I see little in common between Hoffman’s interface theory of consciousness and merely stating that our minds filter out (lossily compress, etc.) information abo

I see little in common between Hoffman’s interface theory of consciousness and merely stating that our minds filter out (lossily compress, etc.) information about reality. Hoffman appears to effectively suggest Kantian idealism: by claiming that perceived time-space and phenomena in it are more like icons on a screen, a representation of some abstract network of conscious agents, he takes a stab at the hard problem and turns materialistic understanding of causality (“neurones fire, therefore I think”) on its head (“I think, and it manifests itself as neurones firing”). Rather than filtering information about some external reality, minds are reality, whereas perceived time-space is a product of them filtering/compressing information about themselves. Idealism of this sort is quite different from and has farther reaching implications than sticking to materialistic monism and likening our brains to meaty computers that have to filter out input about supposedly objectively existing space-time that they are a product of.