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If anything the article gives Apple unjustifiable benefit of doubt. Apple exempts itself fron the IDFA transparency requirements it imposes on third-party app d

by fmajid 3y ago

If anything the article gives Apple unjustifiable benefit of doubt. Apple exempts itself fron the IDFA transparency requirements it imposes on third-party app developers, and has drawn legal scrutiny in France and the EU, among others: https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558 https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-whe... Then there is their scanning of iCloud backups for CSAM without being forced to do so by law, something Meta hasn't done with WhatsApp, and obviously not Signal either. CSAM today, messages critical of the powers that be tomorrow, they breached a fundamental ethical line in end-to-end encryption and they are thus now completely untrustworthy on encryption. Apple's marketing is very effective, but the idea that they are any better than the other Big Tech firms on privacy is just that, marketing fluff without substance if you dig but a little. None of them can be trusted. At this point the only way to really protect your privacy is to connect to the Internet using a MiFI or similar router running open-source software and implementing an outbound firewall blocklist like Jordan Geoghegan's unbound-adblock: https://geoghegan.ca//unbound-adblock.html https://geoghegan.ca//unbound-adblock.html

fh9302 3y ago
Can you show a source for your iCloud backup CSAM scanning claim? These days iCloud supports E2EE so they have no ability to scan once you enable it. Signal does not support any cloud backups and WhatsApp uses iCloud so this seems like a flawed comparison.
- RedComet 3y ago
  Even with e2ee enabled for iCloud, Apple has access to hashes of the plaintext files.
- fmajid 3y ago
  Straight from the horse's mouth: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni... "Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the database of known CSAM hashes". Thus the scanning is done by your device against the unencrypted image before uploading it to iCloud. The fact they abandoned the plan is irrelevant, by considering it in the first place (and to a very high level of engineering R&D as evidenced by the document), they set a precedent and forefeited any trust. It's CSAM today, it will be mentions Winnie the Pooh mocking Xi Jinping tomorrow, and of abortion in Texas the day after. Now, the only way I'd trust an Apple-mediated encrypted messaging service is if the clientapp is third-party and thus can't be backdoored retroactively if Apple feels it expedient to do so.

by fmajid 3y ago

fh9302 3y ago

Can you show a source for your iCloud backup CSAM scanning claim? These days iCloud supports E2EE so they have no ability to scan once you enable it. Signal does not support any cloud backups and WhatsApp uses iCloud so this seems like a flawed comparison.

RedComet 3y ago
Even with e2ee enabled for iCloud, Apple has access to hashes of the plaintext files.
fmajid 3y ago
Straight from the horse's mouth: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni... "Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the database of known CSAM hashes". Thus the scanning is done by your device against the unencrypted image before uploading it to iCloud. The fact they abandoned the plan is irrelevant, by considering it in the first place (and to a very high level of engineering R&D as evidenced by the document), they set a precedent and forefeited any trust. It's CSAM today, it will be mentions Winnie the Pooh mocking Xi Jinping tomorrow, and of abortion in Texas the day after. Now, the only way I'd trust an Apple-mediated encrypted messaging service is if the clientapp is third-party and thus can't be backdoored retroactively if Apple feels it expedient to do so.