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> A "moral" act by NATO, etc., before the war would have been to listen to the advance warnings and concede on some minor points like NATO membership NATO did
by dragonwriter 3y ago
> A "moral" act by NATO, etc., before the war would have been to listen to the advance warnings and concede on some minor points like NATO membership
NATO did that when Russia demanded that NATO not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008, complying with the Russian request. Russia responded almost immediately by invading Georgia, this is also a factor in why Ukraine, even after deposing Yanukovych, did not renew its bid to join NATO until after the Russo-Ukrainian War started with the Russian invasion in 2015. To quote a famous American statesman: “Fool me once, shame on you; fool my twice... can’t get fooled again.”
> (remember that NATO membership means eventual bases in Ukraine, and questionable status for Russia's lease on Sevastopol)
No, it doesn't mean foreign bases in Ukraine (not all NATO members have foreign bases), and Russia's invasion on 2014, largely carried out from and in violation of the agreements governing the bases it had in Ukraine, pretty much guaranteed that their use of those facilities was gone if and when Ukraine regains control of Crimea.
- dundarious 3y ago> NATO did that when Russia demanded that NATO not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008, complying with the Russian request. That is not my understanding of the historical record, and I don't think it's the understanding of the US, French, or German leaders at the time either. The 2008 agenda report states "NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO", emphasis mine. > No, it doesn't mean foreign bases in Ukraine This is fair, and I thought about clarifying the point myself. The reason I left it as is, is that regardless of whether there would be a literal NATO/US base in Ukraine, there would be a highly effective level of military command and equipment synchronization, such that NATO ally troop/materiel movement into Ukraine would be vastly more fast and simple to accomplish. It would certainly vastly expand the risk profile of that section of Russia's border. Of course, since 2014 Ukraine became a NATO-lite member and most of this synchronization began anyway.
- dragonwriter 3y ago> The 2008 agenda report states "NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO", emphasis mine. Both countries were hoping for a formal onramp to membership via a MAP at that summit, Russia demanded that they not be given MAPs, saying that doing so would be a provoication and destabilizing, NATO acceded to the Russian demands and papered over the denial of a concrete onramp with the no-process, no-timeline language you quote, and Russia immediately invaded Georgia. Yes, Russia’s demands 8 years into its subsequent war on Ukraine were somewhat greater (including permanently ruling out all further NATO expansion—not just for Ukraine—and withdrawing all alliance troops from Eastern flank members of the alliance), but the 2008 experience weighed heavily against consideration of acquiescence, even in part, to Russia’s demands of this kind.
- dundarious 3y agoIn the annals of diplomacy, it would not be strange for Russia to have interpreted the near invitation and late-stage downgrade to a "will join" statement as something far from acquiescence. I think it was taken as quite provocative, just less so than an invitation. By analogy, I think a statement from the USSR that "Cuba will join our nuclear military defense pact" would not have been taken as acquiescence during the Cuban missile crisis.
- _kbh_ 3y ago> In the annals of diplomacy, it would not be strange for Russia to have interpreted the near invitation and late-stage downgrade to a "will join" statement as something far from acquiescence. I think it was taken as quite provocative, just less so than an invitation. By analogy, I think a statement from the USSR that "Cuba will join our nuclear military defense pact" would not have been taken as acquiescence during the Cuban missile crisis. I think it didn't matter what happened at the NATO conference Russia was looking for an excuse to invade and they were going to find one regardless of what was said. The reason Russia invaded soon after was because NATO blinked when Russia dared them to, if NATO had given Georgia and Ukraine a MAP I think the situation would be very different today.