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> Because the situation is similar to Dr. House: All disks lie. An OS can't trust the quality of the encryption in modern SSDs Why is this the job of the OS? I
by andersa 3y ago
> Because the situation is similar to Dr. House: All disks lie. An OS can't trust the quality of the encryption in modern SSDs
Why is this the job of the OS? If we trust the SSD ourselves, it should simply accept that and proceed using the API as intended. For example, there's no reason to suspect anything wrong with the latest Samsung SSDs, is there?
I've so far not understood the purpose of the TPM here. Why can't the key be derived off a password entered during boot? It's not necessary to involve a TPM at all.
It seems wild to even consider software encryption for the whole disk at the bandwidth and iops modern SSDs are expected to deliver.
- akvadrako 3y agoThe fact that no one else trusts it is good enough reason not to use it. Crypto always starts out untrusted as there is no way to prove it's secure. Only by standing the test of time with widespread use does it gain at least a relative advantage.
- mschuster91 3y ago> Why is this the job of the OS? If we trust the SSD ourselves, it should simply accept that and proceed using the API as intended. Because in the event of the crypto being only for show, people might blame the software for not warning them. > I've so far not understood the purpose of the TPM here. Why can't the key be derived off a password entered during boot? The general idea behind using the TPM as a crypto HSM was to provide at least a basic protection against simple disk cloning, i.e. evil-maid attacks. > It seems wild to even consider software encryption for the whole disk at the bandwidth and iops modern SSDs are expected to deliver. CPUs are pretty fast these days at anything crypto, as virtually all popular architectures have native AES instructions.