3 ms·
We distinguish things by probing properties because obviously if something is different enough to be distinguished, it will show itself in results. If you want
by famouswaffles 3y ago
We distinguish things by probing properties because obviously if something is different enough to be distinguished, it will show itself in results.
If you want to see if that piece of shiny looking yellow metal is really gold and not some counterfeit, then amongst other possible probes, you pour some hydrochloric acid on it and see how it reacts. If it's virtually unchanged then it's the real deal. If you perform all the possible gold probes on this metal and it passes all of them, if you still insist it isn't gold then you're just a crazy nut who's lost touch with reality. Your definition of "real gold" no longer holds any meaning.
Similarly we have probes for understanding different things (which are mind you biased to us). If something passes those tests, it understands. It's very simple.
a "caution: wet paint" sign would not be pass any understanding tests i know of so it does not understand.
- lxgr 3y agoWell, my definition of "understanding" includes, among other things, the capability to have a large and robust mental model of a specific concept, not just access to all human writing about it and the capability to rephrase and summarize that. Of course that's a spectrum, and sometimes the distinction is not all that important. Sometimes the summary is exactly what helps somebody out in a given moment. Even a human can give you good advice without understanding what they are talking about!
- famouswaffles 3y agoRight... And you think language models can't pass this sort of test ? Because they clearly can. And by the way, performance improvement after empathetic words is about the most robust mental model of emotion and empathy you can expect. That doesn't have anything to do with rephrasing or summarizing anything.
- lxgr 3y agoAre you arguing that LLMs experience emotions and are capable of empathy?
- famouswaffles 3y agoThey are capable of empathy yes because any way we know how to demonstrate empathy shows this. That's the standard we apply for people so that's the standard for LLMs as well. You keep saying, "being able to talk about doesn't mean" but that's pointless when that's not the only understanding tests people employ. The paper i linked shows empathy understanding and has nothing to do with talking about empathy
- lxgr 3y agoBy that definition, a sociopath has empathy because they are able to demonstrate behavior we associate with having empathy. The two are not the same. In many cases, internal states don't matter (e.g. I don't care if I get a well-written summary of an article by a domain expert or just a good copywriter, as long as the meaning is preserved accurately enough), but I'd argue that we can't meaningfully talk about empathy without considering internal states.
- famouswaffles 3y agoIf a sociopath could demonstrate all the behavior we associate with empathy including the right responses and actions then i'm extremely comfortable saying that sociopath understands empathy and any other conclusion is bogus and makes no sense. Internal processes don't matter. Only results. If this hypothetical sociopath was able to respond exactly like any empathetic person in any scenario then there is no actual distinction. In reality of course, the sociopath would slip up somewhere. But that just proves my point, real distinctions manifest in results. If it can't then it's not meaningful.
- lxgr 3y agoBut internal processes determine the results, and being able to (somewhat) predict them is arguably an important basis of human interactions and by extension society. You're essentially saying that theory of mind is either pointless or does not exist; scientific and just observational day-to-day evidence says otherwise. > real distinctions manifest in results Yes, but only in some situations. If the situation is a test, a significantly specialized and/or advanced intelligence will be able to cheat it and be able to conceal its internal distinctions.