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As Mickens said: > In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your advers
by Tao3300 3y ago
As Mickens said:
> In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them.
- kurthr 3y agoI find this sort of fetishism interesting. Certainly, the NSA/FSB were and to some extent still are fetishized in film and media, but it seems Mossad consistently are. Within China 国家安全部 are and I assume that it's useful to them since popular fear of national magic is a potent controlling force. Once you're confronting a nation state you face an opponent who neither considers $M zero-days nor criminal prosecution a challenge. Just hope they don't torture you before using the bone saws.
- 8jef 3y agoReading out loud (I had to) such heavy, thick next level propaganda diarrhea makes me wonder about so many things. Like, who cares?
- Tao3300 3y agoThe Mickens article was well-known satire about security professionals and overstated threat modeling. Or did you mean TFA? Have to admit I didn't get far.