5 ms·
> Very much this. Having authentication tied to hardware you don't control is a near-certain denial of service in the future. Then you can tie it to hardware y
by stavros 3y ago
> Very much this. Having authentication tied to hardware you don't control is a near-certain denial of service in the future.
Then you can tie it to hardware you do control, or to software.
Obligatory "Passkeys misconceptions" article: https://www.stavros.io/posts/clearing-up-some-passkeys-misconceptions/ https://www.stavros.io/posts/clearing-up-some-passkeys-misco...
- 90-00-09 3y agoHow does this address OP's concern? If you have a single device (e.g. an iPhone) and you store all your passkeys on it, then losing it means you lost all passkeys. Your post describes exactly that: - "I can’t recover the keys if I lose the hardware" - "That is a risk you’ll need to take if you’re using hardware authenticators" Fantasizing that with this proposed simplification of the authentication process people will introduce complexities such as a password manager or a backup hardware device is naive to say the least.
- stavros 3y agoI haven't heard anyone claim that passkeys are simpler than passwords, as that would be trivially false. The claim is that they're more secure while still remaining fairly usable. Passkeys are WebAuthn credentials that are synced between devices, so they aren't hardware keys, they're software keys.
- jjav 3y ago> more secure "more secure" is a completely meaningless statement, I wish this usage would die already (in general). You need to talk about security in the face of a very specific threat, then you can say solution A is better than solution B against threat T1, worse for T2 and about a wash for T3 and so on. Security is not a linear scale from 0-100 where you can say "more secure". There are many different criteria and any given solution will be better in some, worse in others. You must do a threat model for your specific use case to say if something is better or worse for those specific threats, and keep in mind other people will have very different threat models for the same solution.
- keskival 3y agoThe most problematic and the most probable security risk I have relating to logins is losing access. It for example took a week to restore access to my Apple account after I had forgotten to update my phone number there. Since this is the greatest security problem, I would hope all the vendors trying to improve security would focus on that.
- jjav 3y ago> The most problematic and the most probable security risk I have relating to logins is losing access. Exactly. Unrecoverable secrets tied to closed hardware solve for the scenario where your most important criteria is that no attacker be able to ever access your account, even at the expense of yourself possibly losing access to it forever. Does this solve a problem anyone actually has for consumer accounts? No. That threat model makes sense for highly classified information where it is preferable to lose the information forever than have an attacker get it. Other than that, it's not a reasonable threat model to optimize for.
- jesseendahl 3y agoThreat #1: Credential theft from server breaches Threat #2: User creates a weak credential Threat #3: User reuses a credential (uses same credential across multiple services) Threat #4: Phishing Attackers use huge password dumps compiled from multiple server breaches, and then try them against other services. Relying on a combination of the fruits of their labor from all four threats, attackers successfully compromise millions of accounts on the internet every year. If you want to see the data, check out the Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report that comes out every year.* These threats affect a majority of both consumers and enterprises. Passkeys address all four of these major real-world threats. Passwords address none of them. Threat #1 mitigation: with passkeys, only a public key is stored on the server. Attackers can steal all the public keys they want; it will not help them compromise any user's account. Threat #2 mitigation: passkeys (which are WebAuthn credentials) are guaranteed to be cryptographically strong. It is not possible for a user to generate an insecure passkey. This is because the browser the the Operating System APIs take care of generating the credential. Threat #3 mitigation: passkeys (which are WebAuthn credentials) are guaranteed to be unique. It is not possible for a user to reuse the same passkey across multiple apps/websites. This is because the browser the the Operating System APIs take care of ensuring that a new, unique credential (passkey) is generated for every new app/website the user sign's into. Threat #4 mitigation: passkeys (and all WebAuthn credentials) are bound to the server FQDN at the time they are created. The browser and Operating System APIs take care of ensuring the credential is only ever sent to the app/website server it was created for. Users cannot be tricked (via phishing) into using their passkey on a malicious app/website controlled by an attacker. * https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T249/reports/2023-data-breach-investigations-report-dbir.pdf https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T249/reports/2023...
- raxxorraxor 3y agoThey are not more secure from a cryptographic standpoint. There are different attack vectors and for some passkeys are superior but in others they are certainly not. Additionally, part of the security concern is also accessibility by yourself. edit: Just tried the Google passkeys on one of my Android phones. It is a complete usability hell and it seems I cannot opt out again without logging in from my browser and deleting my "device". If there is another way to just do it from my device without an additional browser, please tell.
- 90-00-09 3y agoHere is Google discussing how passkeys are easier and simpler to use than passwords: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/making-authentication-faster-than-ever.html https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/making-authenticatio... Here is 1Password discussing how passkeys are simpler to use than passwords: https://1password.com/product/passkeys https://1password.com/product/passkeys Here is Ars Technica declaring that passkeys are easier to use than passwords: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/05/passwordless-google-accounts-are-easier-and-more-secure-than-passwords-heres-why/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/05/passw... Etc etc. If this is the first time you are seeing businesses and media refer to passkeys as being simpler to use than passwords you haven't been paying attention.
- stavros 3y agoOh huh, I stand corrected. I thought passwords were easy, but, thinking about it, I've had lots of trouble trying to figure out which password I've used for each site. I can definitely believe passkeys are easier, in light of that.
- 90-00-09 3y agoPersonally I think that’s the best selling point of passkeys. Most non-tech people don’t use password managers and have to memorize passwords, reset frequently passwords they can’t remember, etc. Security is way harder to sell than convenience. Saying that, I am struggling to understand what is the expectation for ordinary user behavior in terms of hardware-tied credentials. Eg so many people upgrade their iPhone every 1-2 years. If passkeys are not transferred to the new phone, what is the industry suggesting people do?
- stavros 3y agoPasskeys are Google-synced WebAuthn keys, so there's no such thing as hardware-tied passkeys. If you want to use hardware WebAuthn keys, you should know what you're doing.
- JohnFen 3y ago> I haven't heard anyone claim that passkeys are simpler than passwords, as that would be trivially false. I have frequently heard and read claims that passkeys are easier to use than passwords. The claim always seemed incorrect to me for so many reasons. What passkeys do is make things more complicated, but move where the complication is.
- jiggawatts 3y ago“Hardware vendors helpfully suggest buying more hardware as a solution to a problem they introduced.”
- bshacklett 3y agoThe _full_ quote says: “That is a risk you’ll need to take if you’re using hardware authenticators. The fact that the key isn’t copiable means you only have one of it, so you should probably be enrolling multiple hardware authenticators on each account, or just switching to a software authenticator if you don’t care about the decreased security.” Software authentication with backup and synchronization is how passkeys are being shown to end users on two of the biggest platforms. For Apple, this is iCloud. For Android, it’s Google Play services. Add to that the fact that 2FA tokens are very often tied to a particular phone, and there’s very little difference between a passkey and the current system of passwords + 2FA, except that passkeys are currently far more resistant to phishing. Certainly it’s far from perfect, but for the majority of every day users out there, this is a huge potential leap in preventing phishing attacks, which _are_ a real (and growing) threat. Rather than just throwing the technology out, perhaps we, as well informed people, should be looking for solutions to the problem of bootstrapping and recovery, rather than just throwing out the first technology that has a real chance at fixing this problem.
- josephcsible 3y agoThat article is about as misleading as it's possible to be while still being technically right. The "attestation" feature of passkeys exists solely to let websites refuse to let you use passkeys tied to hardware you do control, or to software. The way this article only mentions it in passing and tries to downplay it reminds me of the joke of https://what-if.xkcd.com/49/ https://what-if.xkcd.com/49/ - a very long article listing a bunch of upsides of the Sun going out, and only one sentence about the downside: "We would all freeze and die."
- stavros 3y agoI guess we'll have to wait and see whether websites will force people to use specific authenticators. I don't think they will.
- julianwachholz 3y agoWe can already see this to some degree. On my Android device, Chrome will only let me create a synchronized passkey in a Google account UNLESS attachment is explicitly set to "cross-plattform" - even though not specifying the option is supposed to allow all types. You can try this out on webauthn.io and changing the attachment setting.
- endgame 3y agoWhy does this article claim that attestation is unlikely? We know Google loves the idea - see Web Environment Integrity (WEI). Also, what's stopping us from falling into the passkey version of the world we got with OpenID, where many services force you to log in with your BigTech account?
- lcnPylGDnU4H9OF 3y ago> Why does this article claim that attestation is unlikely? Facebook is still going to want me on their websites even if I’m running Firefox. Most websites people visit will not do any chrome WEI attestation. Likely exceptions are sites which handle any legal, financial, or health-related data. Not credit cards. I doubt most Google properties will use WEI. They still want to slurp up all my juicy Firefox usage data and I bet they think a lot of such users will drop their services like a rock if it meant otherwise dropping their browser.
- RedComet 3y agoI'm willing to bet otherwise (w.r.t. your first statement). They probably consider the sliver of such users expendable. They probably also (rightly) assume that a significant percentage of that sliver will continue using their service (e.g. via sanctioned Chrome on sanctioned hardware) if push comes to shove. Or at least they will at some point in the near future.
- lcnPylGDnU4H9OF 3y agoFacebook went out of their way to make an onion address available for the application (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_onion_address https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_onion_address). They consider nobody to be “expendable” when it comes to their desire to profile individuals. Forcing their users into a specific browser will do nothing for them when what they want is for people to make requests against their servers.