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The big challenge here is false separation we create with language. I can say, “consciousness is neural activity” but others will say, what activity, how does

The big challenge here is false separation we create with language. I can say, “consciousness is neural activity” but others will say, what activity, how does activity become conscious, how do you prove those things are the same, all questions which imply a different causal model structure, one in which there are two entities (neural activity and conscious experience) instead of one. (!) the problem is one of cardinality of our model, not lack of evidence; you can’t fit a dualistic two-peg (the mind and the brain) into a monistic one-hole (mind=brain). This language pattern creates a concept of separation between neurons firing and the mind experiencing. If, in reality, neurons firing ARE mind experiences, then to prove they are identical means to disprove a false separation between two identical concepts. That’s a tricky problem (of language) to solve with tools (of neuroscience).

antonvs 3y ago
It's not just language, though. The real problem is determining the truth of statements such as this one of yours: > "If, in reality, neurons firing ARE mind experiences" Perhaps they are. But does that mean transistors firing are not mind experiences, and computers can never be conscious? If the statement is true, what's special about neurons that they generate mind experiences? That's the real question - "the hard problem" - that many people are attempting to answer.
- wholinator2 3y ago
  In my opinion, the recent developments in AI have primarily show us just how much we _are_ just the firing. People argued about whether the computer could be thinking and whether it could be feeling as if those were 2 highly separated, stratified things. Like you said, it's the hard problem. But i think the connection will come not from thinking that computers are more special, but from thinking of ourselves as less special.

antonvs 3y ago

It's not just language, though. The real problem is determining the truth of statements such as this one of yours: > "If, in reality, neurons firing ARE mind experiences" Perhaps they are. But does that mean transistors firing are not mind experiences, and computers can never be conscious? If the statement is true, what's special about neurons that they generate mind experiences? That's the real question - "the hard problem" - that many people are attempting to answer.

wholinator2 3y ago
In my opinion, the recent developments in AI have primarily show us just how much we _are_ just the firing. People argued about whether the computer could be thinking and whether it could be feeling as if those were 2 highly separated, stratified things. Like you said, it's the hard problem. But i think the connection will come not from thinking that computers are more special, but from thinking of ourselves as less special.