yes strategists learnt the wrong lesson from 1967 and 1999 referenda (but not the abolition of ATSIC). The Labor Party silenced voices internally who criticised the strategy. The no campaign figured out the same flaws in the yes campaign and exploited them ruthlessly. The campaign was ritualistic and symbolic rather than based on actual causality. Like most superstition, the believers expended a lot of effort to convince themselves they were doing something that worked, and when it didn't work they did it harder. It did not fail because of insincerity or lack of effort. Quite the opposite. [1] Uluru statement from the heart [2] "In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard." Uluru statement from the heart [3] Australian constitution

They literally just refused to recognize the aboriginal population in the constitution or to give them a voice in parliament three days ago.

by vGPU 3y ago

They literally just refused to recognize the aboriginal population in the constitution or to give them a voice in parliament three days ago.

Affric 3y ago

Mate, you need to stop commenting on matters you have no idea about. The current Australian government has spent half of its term burning all of its political capital on attempting to get the Voice to parliament up and move the objectives of the Uluru statement forward. They fumbled the execution but they couldn't have made a greater effort.

justinclift 3y ago
> but they couldn't have made a greater effort. Hmmm. To me it seemed like they spent a whole bunch of effort on marketing, but didn't want to spend the effort on actually figuring out the details of their proposal first. And if they can't be bothered to work out the full and complete details of a change to our constitution (up front), in order for people to make an informed choice... then there's no way they were actually serious about wanting to change things. Or they were just er... tripping. Seems more like it was just a political stunt / bullshit for some (unknown) reason. :( --- I was living in the UK when the government there did similar for Brexit. It was heavy on slogans and marketing, but they'd not even bothered to work out the details of what they were proposing. And we've seen how well that went (extremely poorly). :(
- NoPicklez 3y ago
  No hate at all, but I am curious what the "full and complete details" might have looked like? I've heard that a lot and it seems like it differs person to person of what would've been sufficient.
  - justinclift 3y ago
    Yeah, they never bothered to drill into the exact details of what they intended to do. Kind of an important thing when they're wanting to change laws.
    - NoPicklez 3y ago
      Again, what details? My understanding is that the constitution doesn't include much detail. The details of which are legislated thereafter.
  - Affric 3y ago
    Full and complete details is bulldust but a good tactic by the no campaign. What they needed to do was release enough of a proposal to convince 50% + 1 of 4 of 6 states and the whole country to vote yes. There is no fixed amount but the proposal didn't fail because of a conspiracy. It failed because it was an ill-conceived change and an ill-conceived campaign.
- Affric 3y ago
  > didn't want to spend the effort on actually figuring out the details of their proposal first. This is an over simplification. > can't be bothered > there's no way they were actually serious about wanting to change thing > Seems more like it was just a political stunt / bullshit for some (unknown) reason. You're assuming malice. If you want some serious analysis from someone who has worked in electoral politics and won campaigns that have been called unwinnable... well, you're here. It all comes back to the Uluru statement (published in 2017 during the term of the previous government, who did nothing). Perhaps most importantly this line: > We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution. [1] Change to the constitution = referendum. I won't go into the details of why it was thought by the authors of the Uluru statement was necessary but it distills down to democratic legitimacy. Theoretically: Demanded by the people, unable to be erased without the will of the people. If you want further details you shouldn't be reading a Hacker News comment. But from this the referendum was necessary for the government to act on the Uluru statement. Initially support for the voice was polling well. From here the government had to figure out the question to put to Australian electors in a referendum. Australian politicians are well aware of the electorate's resistance to constitutional change. To give the best chance of success they looked back to previous referenda to determine what an optimal strategy might be like. The two referenda that were considered most important by the campaign were the 1967 Aboriginals referendum and the 1999 Republic referendum. The 1967 referendum got up. Easily. It was a source of inspiration for many (I daresay all) involved in the Voice referendum. [2] The 1967 referendum was for the voice to remove the words "other than the aboriginal race in any State" [3] from the constitution with regards to Commonwealth government power and a clause about counting Aboriginals in the census. The view amongst the modern campaigners was that the referendum succeeded because the law was viewed as racist and the Australian people were ready for equality; the past is more nuanced than that. The referendum got up because it was pure equality before the law of the Commonwealth government. Australians didn't do it because they abhorred racism, it succeeded because it resonated with the values of a large cross section of society. Conservatives, Liberals, Fabian Socialists, Communists. This broad coalition had a myriad of reasons they all came to the same answer. "Could the voice have a similar path?" was not a question asked. It was viewed entirely with hindsight. In the minds of the yes campaigners the 1967 referendum was Australians abhorred by racism in the constitution. The 1999 referendum has a lot of myth built around it in the myth of Australia's educated class. A view developed amongst the campaign that part of the reason the referendum failed was that the model was defined when a majority of Australians would support a republic but there was no majority for a single model. This is to some extent true. A view that also exists is that the less popular model was chosen deliberately by Prime Minister Howard to doom the referendum's to failure. This combined with an (internal)acknowledgement that Australians might be uneasy about a voice that was truly independent of Parliament led to them proposing a constitutionally mandated but parliamentary defined Voice. This would also allow the voice to change and grow as needed. I will put forward to readers that the 1999 referendum failed not because a model was defined or because it was sabotaged but because Australians looked at what was on offer and plainly did not believe that there was material benefit to voting yes. These twin illusions combined with the high in principle support of the voice would cloud the judgement of the yes campaign. They assumed that Australian society viewed itself as structurally racist in its organisation but not the electorate (I agree with the view but don't believe that a majority of Australians view it that way). They also assumed that people would see the value of the voice, prima facie. So, they went ahead, no model defined, sure they would win largely based on good will that they incorrectly believed was very solid. This led to them exposing their Achilles heel: they had no easy to communicate argument for the voice nor anything a voter could look at. They couldn't explain what it was going to be. They couldn't explain why it needed to exist. They couldn't explain why it needed to be in the constitution. Once the campaign you have called (on the taxpayer dime) is afoot it you would essentially be admitting you think you are going to lose to change the terms and the themes of your campaign. The only way you can really do it is with some kind of external event rocking the system. For the opposition this was a good opportunity to let the government get itself enough rope and then torch a lot of their political capital. Never interrupt your opponent when they are making a mistake. Some of the voices inside the Labor party who were a bit further from the campaign and had clearer sight of it did try to urge the campaign to change tack before the starting gun. They were told their suggested changes would be seen as cynical and retreating. The Uluru statement authors and yes strategists learnt the wrong lesson from 1967 and 1999 referenda (but not the abolition of ATSIC). The Labor Party silenced voices internally who criticised the strategy. The no campaign figured out the same flaws in the yes campaign and exploited them ruthlessly. The campaign was ritualistic and symbolic rather than based on actual causality. Like most superstition, the believers expended a lot of effort to convince themselves they were doing something that worked, and when it didn't work they did it harder. It did not fail because of insincerity or lack of effort. Quite the opposite. [1] Uluru statement from the heart [2] "In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard." Uluru statement from the heart [3] Australian constitution