3 ms·

Yes, but take this to the extreme and you have nodes who do not wish to censor literally fighting to get to censored, paying users. The more the censored trans

Yes, but take this to the extreme and you have nodes who do not wish to censor literally fighting to get to censored, paying users. The more the censored transactions build up, the easier it is for any honest node to swoop in, outpace the attacker and earn the rewards. And then those users now have a node who is willing to include their data - the incentive structure leads to these connections. The point is that nodes who censor are giving up money to anyone else willing to include the data.

charcircuit 3y ago
>any honest node to swoop in Due to the Sybil attack honest nodes do not get to or it gets hard to even know about the transactions.
- mattwilsonn888 3y ago
  Addressed this in our other thread. Short answer is that as such activity continues the incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase - that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users in extreme attack scenarios like your example tends towards - but in basic cases there are proofs nodes can provide of previous performance which can't be Sybilled.
  - charcircuit 3y ago
    >incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase There are no disincentives to do it and people may want to do it regardless of any incentives that are in place. There being transactions that are illegal to relay (money laundering), so legally nodes are unable to relay no matter the incentives. >that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users This has poor usability. Normal users don't want to deal with manually finding nodes themselves. It is hard to figure out the reputation of nodes when their is no hard proof of who the actual owner is.
    - mattwilsonn888 3y ago
      Well I hoped you wouldn't continue in this thread because I laid out a secure interactive proof scheme that DOES offer statistical proof that a node behaves and performs well, and that it is not likely a Sybil. If you are that concerned with reputation, you can ask for token lock-ups - further diminishing the ability of many identities appearing distinct. But the greater point is that these are not Sybils, because they do not gain power over the system. If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable - some node can take that revenue by saving users' money. And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down, then I can make a similarly unusual case that physical transmission of data is incentivized - because it is. Of course recovering from extreme cases is not user-friendly - but the point is that you can recover and these states of total control are not sustainable; it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states and it wouldn't even offer the attacker an ability to hold it. So in practice it is unlikely to happen. The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
      - charcircuit 3y ago
        I'm not sure why you are continuing because it's impossible to defend against all Sybil attacks in an open network. >If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable One simple scenario where it is sustainable is when you are a part of a competitor's network where the existence of the other network results you in making less money. If the attacker wants to destroy the other network to gain market share they may be willing to have a budget they spend each month to attack it. >And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down It's not extreme if there is to defense to it. >it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states As I mentioned it is easy to run multiple instances of the software to become the majority of the network. >The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate. If you check 100 stores in your area and they all charge that rate you may think that's the market rate.
        3y ago

charcircuit 3y ago

>any honest node to swoop in Due to the Sybil attack honest nodes do not get to or it gets hard to even know about the transactions.

mattwilsonn888 3y ago
Addressed this in our other thread. Short answer is that as such activity continues the incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase - that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users in extreme attack scenarios like your example tends towards - but in basic cases there are proofs nodes can provide of previous performance which can't be Sybilled.
- charcircuit 3y ago
  >incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase There are no disincentives to do it and people may want to do it regardless of any incentives that are in place. There being transactions that are illegal to relay (money laundering), so legally nodes are unable to relay no matter the incentives. >that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users This has poor usability. Normal users don't want to deal with manually finding nodes themselves. It is hard to figure out the reputation of nodes when their is no hard proof of who the actual owner is.
  - mattwilsonn888 3y ago
    Well I hoped you wouldn't continue in this thread because I laid out a secure interactive proof scheme that DOES offer statistical proof that a node behaves and performs well, and that it is not likely a Sybil. If you are that concerned with reputation, you can ask for token lock-ups - further diminishing the ability of many identities appearing distinct. But the greater point is that these are not Sybils, because they do not gain power over the system. If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable - some node can take that revenue by saving users' money. And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down, then I can make a similarly unusual case that physical transmission of data is incentivized - because it is. Of course recovering from extreme cases is not user-friendly - but the point is that you can recover and these states of total control are not sustainable; it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states and it wouldn't even offer the attacker an ability to hold it. So in practice it is unlikely to happen. The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
    - charcircuit 3y ago
      I'm not sure why you are continuing because it's impossible to defend against all Sybil attacks in an open network. >If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable One simple scenario where it is sustainable is when you are a part of a competitor's network where the existence of the other network results you in making less money. If the attacker wants to destroy the other network to gain market share they may be willing to have a budget they spend each month to attack it. >And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down It's not extreme if there is to defense to it. >it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states As I mentioned it is easy to run multiple instances of the software to become the majority of the network. >The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate. If you check 100 stores in your area and they all charge that rate you may think that's the market rate.
      - 3y ago