First ask yourself what you're defending and from whom; is the data you are producing even worth anything to anyone? If the answer is no, risk does not exist an

First ask yourself what you're defending and from whom; is the data you are producing even worth anything to anyone? If the answer is no, risk does not exist and no defense is needed. If you're producing something of perceived value, then you need to consider who might be interested in and what means or length they'll go through to get it. This practice is known as threat modeling and is the only meaningful way to get "security" without wasting resources. When you threat model often, you come to realize almost all attackers are financially motivated and bound by market constraints, which means they're looking for the highest reward for the least amount of work; very few are looking to do anything else with your data other than to use it for quick monetary gain. So? Let them eat cake. Leave a small amount of canary crypto-currency unprotected in your home directory. Set up a public ledger alert and if that currency is transfered, you know you've been compromised, by a keylogger or something else. It's very unlikely your keystrokes are worth any more than this.