5 ms·

Or get someone to click on a spoofed domain, certified by our beloved LetsEncrypt! Apparently al that is needed is an HTTP 302/307 redirect response (or html re

Or get someone to click on a spoofed domain, certified by our beloved LetsEncrypt! Apparently al that is needed is an HTTP 302/307 redirect response (or html redirect payload, maybe even DNS?) pointing the client toward c.betly[.]me

jefftk 3y ago
> certified by our beloved LetsEncrypt Are you saying that CAs should be refusing to issue certs for potentially spoofed domains?
- pipo234 3y ago
  ...or Digicert, Globalsign, the Hongkong post office, whichever CA is in your truststore. I just mentioned LetsEncrypt because it's free and exceptionally easy to use. I'm not implying in any way they aren't providing a great service, it's just that that service also gets misused because it's cheap and easy.
  - xcdzvyn 3y ago
    It really sounds that way, FYI. I interpreted it as a dig at LetsEncrypt in particular.
    - pipo234 3y ago
      Please accept my apologies :-)
      - xcdzvyn 3y ago
        Consider your apologies accepted
insanitybit 3y ago
Huge difference between being tricked into clicking a link vs just browsing the web and getting owned.
- aidos 3y ago
  Is there?
  - insanitybit 3y ago
    Yes. The move from 0 to 1 click exploits (thanks to putting Flash/Java behind a click) in the early 2000s marked a massive negative shift in attacker capabilities and ultimately destroyed multiple (black market) exploit dev businesses.
    - fullspectrumdev 3y ago
      “Click to play” bypasses became incredibly valuable as an enabler for Flash/Java exploits, for a while. They were also few and far between, and if memory serves me, unreliable as fuck.
  - pipo234 3y ago
    It definitely matters. Just think about what sort of how much Dr. Evil would pay for an exploit that relies on user action versus one that doesn't. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator
  - autoexec 3y ago
    I can probably avoid bring tricked into clicking a link, I've avoided many many attempts to trick me in the past. I probably can't avoid browsing the internet though.
- Macha 3y ago
  The vector is an image file. Put your image in a display ad, now you don't need the user to click anything
glaucon 3y ago
I'm interested at your suggestion that Digicert et al are doing some sort of "keeping the streets safe" checking. I have zero experience of using them but I thought all they were doing was confirming the applicant represented some entity that matched the domain name. If I manage to get a company registered called G00gle, buy a corresponding domain and then send them my $500 are you suggesting they're going to refuse to issue a certificate? My impression was the CA's made the likes of Standard and Poor look rigorous, but I'm happy to learn more from actual experience of them rejecting such an application.
- vngzs 3y ago
  I don't see GP claiming CAs should be checking reputability for domain issuance certificates. But the thread originator mentioned subverting CAs! Something to remember about even the most advanced attackers is that they value the continued effectiveness of their tactics, tools and procedures. Even nation-states in possession of CA subversion abilities won't burn their malicious CA on someone if they can conduct the attack with a legitimately-issued certificate, and they won't bother with a legitimately-issued cert if they can conduct the attack without even involving a CA.
  - glaucon 3y ago
    I was referring to this comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
- pipo234 3y ago
  You are absolutely right, that (for plain, domain attestation) paid CAs are exactly as trustworthy as LetsEncrypt, and often much less (remember the Diginotar debacle, for example). "Keeping the streets safe" is not their responsibility, except in a very limited sense. The $500 extended validation was mostly paper work and snake oil. My point wasn't to discredit LetsEncrypt, but to point out that Google's claim to mitigate the MITM attack vector with https-first wasn't a very strong argument. I mean, yes, sure: if you can't intercept or downgrade to HTTP the MITM doesn't work. But all the HTTP seems to do was redirect to a malicious payload. But you can also do a redirect in HTTPS. So if you can spoof someone to go to https://g00gle.com/ https://g00gle.com/ it should be just as easy to launch the attack chain from there.
malaya_zemlya 3y ago
Coincidentally, the ACME DNS verification process that LetsEncrypt uses is vulnerable to the QUANTUM attack. If NSA injects a fake DNS response in the right spot, and have the their response arrive before the official response, they can get the domain verified. OTOH, Certificate Transparency Logs will give the game away, so there's that.
- jrockway 3y ago
  Doesn't Let's Encrypt check the DNS record from multiple widely-distributed endpoints to avoid this attack?

jefftk 3y ago

> certified by our beloved LetsEncrypt Are you saying that CAs should be refusing to issue certs for potentially spoofed domains?

pipo234 3y ago
...or Digicert, Globalsign, the Hongkong post office, whichever CA is in your truststore. I just mentioned LetsEncrypt because it's free and exceptionally easy to use. I'm not implying in any way they aren't providing a great service, it's just that that service also gets misused because it's cheap and easy.
- xcdzvyn 3y ago
  It really sounds that way, FYI. I interpreted it as a dig at LetsEncrypt in particular.
  - pipo234 3y ago
    Please accept my apologies :-)
    - xcdzvyn 3y ago
      Consider your apologies accepted

insanitybit 3y ago

Huge difference between being tricked into clicking a link vs just browsing the web and getting owned.

aidos 3y ago
Is there?
- insanitybit 3y ago
  Yes. The move from 0 to 1 click exploits (thanks to putting Flash/Java behind a click) in the early 2000s marked a massive negative shift in attacker capabilities and ultimately destroyed multiple (black market) exploit dev businesses.
  - fullspectrumdev 3y ago
    “Click to play” bypasses became incredibly valuable as an enabler for Flash/Java exploits, for a while. They were also few and far between, and if memory serves me, unreliable as fuck.
- pipo234 3y ago
  It definitely matters. Just think about what sort of how much Dr. Evil would pay for an exploit that relies on user action versus one that doesn't. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator
- autoexec 3y ago
  I can probably avoid bring tricked into clicking a link, I've avoided many many attempts to trick me in the past. I probably can't avoid browsing the internet though.
Macha 3y ago
The vector is an image file. Put your image in a display ad, now you don't need the user to click anything

glaucon 3y ago

I'm interested at your suggestion that Digicert et al are doing some sort of "keeping the streets safe" checking. I have zero experience of using them but I thought all they were doing was confirming the applicant represented some entity that matched the domain name. If I manage to get a company registered called G00gle, buy a corresponding domain and then send them my $500 are you suggesting they're going to refuse to issue a certificate? My impression was the CA's made the likes of Standard and Poor look rigorous, but I'm happy to learn more from actual experience of them rejecting such an application.

vngzs 3y ago
I don't see GP claiming CAs should be checking reputability for domain issuance certificates. But the thread originator mentioned subverting CAs! Something to remember about even the most advanced attackers is that they value the continued effectiveness of their tactics, tools and procedures. Even nation-states in possession of CA subversion abilities won't burn their malicious CA on someone if they can conduct the attack with a legitimately-issued certificate, and they won't bother with a legitimately-issued cert if they can conduct the attack without even involving a CA.
- glaucon 3y ago
  I was referring to this comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37615985
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
pipo234 3y ago
You are absolutely right, that (for plain, domain attestation) paid CAs are exactly as trustworthy as LetsEncrypt, and often much less (remember the Diginotar debacle, for example). "Keeping the streets safe" is not their responsibility, except in a very limited sense. The $500 extended validation was mostly paper work and snake oil. My point wasn't to discredit LetsEncrypt, but to point out that Google's claim to mitigate the MITM attack vector with https-first wasn't a very strong argument. I mean, yes, sure: if you can't intercept or downgrade to HTTP the MITM doesn't work. But all the HTTP seems to do was redirect to a malicious payload. But you can also do a redirect in HTTPS. So if you can spoof someone to go to https://g00gle.com/ https://g00gle.com/ it should be just as easy to launch the attack chain from there.

malaya_zemlya 3y ago

Coincidentally, the ACME DNS verification process that LetsEncrypt uses is vulnerable to the QUANTUM attack. If NSA injects a fake DNS response in the right spot, and have the their response arrive before the official response, they can get the domain verified. OTOH, Certificate Transparency Logs will give the game away, so there's that.

jrockway 3y ago
Doesn't Let's Encrypt check the DNS record from multiple widely-distributed endpoints to avoid this attack?