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Passkeys aren't inherently un-backup-able. I do agree though that the most common forms of it (e.g., Android/iOS/Windows secure enclave passkeys) need better wa
by the_snooze 3y ago
Passkeys aren't inherently un-backup-able. I do agree though that the most common forms of it (e.g., Android/iOS/Windows secure enclave passkeys) need better ways of recovery and remediation.
That said, what you describe is easily doable in other forms. For hardware tokens, you can have a spare Yubikey that's authorized on your accounts and keep that in a fire safe with its unlock PIN. For something like 1Password, you can print out a recovery kit [1] with the secret key and unlock password.
[1] https://support.1password.com/emergency-kit/ https://support.1password.com/emergency-kit/
- secabeen 3y ago> Passkeys aren't inherently un-backup-able Agreed, I'm just not willing to endorse their use until there are robust recovery and remediation processes. > For something like 1Password, you can print out a recovery kit [1] with the secret key and unlock password. Yeah, this is what I want Google/Appleto provide as it is robust to both user incapacity and provider refusal-of-service.
- goalieca 3y ago> Agreed, I'm just not willing to endorse their use until there are robust recovery and remediation processes They seem ripe for corporate use where ransomware and phishing are common threats and IT can manage account resets by walking over to their desk.