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It's simpler than that. Your thoughts -- the internal monologue deciding what actions to take -- are the result of physical processes in the brain. There is no

It's simpler than that. Your thoughts -- the internal monologue deciding what actions to take -- are the result of physical processes in the brain. There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes; they happen after the fact. We have the illusion of being in the driver seat but really we are just along for the ride. This is assuming you adhere only to what science can prove, and not religious beliefs like the soul. But yeah, the fact that we are the result of past decisions and outside inputs going all the way back to before we even had consciousness at all is also a nice proof by induction.

tcskeptic 3y ago
> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes; they happen after the fact. We have the illusion of being in the driver seat but really we are just along for the ride. How can you conclude this with any certainty?
- pixl97 3y ago
  PBS: Your Brain: Perception Deception https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU6LfXNeQM4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU6LfXNeQM4 PBS: Your Brain: Who's in Control? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ6VOOd73MA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ6VOOd73MA Rationalization is mostly post ad hoc.
  - xpe 3y ago
    There are other interpretations of some of these experiments (e.g. regarding the action potential). In his book on free will, Mark Balaguer elaborates a little bit. I don't remember the details well, but I'll try to sketch what I think he says. First, in my recollection, Balaguer points out the form of the argument as follows. Given that: (1) a particular study shows that one's (perception of when they decided to act) _lags_ the (experimental measurement of the person's action potential spiking), what can we validly conclude? Some people then claim that (2) claims of making a decision are merely post-hoc rationalizations. I get the sense that such a view is widely held among those who have heard of the experiments -- or at least the popular characterizations of them. Balaguer says e.g. "not so fast". He points out that we need to talk about the logically necessary steps to reason from (1) to (2). He has a section on this; he claims it isn't as watertight as some think. As I recall, part of the discussion has to do with motor planning. Another part is this: there could be a volitional choice that precedes and causes both the action potential spike _and_ the perception/recognition. That volitional choice is unavailable to conscious awareness until some time later, presumably. If true, a person could have made the choice, noticed it later, and still be consistent with the experimental findings. Apologies for the hazy recollection. I recall not being strongly convinced, partly because I wasn't impressed by the book overall, but I also haven't dug into these topics as much as I would like. Lucky for us, the issue of latency between action and perception is squarely in the wheelhouse of distributed systems engineers!
ad987 3y ago
> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes; they happen after the fact. How can the truth of this statement be proven? Non-physical thoughts cannot be observed, so they are out of reach of being tested for being correct.
- anon84873628 3y ago
  Eventually we may have sufficiently fine-grained ability to observe brain states, plus a strong enough understanding of neuropsychology, such that an outside observer can accurately predict, for a brain under observation: 1. The subjective internal mental state of the participant (e.g. "you were imagining a red balloon") 2. Actions that will be taken before they physically manifest (e.g. "you will throw rock instead of scissors") If an outside observer can do these things without access to subjects' thoughts, especially with subjects' deliberate efforts to fool the observers, then IMO it is pretty clear evidence the thoughts are meaningless. As for the current day, I say the preponderance of evidence is on anyone who claims otherwise. There's lots of evidence suggesting free will is an illusion, and no evidence of telekinesis or the like.
  - pixl97 3y ago
    Not even eventually, currently we have AI that can decode 'pictures' from our brain activity. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/this-ai-used-brain-scans-to-recreate-images-people-saw-180981768/ https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/this-ai-used-brain...
- Viliam1234 3y ago
  > Non-physical thoughts cannot be observed We wouldn't even be able to talk about them, because if we did, there would be a causal chain starting with a non-psysical thought and ending with moving a (physical) tongue. So somewhere along that chain, a non-physical thing would need to make a physical thing move. How exactly?
  - anon84873628 3y ago
    Neural activity physically exists. Qualia -- the experience of having thoughts -- do not.
krisoft 3y ago
> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes I don’t believe this to be correct. There is nothing non-physical about thoughts. Thoughts are mater interacting with mater. Thoughts are to the brain what waves are to the ocean. They are not less physical than the brain itself.
- TedDoesntTalk 3y ago
  You cannot point to a neurotransmitter or neuron or synapse and say "that's a thought." Thoughts are not material. You might say they are not real. Even if you can point to a group of neurons and processes in the brain and associate it with a particular thought, the thought itself is not real. The neurons and their behaviors are.
  - xpe 3y ago
    First, saying "x is not real" is a proven way to make a mess of a conversation. I suggest we all would be better off avoiding that phrasing, unless we're willing to really dig in and carefully clarify our definitions. > You cannot point to a neurotransmitter or neuron or synapse and say "that's a thought." Are you claiming it is (a) categorically impossible or (b) practically impossible? Why not? > Thoughts are not material. To be clear, when modern philosophers talk about 'materialism' that tends to include all of the abstractions of physics: matter, energy, waves, etc. > You might say [thoughts] are not real. I wouldn't say that. Here is what I would say; there are at least three key different aspects of thoughts: 1. the perceptual level; i.e. the _experience_ of having a thought 2. the conceptual level; i.e. a _concept_ that people use 3. the physical level; the physical things that are happening; may be a set of things; not necessarily contiguous > Even if you can point to a group of neurons and processes in the brain and associate it with a particular thought, the thought itself is not real. My top-most paragraph explains that "X is not real" statements tend to have a lot of downsides. Am I missing something? Does this add something to the discussion?
    - anon84873628 3y ago
      FWIW, when I said "thoughts" in the original comment, I really meant qualia / inner monologue / phenomenological experience, i.e. what you call #1 the perceptual level. Qualia are not part of materialism... which IMO makes them the most interesting thing in the universe, since they are categorically unlike everything else and yet so fundamental to our being.

tcskeptic 3y ago

> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes; they happen after the fact. We have the illusion of being in the driver seat but really we are just along for the ride. How can you conclude this with any certainty?

pixl97 3y ago
PBS: Your Brain: Perception Deception https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU6LfXNeQM4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU6LfXNeQM4 PBS: Your Brain: Who's in Control? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ6VOOd73MA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ6VOOd73MA Rationalization is mostly post ad hoc.
- xpe 3y ago
  There are other interpretations of some of these experiments (e.g. regarding the action potential). In his book on free will, Mark Balaguer elaborates a little bit. I don't remember the details well, but I'll try to sketch what I think he says. First, in my recollection, Balaguer points out the form of the argument as follows. Given that: (1) a particular study shows that one's (perception of when they decided to act) _lags_ the (experimental measurement of the person's action potential spiking), what can we validly conclude? Some people then claim that (2) claims of making a decision are merely post-hoc rationalizations. I get the sense that such a view is widely held among those who have heard of the experiments -- or at least the popular characterizations of them. Balaguer says e.g. "not so fast". He points out that we need to talk about the logically necessary steps to reason from (1) to (2). He has a section on this; he claims it isn't as watertight as some think. As I recall, part of the discussion has to do with motor planning. Another part is this: there could be a volitional choice that precedes and causes both the action potential spike _and_ the perception/recognition. That volitional choice is unavailable to conscious awareness until some time later, presumably. If true, a person could have made the choice, noticed it later, and still be consistent with the experimental findings. Apologies for the hazy recollection. I recall not being strongly convinced, partly because I wasn't impressed by the book overall, but I also haven't dug into these topics as much as I would like. Lucky for us, the issue of latency between action and perception is squarely in the wheelhouse of distributed systems engineers!

ad987 3y ago

> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes; they happen after the fact. How can the truth of this statement be proven? Non-physical thoughts cannot be observed, so they are out of reach of being tested for being correct.

anon84873628 3y ago
Eventually we may have sufficiently fine-grained ability to observe brain states, plus a strong enough understanding of neuropsychology, such that an outside observer can accurately predict, for a brain under observation: 1. The subjective internal mental state of the participant (e.g. "you were imagining a red balloon") 2. Actions that will be taken before they physically manifest (e.g. "you will throw rock instead of scissors") If an outside observer can do these things without access to subjects' thoughts, especially with subjects' deliberate efforts to fool the observers, then IMO it is pretty clear evidence the thoughts are meaningless. As for the current day, I say the preponderance of evidence is on anyone who claims otherwise. There's lots of evidence suggesting free will is an illusion, and no evidence of telekinesis or the like.
- pixl97 3y ago
  Not even eventually, currently we have AI that can decode 'pictures' from our brain activity. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/this-ai-used-brain-scans-to-recreate-images-people-saw-180981768/ https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/this-ai-used-brain...
Viliam1234 3y ago
> Non-physical thoughts cannot be observed We wouldn't even be able to talk about them, because if we did, there would be a causal chain starting with a non-psysical thought and ending with moving a (physical) tongue. So somewhere along that chain, a non-physical thing would need to make a physical thing move. How exactly?
- anon84873628 3y ago
  Neural activity physically exists. Qualia -- the experience of having thoughts -- do not.

krisoft 3y ago

> There is no way those non-physical thoughts are changing the physical processes I don’t believe this to be correct. There is nothing non-physical about thoughts. Thoughts are mater interacting with mater. Thoughts are to the brain what waves are to the ocean. They are not less physical than the brain itself.

TedDoesntTalk 3y ago
You cannot point to a neurotransmitter or neuron or synapse and say "that's a thought." Thoughts are not material. You might say they are not real. Even if you can point to a group of neurons and processes in the brain and associate it with a particular thought, the thought itself is not real. The neurons and their behaviors are.
- xpe 3y ago
  First, saying "x is not real" is a proven way to make a mess of a conversation. I suggest we all would be better off avoiding that phrasing, unless we're willing to really dig in and carefully clarify our definitions. > You cannot point to a neurotransmitter or neuron or synapse and say "that's a thought." Are you claiming it is (a) categorically impossible or (b) practically impossible? Why not? > Thoughts are not material. To be clear, when modern philosophers talk about 'materialism' that tends to include all of the abstractions of physics: matter, energy, waves, etc. > You might say [thoughts] are not real. I wouldn't say that. Here is what I would say; there are at least three key different aspects of thoughts: 1. the perceptual level; i.e. the _experience_ of having a thought 2. the conceptual level; i.e. a _concept_ that people use 3. the physical level; the physical things that are happening; may be a set of things; not necessarily contiguous > Even if you can point to a group of neurons and processes in the brain and associate it with a particular thought, the thought itself is not real. My top-most paragraph explains that "X is not real" statements tend to have a lot of downsides. Am I missing something? Does this add something to the discussion?
  - anon84873628 3y ago
    FWIW, when I said "thoughts" in the original comment, I really meant qualia / inner monologue / phenomenological experience, i.e. what you call #1 the perceptual level. Qualia are not part of materialism... which IMO makes them the most interesting thing in the universe, since they are categorically unlike everything else and yet so fundamental to our being.