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Celsius lost millions in dumb mistakes like that too. Someone at Celsius manually approved a bogus transaction on a hacked website... https://www.coindesk.com

Celsius lost millions in dumb mistakes like that too. Someone at Celsius manually approved a bogus transaction on a hacked website... https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/12/03/crypto-lender-celsius-admits-losses-in-120m-badgerdao-hack/ https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/12/03/crypto-lender-ce... Badger later reimbursed Celsius with inflation on their token that would be released slowly over several years. "restitution". Someone at Celsius thought that they could sell that restitution token and ended up forfeiting it... which was another $22m loss... https://www.thismorningonchain.com/articles/defi/celsius-made-all-the-wrong-moves-and-now-its-dying/ https://www.thismorningonchain.com/articles/defi/celsius-mad... Then they tried to get the DAO to vote to give them back their lost tokens, without even admitting who it was that lost the tokens... and everyone voted against it.

paulpauper 3y ago
yeah a lot of "dumb" mistakes. whoops accidentally sent to wrong address, which i happen to own the private key too...
- catchnear4321 3y ago
  rookie mistake. have to send it to a family member’s address so you can claim it isn’t yours - truthfully.
  - lacrimacida 3y ago
    Yeah, easy steal, no traces, Id never believe it’s just a mistake but the burden of proof is on me.
- latchkey 3y ago
  In this case, it wasn't anything like that. Someone exploited a weakness in CloudFlare and was able to replace the Badger website. When someone clicked on the site to execute an approval transaction, it went to the attacker first, which gave the attacker full control over their wallet. It did take a manual step on the part of Celsius though... which should have been checked more closely. The UX around that checking is really terrible though and when someone is trying to do something quickly, they aren't always going to check. This is a big failure of wallets these days. Balancer.fi just had a similar attack happen to them where the .fi registry allowed a nameserver change. https://twitter.com/Balancer/status/1704552288201883809 https://twitter.com/Balancer/status/1704552288201883809 It is also clear that the frontends really need to be hosted in a way that they can't be modified.
  - pests 3y ago
    > It is also clear that the frontends really need to be hosted in a way that they can't be modified. Years ago the advice was IPFS and IPNS. I agree. This is not the Web3 dream everyone was promising us when frontends and nft media assets themselves are mutably stored on some server relying on serveral entities in the DNS chain to maintain security, behave, and stay available.
    - latchkey 3y ago
      I wish there was a way we could almost hash a website or a piece of the critical path code running the site so that you know the content on the page was not modified and that the code that is executed is what the site intended. We kind of have the 'secure lock' with https doing part of the work, but it is kind of irrelevant if DNS is pointing to some hackers site. This isn't just crypto... it is your bank too.
      - pests 3y ago
        That's kinda what IPFS is - every webpage is identified by its hash. But then updates are impossible so IPNS steps in to give a mutable name -> hash relationship. Just like a git commit, if you have the IPFS hash you are guaranteed for it to be correct. How you find that hash - IPNS or some other method, has been the major challenge. Further we used to have HPKP to further protect the security chain but it ended up being dangerous for various reasons. Monitoring certificate transparency logs for any re-issuences of your domain's certificates is the current detection method as http is pretty heavily penalized in todays browsers.
TimJRobinson 3y ago
That moment where they got scammed by a hacked frontend was when I realised they were extremely incompetent and told everyone to get their funds out immediately. Moving millions of dollars customer funds around via a browser wallet is insanely bad, they should have had well tested scripts that interact with the smart contracts directly.
- latchkey 3y ago
  How many people listened to you?

paulpauper 3y ago

yeah a lot of "dumb" mistakes. whoops accidentally sent to wrong address, which i happen to own the private key too...

catchnear4321 3y ago
rookie mistake. have to send it to a family member’s address so you can claim it isn’t yours - truthfully.
- lacrimacida 3y ago
  Yeah, easy steal, no traces, Id never believe it’s just a mistake but the burden of proof is on me.
latchkey 3y ago
In this case, it wasn't anything like that. Someone exploited a weakness in CloudFlare and was able to replace the Badger website. When someone clicked on the site to execute an approval transaction, it went to the attacker first, which gave the attacker full control over their wallet. It did take a manual step on the part of Celsius though... which should have been checked more closely. The UX around that checking is really terrible though and when someone is trying to do something quickly, they aren't always going to check. This is a big failure of wallets these days. Balancer.fi just had a similar attack happen to them where the .fi registry allowed a nameserver change. https://twitter.com/Balancer/status/1704552288201883809 https://twitter.com/Balancer/status/1704552288201883809 It is also clear that the frontends really need to be hosted in a way that they can't be modified.
- pests 3y ago
  > It is also clear that the frontends really need to be hosted in a way that they can't be modified. Years ago the advice was IPFS and IPNS. I agree. This is not the Web3 dream everyone was promising us when frontends and nft media assets themselves are mutably stored on some server relying on serveral entities in the DNS chain to maintain security, behave, and stay available.
  - latchkey 3y ago
    I wish there was a way we could almost hash a website or a piece of the critical path code running the site so that you know the content on the page was not modified and that the code that is executed is what the site intended. We kind of have the 'secure lock' with https doing part of the work, but it is kind of irrelevant if DNS is pointing to some hackers site. This isn't just crypto... it is your bank too.
    - pests 3y ago
      That's kinda what IPFS is - every webpage is identified by its hash. But then updates are impossible so IPNS steps in to give a mutable name -> hash relationship. Just like a git commit, if you have the IPFS hash you are guaranteed for it to be correct. How you find that hash - IPNS or some other method, has been the major challenge. Further we used to have HPKP to further protect the security chain but it ended up being dangerous for various reasons. Monitoring certificate transparency logs for any re-issuences of your domain's certificates is the current detection method as http is pretty heavily penalized in todays browsers.

TimJRobinson 3y ago

That moment where they got scammed by a hacked frontend was when I realised they were extremely incompetent and told everyone to get their funds out immediately. Moving millions of dollars customer funds around via a browser wallet is insanely bad, they should have had well tested scripts that interact with the smart contracts directly.

latchkey 3y ago
How many people listened to you?