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> So for example, you can read a book about riding a bike, maybe the book is very detailed and tells you everything there is to “know” about riding a bike, but

> So for example, you can read a book about riding a bike, maybe the book is very detailed and tells you everything there is to “know” about riding a bike, but unless you actually ride a bike, you can never “truly know” (experience) what riding a bike is This is often asserted, but I don't see any reason to believe it is true. Just like we can picture creatures that have never existed, and even draw elaborate images of them, with enough detail and introspection we can picture an experience. And even if we really couldn't, this would at best be a limitation of our wiring, there would be no reason to think it's a limitation of any conscious being. After all, a computer is perfectly able to simulate itself and to simulate any input it could receive, so it can clearly simulate any possible experience it could have given enough details. By the same token, the fact that we can't control our optic nerves (nor other senses) as precisely is an accident of our genetic makeup, not some fundamental property.

nico 3y ago
> we can picture an experience Picture it, but not experience it, it’s two different things Whether our own perception is an accident of our genetic makeup or a fundamental property doesn’t really matter, it’s still the only way we can ever experience the world
- tsimionescu 3y ago
  First, I would still challenge the idea that there is a fundemantal difference for us between picturing an experience and actually experiencing it. It will probably vary by experience, but at least things like "how would it feel to watch my loved ones die" can be experienced even if it doesn't happen, with enough introspection. And this very much does matter for certain arguments about consciousness. If qualia are separate from thoughts but only through an accident of our own human minds' construction, then all arguments that rely on qualia to argue consciousness must be un physical (Chalmers likes these a lot) are obviously invalid.

nico 3y ago

> we can picture an experience Picture it, but not experience it, it’s two different things Whether our own perception is an accident of our genetic makeup or a fundamental property doesn’t really matter, it’s still the only way we can ever experience the world

tsimionescu 3y ago
First, I would still challenge the idea that there is a fundemantal difference for us between picturing an experience and actually experiencing it. It will probably vary by experience, but at least things like "how would it feel to watch my loved ones die" can be experienced even if it doesn't happen, with enough introspection. And this very much does matter for certain arguments about consciousness. If qualia are separate from thoughts but only through an accident of our own human minds' construction, then all arguments that rely on qualia to argue consciousness must be un physical (Chalmers likes these a lot) are obviously invalid.