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>The Hungarian government - who presumably has access to the EU CSAM database (or can coerce those who do), might attempt to add a fingerprint of a manipulated
by slg 3y ago
>The Hungarian government - who presumably has access to the EU CSAM database (or can coerce those who do), might attempt to add a fingerprint of a manipulated CSAM image that collides with the fingerprint of the satirical image.
Then what? What does that achieve? There would be a huge spike in images identified as CSAM which would obviously throw up red flags. It seems like this would mostly just be headache for the law enforcement across the EU. It isn't like France is going to arrest a huge number of people without any investigation or thought of how this one CSAM image spread so far so quickly. And if we are talking about the result in Hungary, that government doesn't need this tool to abuse its power. Why go through all that effort? They could just do the equivalent of rubber-hose cryptanalysis.
- mandelken 3y agoOne idea would be for the government of Hungary to create a list of its citizens that share this inciting, dangerous or whatever you you wanna call it material. If they keep on finding the same persons distributing multiple times, they may pay them a visit, get them fired from their government job, block their bank accounts, put them on the no-fly list or whatever. And that’s just one idea, probably there’s others.
- slg 3y agoBut why do this flagging out in the open where other member countries will see this obvious pattern of behavior and abuse of this system? Once again, yes this tool can be abused, but there are much simpler and harder to detect approaches that a corrupt or authoritarian government could implement. That is where the rubber-hose analogy comes into play.