> if the consensus of the whole academic field of post-quantum cryptography doesn't count for anything This is precisely not what I'm saying (and isn't what's

> if the consensus of the whole academic field of post-quantum cryptography doesn't count for anything This is precisely not what I'm saying (and isn't what's happening here). What I'm saying is that given the evidence presented about NIST repeatedly changing evaluation methods, incorrectly calculating the strength of the Kyber, and refusing to clarify any of the above, it really looks like NIST had an outcome that they wanted to reach and took the actions necessary to reach that outcome. It's also really weird to say "it's not enough that almost every participant in the competition agrees that it was well conducted" in response to the lead designers of one of the two primary algorithms saying that the competition wasn't well conducted. With a competition like this, you do expect some people to think that the decision criteria weren't quite the right ones or something like that, but here there's a very clear accusation that NIST either just lied about the security of Kyber or messed it up and refused to correct it when it was pointed out to them.