I wouldn't put them in the same bucket though exactly. Yes in the broad sense Challenger and Columbia were "organizational management failures", but the basic o

I wouldn't put them in the same bucket though exactly. Yes in the broad sense Challenger and Columbia were "organizational management failures", but the basic organizational failures was the whole federal process leading to the Space Shuttle in the first place. It was simply a fundamentally bad design made far worse due to political forces, and not because it was doing something cutting edge and nobody knew better. It was made to work through heroics, but the human condition being what it is, building a system that depends on continuous perfection is a bad idea. Why were the SRBs in sections that needed all O-rings in the first place? Because they were made in freaking Utah and then had to be transported thousands of miles. Other rockets will never have Challenger's failure mode at all regardless of organizational problems. Or even more fundamentally, the Space Shuttle was unique(ly bad) in having the important payload section on the side of the rocket, instead on top like everything else from Mercury to Apollo to Falcon 9. That harmed both escape modes and debris. When the payload/passenger bits are on top, escape, no matter what stage of launch/flight you're at, effectively boils down to: go faster. Which is aided by an emergency needing escape tending to result in all the boom-y bits below you propelling you in the direction you want (forward, faster) while simultaneously slowing down the rest. And any ice or foam or whatever else that falls off will be falling down, away from the top. Any boom has lots more stuff between compartment at the top and it. So F9 or even Starship are just never going to face the Challenger or Columbia failure modes in the first place no matter. The entire class of issues has been simply negated at the engineering level. If they do face problems, they will have full envelope escape options that the Space Shuttle simply never could. When it comes to reliability, the default best part is no part. Organization should be on top of sound engineering foundations. For the Nedelin situation, while yes politics screwed that up too, they were at least doing something fundamentally hard and new. It's easy to say that there were better engineering solutions there as well, and indeed moves were made by all sides towards solid fueled ICBMs. But it's not like they consciously chose a junk given better options, liquid was the best for speed at that point and hypergolics in turn for military usage. The Space Shuttle was always a series of tragedies waiting to happen and so utterly unnecessary.