5 ms·

I mean, this is the company where the only security certification advertised on their website for macOS [1][2] only achieved the lowest possible level of securi

• irundebian 3y ago
  EAL is not a measure of security but a measure of the depth of analysis. Looking at the complexity of monolithic-kernel-based operating systems, I don't much can be derived from certifications with an EAL < 5.
  • Veserv 3y ago
    Evaluated assurance levels (EAL) are a bundle of security assurance requirements (SAR) that reasonably trace to varying levels of assurance that the target of evaluation (TOE) enforces the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) of the product. One of the core SARs being AVA (vulnerability assessment) which evaluates resistance to penetration attackers and the presence of vulnerabilities. It is only at EAL5 that you are required to demonstrate AVA_VAN.4 which is resistance to penetration attackers with a moderate attack potential. What we derive from companies only able to achieve EAL < 5 is that their systems are not designed, nor capable of protecting against moderate attackers. This has been borne out by decades of experience where the security properties of these systems have been routinely defeated by attackers with moderate or lower attack potential. The certification process is both effective and accurate at identifying that these consumer operating systems are inadequate against attackers of moderate ability as an upper bound. We further know from decades of experience that any system that attempts EAL5 certification and then fails has structural deficiencies that make it practically impossible for any configuration to ever be certified without a total redesign. As far as I know, nobody has ever achieved that despite decades of attempts and billions of dollars spent attempting to retrofit inherently insecure designs such as Windows, Linux, or macOS. So, what we know is that macOS, iOS, Linux, Windows, BSDs, etc. are structurally insecure against moderate attacks such as those employed by commercial hackers and organized crime, let alone state-level actors, and that it is hopeless for them to ever be improved to reach such a level. Anything less than EAL5 is inadequate for the modern threat landscape of established commercial hackers and state actors as experienced by consumers, businesses, and governments. Therefore, the systems currently deployed are universally unfit for their usage in these connected systems and we have the certifications and continuous examples to prove it.
    • irundebian 3y ago
      How do you define "penetration attackers with a moderate attack potential"? No EAL>4 certification does not imply that something is insecure. Judging something as "insecure" or "structurally insecure" is highly opinionated. Not everyone has the same tolerance of risk. For most users the common operating system is secure enough. Besides that security is not only depending on the kernel. Smartphone operating systems which are based on Linux practically provide more security through app isolation than most desktop-oriented Linux-based distributions. Besides that a CC certification does not necessary certify the product as a whole which finally means you cannot even derive a state of security statement for the end user. Example: Integrity OS has been certified on EAL6, yet the have provided a vulnerable telnet server: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7715 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7715 Another example was the genugate firewall which has been certified on EAL4+ (including ALC_FLR.2, ALC_PAM.1, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5), so in the end it was certified against attack with a high attack potential. Yet, the product was vulnerable to a simple authentication bypass of the management interface resulting in a CVSS score of 9.8: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27215 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27215