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The comment above refers to Hume's 'induction problem' [1]. > we've never successfully answered Hume's general skepticism about the existence of causality as s

by xpe 3y ago

The comment above refers to Hume's 'induction problem' [1]. > we've never successfully answered Hume's general skepticism about the existence of causality as something that is real outside of our own minds The quote seems to imply a strong consensus, but [1] disagrees. The phrasing "the existence of causality as something that is real outside of our own minds" sounds like philosophical idealism [2]. One can take that view without discussing causation at all, seems to me. Forgive the following blunt questions: how is philosophical idealism either (a) useful or (b) testable? To me, currently, it seems to be neither. Maybe I'm missing something? For those that get value from it, what are some practical take-aways you get out of thinking about Hume's 'problem of induction'? I'm very much into philosophy, but I admit I don't see a lot of utility in digging into this outside of historical purposes. It feels to me that the tools from inferential statistics combined with some deeper study on causation are far more useful and enlightening than trying to figure out the historical context around Hume's writing here. I'm glad other people do it, for sure, but what I've skimmed doesn't "grab" me. WRT causation, I often return to the idea of "no model is perfect, but some are useful". There are many times when we build useful models that -- when combined with proper experimentation -- very strongly indicate causation. The laws of physics, for example. As soon as people get involved, it gets messy. [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ [2]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

brutusborn 3y ago
I completely agree that looking at old epistemology isn't that useful; simply because more recent theorists will need to address the same issues, so generally refer to older theory within their work. If you want a deep understanding then you need to look at the source material, but as you mention this is mostly only interesting for gaining a historical perspective. Unfortunately many of the people who create introductory science courses seem to mostly only be aware of Popper, so most students are aware of the importance of falsifiability but not of its problems. I suspect this is because reading Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend leaves one with an impression that science isn't an objective endeavour and this is an uncomfortable truth when start from a belief that science is some infallible rationalist project. Personally it transformed my view from "trust the science"(TM) to "question the science, always." Science isn't always science unfortunately.

by xpe 3y ago

brutusborn 3y ago

I completely agree that looking at old epistemology isn't that useful; simply because more recent theorists will need to address the same issues, so generally refer to older theory within their work. If you want a deep understanding then you need to look at the source material, but as you mention this is mostly only interesting for gaining a historical perspective. Unfortunately many of the people who create introductory science courses seem to mostly only be aware of Popper, so most students are aware of the importance of falsifiability but not of its problems. I suspect this is because reading Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend leaves one with an impression that science isn't an objective endeavour and this is an uncomfortable truth when start from a belief that science is some infallible rationalist project. Personally it transformed my view from "trust the science"(TM) to "question the science, always." Science isn't always science unfortunately.