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Looking at the validation section of https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/acti
by acdha 3y ago
Looking at the validation section of https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/dev... - did I miss something or does that still lack any mention of the importance of checking dates or revocation for the issuer? Since the pseudo code doesn’t I’d bet there are more implementations which trust any key Microsoft has ever published (modulo some kind of cache purge).
- trifurcate 3y ago> Since the pseudo code doesn’t I’d bet there are more implementations which trust any key Microsoft has ever published Bingo, this is the most worrying bit to me. Pasting from a comment I posted earlier: > Microsoft's own developers failed to implement a secure authentication check on top of their own libraries and infrastructure. If Microsoft can't use its own identity platform correctly in a flagship Microsoft product (Outlook), what chance does anyone else stand?
- alphager 3y agoThis is the core problem. Everybody is discussing the crash dump and the exfil, but the core problem is that Microsoft neither validated the validity of keys (the leaked key was already invalid) nor the context of the key usage (the key wasn't allowed to generate admin tokens). They just checked if the key was signed by the Microsoft CA. This is something that's incredibly obvious in a code review.