I'm out-of-steam with this argument but making a probability-derived argument based on a cherry-picked agreement rate of 90% instead of an empirical argument th

I'm out-of-steam with this argument but making a probability-derived argument based on a cherry-picked agreement rate of 90% instead of an empirical argument that considers the legal deliberation process and culture that produced this agreement rate isn't persuasive to me. Kalven-Zeisel specifically argues "Disagreement rates were no higher when the judge characterized the evidence as difficult than when the judge characterized it as easy, suggesting that the disagreements were not produced by the jury’s inability to understand the evidence." It seems impossible to mathematically tease out how much of the agreement comes from a shared understanding of the reasonable doubt standard vs other facts from the case -- either way, the idea that juries generally ignore reasonable doubt and err towards convicting people is not evidenced.