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So a couple of points of clarifications > specifically the battle of cannae, leading to world war one is pretty weak. I buy that German generals were obsessed

So a couple of points of clarifications > specifically the battle of cannae, leading to world war one is pretty weak. I buy that German generals were obsessed with the battle, So not just the German generals specifically Schlieffen. The Schlieffen plan developed by it's namesake general was the governing document for the German plan of battle at the beginning of WW1. Schlieffen spent his entire life trying to figure out the plan that would eventually be his namesake, and he was also obsessed with Canne, so I could see an argument that was a contributing factor. If schlifen wasn't obsessed with the double envelopment he is less likely to send troops through Belgium and no Belgium means no UK involvement leading to a very different war. > Going to war is first and foremost a political act That is one of the fascinating things about WW1 is there are times where it seems as if forces more than men were dictating things. At one point after mobilization and but prior to the actual invasion of Belgium the Kaiser wanted to stop things as he believed a peace deal was reached and was told no, not only no but that such a thing was fundamentally impossible at that point because the military plans laid out by the generals many years ago had dictated so precisely how things had to happen that any change to the plans was close to impossible once they were set in motion. The same thing happened in the Russian side the Czar issued orders for mobilisation then stand down then mobilization again and then one general smashed his telephone so that it could not be rescinded. I think they is part of what made WW1 the war it was, it was one ran primarily by and for the generals (until the later years) with the political officials deferring all power and authority to them.

TSiege 3y ago
From what I've been able to find, the importance of invading Belgium had more to do with capturing it's rail network for logistics, than recreating the battle of cannae
- gustavus 3y ago
  I'd argue against that interpretation, the importance of invading Belgium had more to do with avoiding the French line of fortresses and hoping that the Belgians would just roll over than capturing rail networks that they wouldn't be able to use without a protracted war, which they had no anticipation of as they expected to be marching into Paris 900 hours after mobilization was declared.
  - TSiege 3y ago
    That also makes sense, and has nothing to do with the battle of cannae? Like that seems like a logical tactical decision. Offensive maneuvers are costly for the attacker against well fortified positions, so avoiding them by going around them makes sense as well as using the element of surprise. It also has nothing to do with the 2000 year old battle
    - Apocryphon 3y ago
      "Convinced that Germany, surrounded by powerful enemies, would have to fight outnumbered and win, Schlieffen believed the key to victory could be discovered in an account of the Battle of Cannae, written by the German military historian Hans Delbrtick. Therefore, Schlieffen ordered the historical section of the General Staff to produce a set of Cannae Studies that would demonstrate that the principle of double envelopment practiced by Hannibal at Cannae was the master key to victory in battle." https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA622847 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA622847
    - jakderrida 3y ago
      > It also has nothing to do with the 2000 year old battle It has a little bit to do with it, I think, but only in two sense 1. It involved a decisive victory by envelopment which, completely unrelated to Cannae, Germany needed to avoid a two-front war. 2. It's just the go-to military general's example to refer to their own "masterpiece". aka. Schlieffen's Cannae. I'll agree, though, that it would be equally relevant had Schlieffen called it, "Pulling my goalie to put an extra man on the ice".
mighmi 3y ago
> The Schlieffen plan developed by it's namesake general The Schlieefen plan didn't exist. > The Schlieffen memorandum of 1905, with its 1906 supplement, was not a plan. It was not operational. It did not go into details or issue orders David Frmokin's Europe's Last Summer Terence Zuber's Inventing the Schlieefen Plan shows that the "plan" was written in a memorandum at his retirement, which his daughter kept in her family photos (even in August 1914). The memorandum also involved 20 divisions which never existed - 48 corps should have attacked France instead of the actual 34... The actual plan as described was a one front war against France... From Schlieefen's other writings were Germany at war with France and Russia, he suggested using interior rail lines to lure enemy forces inside, and then counteract by taking their supply lines (the move through Belgium and Northern France), quickly winning the war, which bears only the most superficial resemblance to the war as started. Mark Humphries and John Maker have gone into more detail on where the actual war plan (as followed) came from, von Moltke's beliefs etc. Even e.g. Gross who has strongly debated Zuber about this agrees that there was no official plan as such, instead arguing that Schlieffen's influence, staff rides etc. planted the seeds of seeing potential victory through such an approach.
- gustavus 3y ago
  My friend, I have been eagerly gobbling up all the good literature I can get my hands on recently, do you have any suggestions on books that you feel do a decent job of examining the Shlieefen Plan? Besides The Guns of August which I just finished last month.
  - mighmi 3y ago
    You'll want "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" and especially GJ Meyer's "The World Undone". The second deals with prewar military strategy, showing that European militaries expected trench warfare and ineffective offensive, until the Ruso-Japanese war, which made them switch gears, believing a strong offensive and bayonets could overcome machine guns. One interesting point is bayonet designs in the 1870s and 1880s were wide, meant to be used for digging, entrenching. But by the 1910s, they were suddenly long and thin to give soldiers "more reach" akin to spears!
rexpop 3y ago
> forces more than men were dictating things > one general smashed his telephone so that it could not be rescinded Seems like your "forces more than men" are actually just "more men." Arguably, though, you're describing ideology or mythos, eg "Der tag!"[0] 0. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-archive/der-tag-an-accusation-of-hostile-intent-1916/ https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-arch...
- gustavus 3y ago
  To an extant yes, but another example where it seemed forces more than men moved things was Verdun. Halfway through the battle both the Germans and the French generals commanding the armies wanted to pull out because it was so horrible, but the Germans were so close to a victory they couldn't pull out after all the blood that had been spilt being so close to victory, meanwhile the French couldn't give a single inch of ground for doing so would mean the loss of Verdun, which was a monument of national pride, and so for three hundred and three days below the sun the battle carried, father and son fell one by one. The war is replete with similar examples, and sure we can call it mythos or ideology or something like that, but it is clear there were times in the war that even had the generals and the populace wanted things to be different it was near impossible to change and men continued thrown into the meat grinder.

TSiege 3y ago

From what I've been able to find, the importance of invading Belgium had more to do with capturing it's rail network for logistics, than recreating the battle of cannae

gustavus 3y ago
I'd argue against that interpretation, the importance of invading Belgium had more to do with avoiding the French line of fortresses and hoping that the Belgians would just roll over than capturing rail networks that they wouldn't be able to use without a protracted war, which they had no anticipation of as they expected to be marching into Paris 900 hours after mobilization was declared.
- TSiege 3y ago
  That also makes sense, and has nothing to do with the battle of cannae? Like that seems like a logical tactical decision. Offensive maneuvers are costly for the attacker against well fortified positions, so avoiding them by going around them makes sense as well as using the element of surprise. It also has nothing to do with the 2000 year old battle
  - Apocryphon 3y ago
    "Convinced that Germany, surrounded by powerful enemies, would have to fight outnumbered and win, Schlieffen believed the key to victory could be discovered in an account of the Battle of Cannae, written by the German military historian Hans Delbrtick. Therefore, Schlieffen ordered the historical section of the General Staff to produce a set of Cannae Studies that would demonstrate that the principle of double envelopment practiced by Hannibal at Cannae was the master key to victory in battle." https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA622847 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA622847
  - jakderrida 3y ago
    > It also has nothing to do with the 2000 year old battle It has a little bit to do with it, I think, but only in two sense 1. It involved a decisive victory by envelopment which, completely unrelated to Cannae, Germany needed to avoid a two-front war. 2. It's just the go-to military general's example to refer to their own "masterpiece". aka. Schlieffen's Cannae. I'll agree, though, that it would be equally relevant had Schlieffen called it, "Pulling my goalie to put an extra man on the ice".

mighmi 3y ago

> The Schlieffen plan developed by it's namesake general The Schlieefen plan didn't exist. > The Schlieffen memorandum of 1905, with its 1906 supplement, was not a plan. It was not operational. It did not go into details or issue orders David Frmokin's Europe's Last Summer Terence Zuber's Inventing the Schlieefen Plan shows that the "plan" was written in a memorandum at his retirement, which his daughter kept in her family photos (even in August 1914). The memorandum also involved 20 divisions which never existed - 48 corps should have attacked France instead of the actual 34... The actual plan as described was a one front war against France... From Schlieefen's other writings were Germany at war with France and Russia, he suggested using interior rail lines to lure enemy forces inside, and then counteract by taking their supply lines (the move through Belgium and Northern France), quickly winning the war, which bears only the most superficial resemblance to the war as started. Mark Humphries and John Maker have gone into more detail on where the actual war plan (as followed) came from, von Moltke's beliefs etc. Even e.g. Gross who has strongly debated Zuber about this agrees that there was no official plan as such, instead arguing that Schlieffen's influence, staff rides etc. planted the seeds of seeing potential victory through such an approach.

gustavus 3y ago
My friend, I have been eagerly gobbling up all the good literature I can get my hands on recently, do you have any suggestions on books that you feel do a decent job of examining the Shlieefen Plan? Besides The Guns of August which I just finished last month.
- mighmi 3y ago
  You'll want "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" and especially GJ Meyer's "The World Undone". The second deals with prewar military strategy, showing that European militaries expected trench warfare and ineffective offensive, until the Ruso-Japanese war, which made them switch gears, believing a strong offensive and bayonets could overcome machine guns. One interesting point is bayonet designs in the 1870s and 1880s were wide, meant to be used for digging, entrenching. But by the 1910s, they were suddenly long and thin to give soldiers "more reach" akin to spears!

rexpop 3y ago

> forces more than men were dictating things > one general smashed his telephone so that it could not be rescinded Seems like your "forces more than men" are actually just "more men." Arguably, though, you're describing ideology or mythos, eg "Der tag!"[0] 0. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-archive/der-tag-an-accusation-of-hostile-intent-1916/ https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-arch...

gustavus 3y ago
To an extant yes, but another example where it seemed forces more than men moved things was Verdun. Halfway through the battle both the Germans and the French generals commanding the armies wanted to pull out because it was so horrible, but the Germans were so close to a victory they couldn't pull out after all the blood that had been spilt being so close to victory, meanwhile the French couldn't give a single inch of ground for doing so would mean the loss of Verdun, which was a monument of national pride, and so for three hundred and three days below the sun the battle carried, father and son fell one by one. The war is replete with similar examples, and sure we can call it mythos or ideology or something like that, but it is clear there were times in the war that even had the generals and the populace wanted things to be different it was near impossible to change and men continued thrown into the meat grinder.