I wonder whether we need a different presumption of executive responsibility in these cases. Plausible deniability seems way too weak a defense to permit, sinc

I wonder whether we need a different presumption of executive responsibility in these cases. Plausible deniability seems way too weak a defense to permit, since it allows executives to set up a culture and incentives to encourage wrongdoing and yet walk away from the consequences if they weren't directly informed of the specific actions taken. In a away it's analogous to the 'it wasn't me, it was the algorithm' defense - 'it wasn't me, it was my employees'. This doesn't mean that executives should necessarily be held personally liable for the damages caused by their companies, but if they persistently can't keep their organizations operating within the law, perhaps a period of open public administration at the company's expense might be a good remedy. [note: there might be some serious drawbacks to this proposal - it's just a conjecture since corporate wrongdoing is a serious problem that doesn't seem to have good solutions yet]