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I'm interested at your suggestion that Digicert et al are doing some sort of "keeping the streets safe" checking. I have zero experience of using them but I tho

I'm interested at your suggestion that Digicert et al are doing some sort of "keeping the streets safe" checking. I have zero experience of using them but I thought all they were doing was confirming the applicant represented some entity that matched the domain name. If I manage to get a company registered called G00gle, buy a corresponding domain and then send them my $500 are you suggesting they're going to refuse to issue a certificate? My impression was the CA's made the likes of Standard and Poor look rigorous, but I'm happy to learn more from actual experience of them rejecting such an application.

vngzs 3y ago
I don't see GP claiming CAs should be checking reputability for domain issuance certificates. But the thread originator mentioned subverting CAs! Something to remember about even the most advanced attackers is that they value the continued effectiveness of their tactics, tools and procedures. Even nation-states in possession of CA subversion abilities won't burn their malicious CA on someone if they can conduct the attack with a legitimately-issued certificate, and they won't bother with a legitimately-issued cert if they can conduct the attack without even involving a CA.
- glaucon 3y ago
  I was referring to this comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
pipo234 3y ago
You are absolutely right, that (for plain, domain attestation) paid CAs are exactly as trustworthy as LetsEncrypt, and often much less (remember the Diginotar debacle, for example). "Keeping the streets safe" is not their responsibility, except in a very limited sense. The $500 extended validation was mostly paper work and snake oil. My point wasn't to discredit LetsEncrypt, but to point out that Google's claim to mitigate the MITM attack vector with https-first wasn't a very strong argument. I mean, yes, sure: if you can't intercept or downgrade to HTTP the MITM doesn't work. But all the HTTP seems to do was redirect to a malicious payload. But you can also do a redirect in HTTPS. So if you can spoof someone to go to https://g00gle.com/ https://g00gle.com/ it should be just as easy to launch the attack chain from there.
malaya_zemlya 3y ago
As far as I can tell, the verification that DigiCert performs is 1. the company exists in various Business listings 2. the phone number listed in whois has a human behind it and the human confirms the phone number belogs to the company. Source: Have to be that human from time to time
- nerdbert 3y ago
  Only if you pay $$$$ for OV/EV. If you get the normal DV cert they don't provide any more verification than Letsencrypt. And since browsers have moved away from indicating OV/EV certs to end users, not many organizations are paying for those anymore.
  - Tijdreiziger 3y ago
    Can confirm as someone who has to renew a non-Let’s Encrypt cert every year (for reasons). The CA sends an automated email to the email address listed in WHOIS, you click a link in the email, and they issue the certificate. No human interaction necessary.
    - ComputerGuru 3y ago
      EV certs have a slightly more rigorous approach. They’ll call the registered agent for the business as registered/licensed with the state, not the phone number from whois or an email to webmaster@
      - Tijdreiziger 3y ago
        Yes, I’m just talking about regular DV certificates (the same type you’d get if you just used Let’s Encrypt).

vngzs 3y ago

I don't see GP claiming CAs should be checking reputability for domain issuance certificates. But the thread originator mentioned subverting CAs! Something to remember about even the most advanced attackers is that they value the continued effectiveness of their tactics, tools and procedures. Even nation-states in possession of CA subversion abilities won't burn their malicious CA on someone if they can conduct the attack with a legitimately-issued certificate, and they won't bother with a legitimately-issued cert if they can conduct the attack without even involving a CA.

glaucon 3y ago
I was referring to this comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]

pipo234 3y ago

You are absolutely right, that (for plain, domain attestation) paid CAs are exactly as trustworthy as LetsEncrypt, and often much less (remember the Diginotar debacle, for example). "Keeping the streets safe" is not their responsibility, except in a very limited sense. The $500 extended validation was mostly paper work and snake oil. My point wasn't to discredit LetsEncrypt, but to point out that Google's claim to mitigate the MITM attack vector with https-first wasn't a very strong argument. I mean, yes, sure: if you can't intercept or downgrade to HTTP the MITM doesn't work. But all the HTTP seems to do was redirect to a malicious payload. But you can also do a redirect in HTTPS. So if you can spoof someone to go to https://g00gle.com/ https://g00gle.com/ it should be just as easy to launch the attack chain from there.

malaya_zemlya 3y ago

As far as I can tell, the verification that DigiCert performs is 1. the company exists in various Business listings 2. the phone number listed in whois has a human behind it and the human confirms the phone number belogs to the company. Source: Have to be that human from time to time

nerdbert 3y ago
Only if you pay $$$$ for OV/EV. If you get the normal DV cert they don't provide any more verification than Letsencrypt. And since browsers have moved away from indicating OV/EV certs to end users, not many organizations are paying for those anymore.
- Tijdreiziger 3y ago
  Can confirm as someone who has to renew a non-Let’s Encrypt cert every year (for reasons). The CA sends an automated email to the email address listed in WHOIS, you click a link in the email, and they issue the certificate. No human interaction necessary.
  - ComputerGuru 3y ago
    EV certs have a slightly more rigorous approach. They’ll call the registered agent for the business as registered/licensed with the state, not the phone number from whois or an email to webmaster@
    - Tijdreiziger 3y ago
      Yes, I’m just talking about regular DV certificates (the same type you’d get if you just used Let’s Encrypt).