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Right - and this gets to perhaps the stickiest point on this: is a node a Sybil if they are the most efficient route into the network? If a single node can make

Right - and this gets to perhaps the stickiest point on this: is a node a Sybil if they are the most efficient route into the network? If a single node can make all the blocks, they still only hurt themselves by adding hops (reducing block time, opening door for someone else to do it faster). Many people argue that because nodes can still create an arbitrary number of identities, that they are in fact Sybilling. I believe that is incorrect, and [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack) seems to agree: "[A Sybil Attack] is an attack wherein a reputation system is subverted by creating multiple identities" If you take 'reputation system' generally to mean a system where nodes are gaining power from their identity, or in the case of Saito: their behavior, then you can easily say Saito is Sybil Proof even if it allows arbitrary identities because the 'reputation' you use to influence the network cannot be gamed by making additional identities - even though making them is free.

charcircuit 3y ago
If all transactions flow through an attacker's nodes they can censor transactions they don't like. The reputation in this system is properly routing transactions. If someone notices a node censoring transactions they could blacklist that node, but the attacker can instantly spin up another.
- mattwilsonn888 3y ago
  Yes, but take this to the extreme and you have nodes who do not wish to censor literally fighting to get to censored, paying users. The more the censored transactions build up, the easier it is for any honest node to swoop in, outpace the attacker and earn the rewards. And then those users now have a node who is willing to include their data - the incentive structure leads to these connections. The point is that nodes who censor are giving up money to anyone else willing to include the data.
  - charcircuit 3y ago
    >any honest node to swoop in Due to the Sybil attack honest nodes do not get to or it gets hard to even know about the transactions.
    - mattwilsonn888 3y ago
      Addressed this in our other thread. Short answer is that as such activity continues the incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase - that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users in extreme attack scenarios like your example tends towards - but in basic cases there are proofs nodes can provide of previous performance which can't be Sybilled.
      - charcircuit 3y ago
        >incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase There are no disincentives to do it and people may want to do it regardless of any incentives that are in place. There being transactions that are illegal to relay (money laundering), so legally nodes are unable to relay no matter the incentives. >that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users This has poor usability. Normal users don't want to deal with manually finding nodes themselves. It is hard to figure out the reputation of nodes when their is no hard proof of who the actual owner is.
        mattwilsonn888 3y ago
        Well I hoped you wouldn't continue in this thread because I laid out a secure interactive proof scheme that DOES offer statistical proof that a node behaves and performs well, and that it is not likely a Sybil. If you are that concerned with reputation, you can ask for token lock-ups - further diminishing the ability of many identities appearing distinct. But the greater point is that these are not Sybils, because they do not gain power over the system. If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable - some node can take that revenue by saving users' money. And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down, then I can make a similarly unusual case that physical transmission of data is incentivized - because it is. Of course recovering from extreme cases is not user-friendly - but the point is that you can recover and these states of total control are not sustainable; it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states and it wouldn't even offer the attacker an ability to hold it. So in practice it is unlikely to happen. The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
- trevelyan 3y ago
  You're not describing a sybil attack. You're talking about censorship. If you want to address that, your best strategy is to incentivize people to run access points that do not censor. This requires payouts to routing nodes in proportion to the value of the transactions they process, which requires the ability to make routing payouts, which requires a sybil-proof routing mechanism.

charcircuit 3y ago

If all transactions flow through an attacker's nodes they can censor transactions they don't like. The reputation in this system is properly routing transactions. If someone notices a node censoring transactions they could blacklist that node, but the attacker can instantly spin up another.

mattwilsonn888 3y ago
Yes, but take this to the extreme and you have nodes who do not wish to censor literally fighting to get to censored, paying users. The more the censored transactions build up, the easier it is for any honest node to swoop in, outpace the attacker and earn the rewards. And then those users now have a node who is willing to include their data - the incentive structure leads to these connections. The point is that nodes who censor are giving up money to anyone else willing to include the data.
- charcircuit 3y ago
  >any honest node to swoop in Due to the Sybil attack honest nodes do not get to or it gets hard to even know about the transactions.
  - mattwilsonn888 3y ago
    Addressed this in our other thread. Short answer is that as such activity continues the incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase - that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users in extreme attack scenarios like your example tends towards - but in basic cases there are proofs nodes can provide of previous performance which can't be Sybilled.
    - charcircuit 3y ago
      >incentives to compete by behaving less duplicitously also increase There are no disincentives to do it and people may want to do it regardless of any incentives that are in place. There being transactions that are illegal to relay (money laundering), so legally nodes are unable to relay no matter the incentives. >that may mean unorthodox means of finding those users This has poor usability. Normal users don't want to deal with manually finding nodes themselves. It is hard to figure out the reputation of nodes when their is no hard proof of who the actual owner is.
      - mattwilsonn888 3y ago
        Well I hoped you wouldn't continue in this thread because I laid out a secure interactive proof scheme that DOES offer statistical proof that a node behaves and performs well, and that it is not likely a Sybil. If you are that concerned with reputation, you can ask for token lock-ups - further diminishing the ability of many identities appearing distinct. But the greater point is that these are not Sybils, because they do not gain power over the system. If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable - some node can take that revenue by saving users' money. And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down, then I can make a similarly unusual case that physical transmission of data is incentivized - because it is. Of course recovering from extreme cases is not user-friendly - but the point is that you can recover and these states of total control are not sustainable; it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states and it wouldn't even offer the attacker an ability to hold it. So in practice it is unlikely to happen. The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
trevelyan 3y ago
You're not describing a sybil attack. You're talking about censorship. If you want to address that, your best strategy is to incentivize people to run access points that do not censor. This requires payouts to routing nodes in proportion to the value of the transactions they process, which requires the ability to make routing payouts, which requires a sybil-proof routing mechanism.