4 ms·
The design of io_uring has nothing to do with the language the Linux kernel is implemented in. And safer languages really can't provide guarantees when the iss
by eqvinox 3y ago
The design of io_uring has nothing to do with the language the Linux kernel is implemented in. And safer languages really can't provide guarantees when the issue at hand is designing a shared memory cross-executable (kernel⋄userspace) API.
- chlorion 3y agoJust having first class slice types, where your pointer is paired with a length, which allows for doing bounds checking automatically is a huge upgrade over C, even if it doesn't solve every other problem. Security exploits from out of bounds access should not be happening today, bounds checking is a solved problem, and has been solved for decades.
- pjmlp 3y agoTime to make the point that not even C authors were able to change WG14 mind on the necessity of having fat pointers. https://www.bell-labs.com/usr/dmr/www/vararray.pdf https://www.bell-labs.com/usr/dmr/www/vararray.pdf
- winter_blue 3y agoThat's a pretty interesting paper. Thanks for sharing it. I wonder why Dennis Ritchie, with the weight his name carries, wasn't able to push it into mainstream implementation...
- pjmlp 3y agoBecause once a language is managed by ISO, that doesn't matter, the author gets one vote like everyone else. So this shows how the majority of WG14 members see security in C.