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FCC Proposes Voluntary Security Labels for IoT Most Companies Will Likely Ignore
- Khelavaster 3y agoGreat idea. Let markets decide security.
- indymike 3y agoI would like involuntary labeling for: 1. When the device manufacturer will discontinue support. 2. Up front disclosure of subscription fees if required to make the device work. 3. Software or hardware locks that prevent the user from modifying the device's firmware.
- HankB99 3y agoThe "S" in IoT stands for security. :-/
- gjsman-1000 3y agoReminder for everyone here who ever feels "Imposter Syndrome": If you built an IoT Device, would you ever: - Not consider changing the root username and password? - Not consider shutting off the SSH server? - Not consider writing the most delicate parts in a memory-safe language? - Not consider enabling Secure Boot or tamper detection? - Not consider building a system for easy and automatic security updates, perhaps with an opt-out for those interested? Almost all of us here would consider the above. Yet most IoT manufacturers never thought of any of them. You're competent.
- networkchad 3y ago[dead]
- giantg2 3y ago"Yet most IoT manufacturers never thought of any of them." It's possible they did think of these and just didn't do them for various reasons. Like it wasn't worth the cost (not necessarily due to changing the setting, but more from a support side), or they might have an incentive to leave it unsecured (Chinese tech), or something else. The sad part is, the people making the decisions don't have imposter syndrome because they're making money with a success product and any shortcomings must be from the people under them.
- sumtechguy 3y agoHey boss lets secure this system. We need to do these 10 things. Sure thing... How long will it take and will it get in the way of these 4 features we promised to the customer that they wanted last week? Probably like about a month of work. Well add it to the backlog and we will get to it eventually.
- dilippkumar 3y agoFirmware engineer here with an opinion from down in the trenches: The reality is that it takes a ton of work to get a microcontroller to blink an LED. Various clocks need to be configured, various peripheral devices (I2C controllers, GPIO controllers etc) need to be configured, interrupt vector tables need to be set up and so on. Who is expected to do this work? Today, it is done by the semiconductor vendor. When you buy a microcontroller, you’ll use an SDK and a toolchain that the vendor offers. The vendor is incentivized to keep their SDK and tool chain as general as possible to sell into as many different designs as possible. The OEM wants to ship a product as quickly as possible to make their cashflow model work. There’s a huge gap between these two ends where a ton of important stuff goes unaddressed. At no point are the OEM and semiconductor vendor incentivized to sit together and addresses all the issues that fall through the cracks. The current school of thought dominating MBA courses would see addressing these issues as a cost with no tangible benefits to the business. I can see their rationale: if consumers don’t signal that they care about security, then it is actually hard to argue that addressing security is a benefit to the business. Most consumers today don’t know how bad the situation is to care about this stuff. It sucks because we firmware engineers want to do the right thing but we can’t justify it.
- brightlancer 3y ago> The current school of thought dominating MBA courses would see addressing these issues as a cost with no tangible benefits to the business. I can see their rationale: if consumers don’t signal that they care about security, then it is actually hard to argue that addressing security is a benefit to the business. At least in the US, customers are very price conscious and will sacrifice a lot to save a dollar. To frame this from their standpoint, "Why do I have to pay more for ¨features¨ that I don't want?" I think folks _should_ demand more secure devices, but they also must be willing to pay for it. (Many folks will immediately respond, "We'll use the government to force companies to do this!" but that can cost even more, as the company provides the extra features and also pays for the bureaucracy.)
- ilyt 3y ago> The reality is that it takes a ton of work to get a microcontroller to blink an LED. Various clocks need to be configured, various peripheral devices (I2C controllers, GPIO controllers etc) need to be configured, interrupt vector tables need to be set up and so on. No, that's the easy part (even if done manually). The hard part starts with networking > There’s a huge gap between these two ends where a ton of important stuff goes unaddressed. At no point are the OEM and semiconductor vendor incentivized to sit together and addresses all the issues that fall through the cracks. Most SDKs I've seen end up somewhere at level of TCP stack, sometimes at level of simple web server. Because everything above will be very application specific. It's near-entirely on the app vendor to fuck stuff above that. Don't try to push blame on manufacturer of the chip here, they didn't force your password to be 12345678
- jprete 3y agoI think I'd start by removing, at the hardware level, the ability of the IoT devices to do general computing and networking. They accept authenticated external control instructions, they execute the instructions, they physically cannot do more. Most likely there would be no updates at all. There would also be a physical off switch. My idea is that, if you limit the IoT device - say, a thermostat or a smart bulb - to only have the exact capabilities it is supposed to have, then the damage from any external hack is limited to messing with the user's house. And, if the user has the ability to turn it off, the damage of the hack is limited to "the device doesn't do anything anymore". I figure this is much better than the possibility that breaking the security enables the IoT device to spy on the user's network traffic, or their house, or be part of a botnet, or a bounce point for hacking attempts. EDIT: I recognize there are good real-world reasons why IoT companies don't do it this way. If we actually valued security, then there would be an incentive for someone to build up the systems to facilitate this kind of limited-attack-value design.
- AlotOfReading 3y agoGiven how utterly trivial it is to accidentally achieve turing completeness, I suspect any reasonable subset you could come up with would also be capable of general computation. Moreover, such a design would be inherently expensive and inefficient, because it can't achieve the economies of scale modern uCs do, nor can it do anything without an external (presumably networked) command for every single operation.
- Mister_Snuggles 3y agoThe challenge is that even a minimal implementation requires quite a lot of functionality. Take a Wifi-based smart outlet, for example. The functionality is literally a single output that drives a relay. But in order for that to work, it needs to join a Wifi network - that means that you need some way to get an SSID and password onto the device and it needs a DHCP client to get an IP address. There also needs to be a way for the controller to discover the device's IP address, which means there's now likely an mDNS implementation on the device. Then there needs to be a way for the device to receive commands, so now we've got an HTTP server. If you want out-of-home access, which I suspect most people do, there's even more work required. Usually this means a central server that the device connects to since most regular people don't have a VPN connection back home. Another option is HomeKit, which is explicitly about local control with all of the remote access magic handled by Apple. But HomeKit is yet more stuff to run on the device, and only works if you've bought into the Apple ecosystem. This is a ton of scope creep for a pretty minimal device. A Zigbee or Z-Wave based outlet would be better, but that really just moves all of that scope creep from the individual device to the hub.
- pierat 3y ago- Not consider changing the root username and password? I would bake it in the bios or similar, and print it on the bottom of the device. - Not consider shutting off the SSH server? I would keep sshd running, precisely for the fact that the person who bought this could modify it I'm a reasonable and sane manner, like any Linux peripheral. It also allows for more extensibility past what I thought of. - Not consider writing the most delicate parts in a memory-safe language? I wouldn't reinvent the wheel. Use Linux, QNX, or Tron. Probably not Tron, but it IS open source. - Not consider enabling Secure Boot or tamper detection? Are we assuming the person who buys this as the enemy, or are we trying to evade Mission Impossible level national spies from looking how some IoT shit works? - Not consider building a system for easy and automatic security updates, perhaps with an opt-out for those interested? Most "security" updates are just malware in disguise. I've seen enough de-featurization and others in the name of security.
- rogerbinns 3y agoThe issue that needs to be addressed is economic. Devices are paid for once, but security is ongoing work. The Android world has shown that no-one has figured out how to deal with the mismatch. I'd expect that devices on subscription will do better on security because they have an economic incentive to do so. Even then vendors will want to end of life hardware that is no longer economic to support.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 3y agoWe are too spoiled by cheap garbage and the true cost of these things is hidden.
- Goronmon 3y agoYup, all we have to do is make expensive garbage instead, and then the problem would be solved.
- ilyt 3y ago"If you want to stop supporting it before 10 years, open source everything including getting the new firmware onto device (so all the keys etc)" So keep supporting it or give away how your stuff works underneath and allow someone else to. Bricking device into a landfill should not be decision corporation is allowed to take on most (all?) customer devices.
- janosdebugs 3y agoThis is not viable because what of the vendor used a proprietary build system? They can't open source it. Setting that aside, I have yet to see a complex system that you can rebuild without a lot of undocumented know-how just by having the source code. Companies don't typically keep meticulous documentation on this, they keep people around to do it. When the product goes out of support, the people get transferred or fired.
- squeaky-clean 3y ago
- hunson_abadeer 3y agoWhile I'm sure the FCC has an end game of actually mandating these labels, the vast majority of IoT devices are not exposed to the internet and just aren't a major attack vector in most environments. How much money and time needs to be spent to secure an RGB lightbulb or a wireless speaker? There is approximately one class of consumer devices that I suppose fall under the IoT umbrella and that are commonly attacked: modems and wifi routers. But these generally get security support. And if you had product labels, would it change shopping behaviors in any way? "This NetGear router will get security updates for 8 years" sounds great. But then, in 10 years, you might have the same router in your closet. Will you even remember the label by then?
- thayne 3y ago> the vast majority of IoT devices are not exposed to the internet IoT stands for "internet of things". I am by no means an expert in the area, but my understanding was that am IoT device is by definition connected to the Internet.
- loeg 3y agoIf the device isn't internet-connected, it's not an IoT device. That's what the I stands for. If what you're getting at is that most networked devices sit behind a consumer firewall, and that's probably good enough -- well, I mostly agree.
- Karunamon 3y agoDisagreeing on being good enough. The problem is that many of these devices regularly poll their mothership for commands and updates. We are one (feasibly, already done but unknown) server compromise away from millions of light bulbs or outlets or whatever turning into a botnet.
- riskable 3y agoMost consumer routers these days are automatically assigning global IPv6 addresses to every device on their network. The only security feature protecting them is the difficulty of (random) discoverability (no firewall rules by default). As in, you can't just scan the entire IPv6 Internet looking for insecure devices as it would take too long (e.g. thousands of years) but if you can figure out their address they're right there, ready for hacking, from anywhere in the world. The truth is that there's always other ways to find the IPv6 address of various devices inside a home. Many of them will happily tell you if you just send out the right broadcast (e.g. zeroconf) or they connect to services on the Internet that can be spoofed or just have generally terrible security (e.g. the addresses of all devices are publicly discoverable). Another fun way to find these devices is buying up dead domain names (e.g. because the company no longer exists) and setting up services that auto-hack the insecure devices once they can finally "phone home" again due to the malicious domain suddenly coming back online. This kind of hack works regardless of firewall rules (assuming the device is allowed to "phone home" at all).
- tacitusarc 3y agoRelated conversation with FCC commissioner: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37392676 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37392676
- charles_f 3y agoI started automating part of my house some time ago and used an ezlo zwave hub, which is a small Linux box where you can ssh in. If you change the default 8char password that's printed on the box, it resets to default upon reboot. That's their answer per why: > Unfortunately, the current configuration of the controller for networking connections will be taken back for default, including new credential set for SSH connections after a simple reboot because of security reasons
- Larrikin 3y agoWhy wouldn't you go with Home Assistant? When I was researching, there basically seemed to be no other competent solution that worked across devices. The only other reliable solutions seemed to force you to lock yourself into Apple or Google's ecosystem
- ilyt 3y agoI wish there was better designed competitor. I don't like the all-in-one blob architecture as any upgrade is pretty much "your automation will not work during it", and there is no good way to run it in HA. I'd like to see some that have separate "rule running engine hub" (that can be run in some kind of active/passive HA) + "UI/editor" (that if required can be run on separate machine so the "hub" could run on even weaker hardware if needed)
- charles_f 3y agoMostly cause I wanted something boxed where I don't have to invest too much time. But yeah I regret that decision now.
- AnimalMuppet 3y agoBecause of security reasons they're reverting to a default password? That has to be the most insane thing I've read in a while...
- charles_f 3y agoYeah, that was my answer > “for security reasons” is a pretty bad reason to reset the password to a default 8 characters printed under the box!
- WarOnPrivacy 3y agoGlob Love Karl Bode for getting to the meat of the issue, for not gushing with tech-journo love for the subject of the article, and for not gifting endless benefit of the doubt for Gov/Corp.
- codedokode 3y agoThe main issue caused by vulnerable devices is that they can be used in DDoS attacks. If there were no attacks, there would be almost no merit to hack those devices. So why don't we take measures against DDoS attacks instead? What I suggest is to make all Tier-1 ISPs adapt a protocol that would allow any host to block incoming traffic from specific IP/subnet at all upstream providers. So during attack the malicious traffic would be blocked at source network level or at Tier-1 level and never reach the target. Wouldn't networks be more secure in this case? Critical infrastructure like banks or government services would be better protected. Also, middlemen like Cloudflare would become unnecessary. What surprises me is why we use technologies that allow to perform DDoS attacks with mimimun costs. ISPs turn a blind eye to this and route malicious traffic to the victim without trying to stop it. Security updates for IoT devices won't fix this. ISPs are the ones who need to be fixed. Also, if IoT devices were restricted to local network, then outdated firmware wouldn't be a problem too.
- NoZebra120vClip 3y ago> What I suggest is to make all Tier-1 ISPs adapt a protocol that would allow any host to block incoming traffic from specific IP/subnet at all upstream providers. Cool story bro, and this is authenticated and secured, how? What happens when malware starts black-holing Google and Microsoft for all my devices? What happens when a botnet starts black-holding Cloudflare for all their neighbors? You want to prevent a floody-floody DDOS by creating opportunities for another variety of DDOS?
- codedokode 3y ago> What happens when malware starts black-holing Google and Microsoft for all my devices? You will send an unblock packet. Well, maybe this protocol should only work for commercial IP addresses, not for residential. > this is authenticated and secured, how? By your source IP address. You can only block traffic to your own IP address.
- NoZebra120vClip 3y ago> By your source IP address. Hey, 1985 called, and they want their authentication methods back.