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Tanks and Troops Out In The Open In Ukraine Are Fired Upon Within 10 Minutes
- pipo234 3y agoIf FPV drones are that ubiquitous, you'd expect some sort of drone mitigation to emerge as well. I guess communication between drone and drone operator are the weakest link. So signal detection, radio scrambling, interference are probably areas of active R&D. My two cents are: the battle field will look yet different in a year or two.
- RetroTechie 3y agos/air superiority/drone superiority/ Sounds like a winning strategy here would be to flood the battlefield with cheaper / more / smarter / more effective drones than opponent. Over time clearing opponents' heavy armour & artillery (or even individual soldiers!). At which point even lightly armed troops could take the ground. That, or have more effective methods to remove opponent's drones from the theatre. But that's just armchair talk. ;-) No doubt Ukrainian or Russian commanders know more about what works & what doesn't.
- tibbydudeza 3y agoRemember a story from Phillip K Dick where there are self-replicating robots that patrols and target the opposing forces on the battlefield (ironically it is Russians vs the UN). Second Variety
- dredmorbius 3y agoPKD spells with one 'l'. Wikipedia article: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Variety https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Variety>
- dredmorbius 3y agoMovement on foot is limited to about 5 kph at a brisk walking pace, and under combat conditions is probably half or less of that. Ten minutes gives about 400--800 metres effective movement. Mechanised armour can move more quickly but is still likely limited to 25--50 kph, or 4--8 km maximum movement within 10 minutes. Compound this with extensive use of mines and movement is slowed even further. The situation strikes me as akin to WWI's trench warfare, in terms of the relative immobility of the combatants along the front line. And yes, there's some use of trench warfare in the region, but the vulnerability of rear operations for ranges of tens or even 100s of kilometres under modern conditions is critical. The odds of a continued scorched-earth campaign seem likely. Not mentioned is the degree to which foreign intelligence capabilities are delivering information on troop movements, though I strongly suspect both satellite and signals intel (much of that gained from just outside the combat theatre) is playing a key role. This means that the most effective countermeasures are all but certainly cutting off both C3 (command, control, communications) and resupply routes. Here it seems Ukraine has the general advantage, though cutting resupply especially to Crimea (rail and bridge routes) and the Donetsk regions are key. Russia's limited capability to provide weapons and munitions (and likely increased reliance on cheaper options such as mines, drones, and cluster munitions, or stand-off munitions such as long-range missiles. The latter are expensive and limited in effects, and Russia's used these extensively against civilian targets. Air superiority would be the other element that could be decisive, though it's expensive to maintain, and neither side here has yet been able to accomplish it. And of course, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran are likely paying close attention to how things are playing out and the relative costs and benefits of specific tactics, strategies, weapons, and intel systems.