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> If you can defraud millions and put that money to work saving lives and buying many more QALYs than the defrauded would have otherwise had, you have a moral o
by TedDoesntTalk 3y ago
> If you can defraud millions and put that money to work saving lives and buying many more QALYs than the defrauded would have otherwise had, you have a moral obligation to do so
So defrauding millions to accrue QALYs (for whom?) is morally acceptable?
> Though it is an almost-inescapable conclusion of being a utilitarian and significantly smarter than average.
A modicum of spirituality or religion will quickly quash this. So you have to add atheism to the requirement. Or at least non-spirituality or belief in materialism (I'm not a philosopher so may be using that term incorrectly).
- NateEag 3y ago> So you have to add atheism to the requirement. Yep, you're absolutely right - I forgot to specify that. Most utilitarians don't believe in transcendence, in my experience - not believing in it is usually why they're utilitarian (trying to salvage any argument for behavioral standards other than "I like it when other people do what I like").
- NateEag 3y ago> So defrauding millions to accrue QALYs (for whom?) is morally acceptable? Under most utilitarian theories of ethics, I think it's morally required, if you can show the fraud really does yield a significantly higher QALY count. The best out I can see to argue the fraud is not required is to show that another course of action will yield even more QALYs. Then you'd be obligated you do that instead. That, of course, comes to another fundamental flaws of utilitarianism, namely the belief that you can know what the results of your actions will be with any meaningful completeness or certitude. You can't. Without that it's all just excuses that justify whatever you want to do.
- TedDoesntTalk 3y ago> namely the belief that you can know what the results of your actions will be with any meaningful completeness or certitude. You can't. In parallel threads, a subscriber to this belief mentions probabilities. As long as the probability of an outcome is likely (based on variables and formulas who defines, I don’t know), the means justify the ends. So it’s even worse than what you describe: certitude is not even required, only a likely probability of certitude.