4 ms·

Worth noting a practical counter argument against e2ee: the vast majority of people are much more susceptible to losing all of their data because they forget or

by sxg 3y ago

Worth noting a practical counter argument against e2ee: the vast majority of people are much more susceptible to losing all of their data because they forget or lose their encryption key compared to having their data compromised by admin staff or governments. While I'd love to turn on e2ee, I don't trust myself enough to not lose the encryption key.

eviks 3y ago
Then give the encryption key to a few people, there is at least 1 person you trust not to lose it?
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
- ClumsyPilot 3y ago
  Indeed, just print multiple copies on paper. The digital attack vector and physical one almost never intersect. I think it’s less about protecting yourself against targeted attack, and more as a defence gains snooping and physhing and some gathering dirt.
idle_zealot 3y ago
> I don't trust myself enough to not lose the encryption key If you're using a password manager, you can put the key in there. In effect this backs up the key (encrypted) to every device you install the password manager on, plus a cloud backup depending on what manager you're using.
ls612 3y ago
I enabled Advanced Data Protection and put the recovery key in an encrypted 7zip file, then uploaded that file to Onedrive and Backblaze also picked it up. Every now and then I have a reminder on my phone to test-decrypt the recovery key locally to make sure I don't forget the encryption key.
- jackson1442 3y ago
  Do you think “the vast majority of people” know (or even want to know) how to create an encrypted 7zip file, let alone do a dry run of decryption at some regular cadence? You can barely convince the average user to set up their own backups, and of the users that do, how many do you think test their backup recovery procedures?
- fbdab103 3y ago
  I do not know your threat model, but maybe keep a physical backup of the key?
  - ls612 3y ago
    I’m not sure what that would solve? I’m fairly confident in my backup system it follows 3-2-1 so a paper printout seems unnecessary and would possibly weaken security?
    - fbdab103 3y ago
      It would eliminate that fear of forgetting the key. Again, it comes down to your threat model. Key stored in more locations is potentially compromising security, but is a trade-off everyone has to consider. It still prevents disinterested drag-net style data leakage. If you are targeted by the big bad, I doubt my operational security would be sufficient to protect me from a motivated attacker. I suspect that there are vulnerabilities in my TPM/random number generators/encryption software that are exploitable. An evil maid or even just a camera positioned over my keyboard would probably be sufficient to grab my data. Plus those $5 wrenches.
      - ls612 3y ago
        Yeah my threat model is that nobody cares about surveilling me in particular right now, and I’m not in a jurisdiction where rubber hose cryptography is very realistic. ADP will protect me easily from most attacks short of someone blowing a zero day on me.
DavideNL 3y ago
There is a recovery method for this too: a recovery contact: ” If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it — you’ll need to use your device passcode or password, a recovery contact, or a personal recovery key. Because the majority of your iCloud data will be protected by end-to-end encryption, you’ll be guided to set up at least one recovery contact or recovery key before you turn on Advanced Data Protection. ” https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

by sxg 3y ago

eviks 3y ago

Then give the encryption key to a few people, there is at least 1 person you trust not to lose it?

deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
ClumsyPilot 3y ago
Indeed, just print multiple copies on paper. The digital attack vector and physical one almost never intersect. I think it’s less about protecting yourself against targeted attack, and more as a defence gains snooping and physhing and some gathering dirt.

idle_zealot 3y ago

> I don't trust myself enough to not lose the encryption key If you're using a password manager, you can put the key in there. In effect this backs up the key (encrypted) to every device you install the password manager on, plus a cloud backup depending on what manager you're using.

ls612 3y ago

I enabled Advanced Data Protection and put the recovery key in an encrypted 7zip file, then uploaded that file to Onedrive and Backblaze also picked it up. Every now and then I have a reminder on my phone to test-decrypt the recovery key locally to make sure I don't forget the encryption key.

jackson1442 3y ago
Do you think “the vast majority of people” know (or even want to know) how to create an encrypted 7zip file, let alone do a dry run of decryption at some regular cadence? You can barely convince the average user to set up their own backups, and of the users that do, how many do you think test their backup recovery procedures?
fbdab103 3y ago
I do not know your threat model, but maybe keep a physical backup of the key?
- ls612 3y ago
  I’m not sure what that would solve? I’m fairly confident in my backup system it follows 3-2-1 so a paper printout seems unnecessary and would possibly weaken security?
  - fbdab103 3y ago
    It would eliminate that fear of forgetting the key. Again, it comes down to your threat model. Key stored in more locations is potentially compromising security, but is a trade-off everyone has to consider. It still prevents disinterested drag-net style data leakage. If you are targeted by the big bad, I doubt my operational security would be sufficient to protect me from a motivated attacker. I suspect that there are vulnerabilities in my TPM/random number generators/encryption software that are exploitable. An evil maid or even just a camera positioned over my keyboard would probably be sufficient to grab my data. Plus those $5 wrenches.
    - ls612 3y ago
      Yeah my threat model is that nobody cares about surveilling me in particular right now, and I’m not in a jurisdiction where rubber hose cryptography is very realistic. ADP will protect me easily from most attacks short of someone blowing a zero day on me.

DavideNL 3y ago

There is a recovery method for this too: a recovery contact: ” If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it — you’ll need to use your device passcode or password, a recovery contact, or a personal recovery key. Because the majority of your iCloud data will be protected by end-to-end encryption, you’ll be guided to set up at least one recovery contact or recovery key before you turn on Advanced Data Protection. ” https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303