4 ms·
>Myanmar Pretty much all negative coverage of JF17 (joint PRC+PK manufacturing but so far SOLD by PK) are sourced from Indian tabloid rags with no credibility.
by dirtyid 3y ago
>Myanmar
Pretty much all negative coverage of JF17 (joint PRC+PK manufacturing but so far SOLD by PK) are sourced from Indian tabloid rags with no credibility. Myanmar airforce has 100+ PRC airframes, variety of models in the last 30 years with little issue. Pretty much the only useful piece of info so far is Myanmar doesn't have adequate experience operating tech in 4th gen fighters, most of their fleet is 3rd gen. IIRC Myanmar got the jets before they even got simluators, and then bought 4th gen trainers (JL9) from PRC.
>Thailand
Yuan subs aren't operational because PRC couldn't acquire original specified German engines after EU sanctions. There's a period where Thai Navy was deciding whether to accept PRC engines, which they did. Some analysts implied if Thai did not accept PRC engines it would imply they were unsuitable, even more retarded media then spung that as technical issues with PRC engines. Both complete misinformation narratives since there's no basis for evaluating those unintegrated PRC engines at all.
>aircraft carriers
Training carriers based off RU design that analysis suggest PLAN has more or less maximized sortie potential vs when USSR was running carrier ops on similar flight deck. Late 2022 USNI analysis on PLAN carrier ops is they're basically reached "true" blue water deployment, i.e. a few hundred nms near Guam, 1000nm+ from mainland, with no divert airfrields or aerial refueling as backup. Which is about as far as PRC none nuke carriers need to deploy given strategic considerations. Caveate being conservative sorties and pretty clean (light) load outs to compensate for lack of divertion and ski jump. The struggle with PLAN carriers is they won't have catapults and capabilites that brings until 003 and training was hectic because they only had 1-2 carriers training 3-4 crew rotations, somewhat alleviated by converted cruise/barrack ships. TLDR is I would not characterize as overall carrier ops capabilities as struggling as limited by hardware, which TBH is expected since carriers does not seem particularly high priority outside of prestige - given PRC ship building capacity, they could have rushed 10 carriers like US did Forrestal class. Basically most US analysis of various PRC military modernization is they're lacking and focusing on XYZ, but should get there in a few years. Occasionally throw in the word struggle because they watch CCTV7 where miltiary propaganda talks about how hard they work. A few years later, new analysis that they got there (i.e. asw, jointness), something something evolving, modernizing at astonishing rate, but here's the new struggle. Rinse and repeat. Combined with customary but no real combat experience (which no one has in modern peer warfare). But the underlying pattern if you look at meat of improvements year by year is PLA modernizing fast.
- themadturk 3y agoI wonder if PRC really sees using a navy as a means of force projection as important. They could have a world-spanning navy like the U.S. has, but haven't made it a priority. No one has done it as well for as long as the U.S., but it's also something that could be erased in a few minutes by some well-placed Long Swords.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- dirtyid 3y agoNavy + carrier good for peacetime "diplomacy" via show of force / presence. Hence worth pursuing in some capacity. But ultimately PRC can't have world spanning navy because geopolitical conditions to replicate US global basing not present anymore - would take status quo / order changing conflict. And it would still take decades to train for 10+ carrier groups for parity. Therefore (IMO) PRC doubling down on long range (even global) fires, advanced rocketry that can be acquired and deployed at scale, in relatively short time, to destroy prestige platform from PRC mainland basing, without complex forward deployment or doctorine considerations. Basically make sure you have more missiles and ISR with sufficient CEP than enemies can defend/degrade. Hit aircraft carriers, subs, when they're in port, or the 10 fast combat support ships that sustains most of USN critical deployement options. For as large USN is, the system that sustains fleet is extremely brittle (same with PLAN) - carrier escorts have days of endurance on aggressive tasking. Would take PRC rocketry _minutes_ to take out replenishment ship restocking at port and carriers become single deployment assets. This kind of capability was not technically feasible 10-20 years ago - none of US adversaries could disrupt USN logistics. But now is. IMO US pretty much understands this as well, for as much reporting there is on dysfunction of navy and urgent need to fix, there hasn't been much actions instead we see doubling down on distributed land based fires and increasing aviation standoff range, and ultimately long range bombers strait from CONUS to reduce basing dependencies abroad.
- themadturk 3y agoI think you've got a point on strategy and standoff weapons, but I'd question whether anyone thinks a strike on support craft (or even combat vessels) while they're sitting in either U.S. or allied ports isn't an even more serious provocation than hitting our ships at sea. A forward deployed carrier strike group has, as you say, supplies for several days (at least) of unsupported operations, and (as long as the carriers aren't sunk) could carry an impressive punch during that time. I don't know how PLAN anti-submarine capabilities are, but fast attack submarines can carry a heavy conventional punch via cruise missiles. I think it's possible attacks on American soil could result in similar retaliation on enemy soil, such as direct strikes on Chinese naval bases and even political targets.