4 ms·
Here's the "airtight hatch" article folks are referring to: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31283 https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldn
by skybrian 3y ago
Here's the "airtight hatch" article folks are referring to:
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31283 https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31...
Phishing does involve an insider being confused and letting someone in, though. The question is what a vscode user could be tricked into doing. That part of the explanation could be fleshed out more?
I'm also reminded of how browsers do defense in depth. The "airtight hatch" argument implies that second-level security is worthless because the first level is secure. Having a useful binary already there on the system might be useful for chaining with another exploit?
But that assumes a developer environment can be made into a low-privilege container, sort of like a browser's render process. I don't think many people work that way?
Perhaps someday we will work in containers and code editors will be locked down like browsers. The most straightforward path to that would probably be for the code editor to run in the browser.
That's something VS Code can do, so a policy that says you must use a browser-based version of VS Code might actually work for some organizations?
- ahhfgshando6698 3y ago[dead]
- t0mas88 3y agoThe "airtight hatch" story is not fully applicable here. Executing VScode instead of a random exploit payload could be considered an increase in privilege, because you're going from an unsigned and unknown binary to one that is signed by Microsoft. And VScode is probably allowed through any outgoing firewall rules because the main user of the machine is using it, while a random exploit payload would not be.