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> To revive this, they would have to find an expert to attest that it is technically feasible to have security with a backdoor that government can access, but a

by orlp 3y ago

> To revive this, they would have to find an expert to attest that it is technically feasible to have security with a backdoor that government can access, but at the same time is impossible for malicious entities to access. > Ergo, this is technically dead, which is the best form of dead. Except it's not. There exist such cryptographic trapdoor constructions that are perfectly secure, if the government backdoor key is kept safe. The problem is keeping the government backdoor key safe. But that's not a literal impossible technical problem. It's much more a social problem. Don't get me wrong, I really, really wish what you said was true and we could kill this garbage forever by nature of technical argument. But it isn't, so we must keep fighting against it for the real reason: we simply don't want this.

rightbyte 3y ago
Ye I find it somewhat amusing that sharing a private key with the government is technically impossible. I guess you could be philosophical about whether it is private though, in that case. Anyway, I am gladly surprised they seem to back off.
- ncallaway 3y ago
  The part that's technically impossible is _keeping that key secure_. https://www.pcmag.com/news/master-key-for-tsa-approved-locks-leaked-again https://www.pcmag.com/news/master-key-for-tsa-approved-locks... More importantly, the thing that's technically impossible is a scheme to detect that the key has become compromised before it is used maliciously.
glitchc 3y ago
well, by definition if the key is to be used, and to be used more than once, it cannot be kept safe. The key has to go through multiple hands on its way from the senior government official responsible for its safekeeping to the peon assigned to unlock a specific phone at a specific point in time. It could be copied at any one of those points. No amount of technology or cryptography can solve the master key problem. The social problem is the technical problem, they aren't distinct.
- ChrisKnott 3y ago
  Doesn't this problem exist throughout the tech industry though? Microsoft, Google, Apple etc are keeping the keys that allow you to push updates secret, aren't they?
  - sebzim4500 3y ago
    Yeah, but if we're honest all three of those companies are more competent than the UK goverment. Source: sometimes interact with the UK government
    - Spivak 3y ago
      So you just make the three companies keep the keys then. People are out here like "a secure backdoor to encryption is impossible" and then don't even blink for the keys for root CAs which is the basis for the world's online security. Or the AWS managed S3 encryption keys. There's a lot of of hopium in this thread for people who I think want it to be more impossible in practice than it really is.
      - ChrisKnott 3y ago
        It was never even suggested that the government would have encryption keys. The government do not have access to SSL traffic, but companies are responsible for CSAM uploaded over SSL.
  - aae42 3y ago
    Also public key certificate authorities
  - skydhash 3y ago
    > Microsoft, Google, Apple etc are keeping the keys that allow you to push updates secret Governments can provide immunity, which companies can't do. Companies try not to do these kinds of stealing, governments don't care.
  - owlbite 3y ago
Jigsy 3y ago
> The problem is keeping the government backdoor key safe. Not a problem. Just change the locks every week. [tapping head]
dwaite 3y ago
> There exist such cryptographic trapdoor constructions that are perfectly secure, if the government backdoor key is kept safe. A big problem with this statement is the term “the government”. If you give the private key to the UK - the US, India and China will want a copy as well. The UK might want to spy on foreign nationals only in the country and only for CSAM, but that doesn’t mean other nations won’t use it for more traditional espionage.
- 1letterunixname 3y ago
  The ostensible reasoning is "think of the children" horseshit, but history proves such a powerful capability will be abused for unrestrained spying. Key escrow for the entire US and world was floated with the Clipper chip (1993-1996). That was strangled in its crib because trusting thousands of people at NSA or GCHQ to just not stalk people is sheer fantasy, just as the Snowden leaks revealed. iMessage stores the e2ee key in iCloud by default, which effectively makes all of a user's communications decryptable by governments and Apple at any time. To offer a centralized service with actual privacy without zero knowledge p2p constructions, then it falls victim to the Lavabit problem. If you want security and plausible anonymity across your own devices, not metadata, then use a fork of Signal such as Session. (Signal is irreparably broken by being tied to phone number, which is a universal tracking device. The only people who use Signal are drug dealers and software engineers who don't know any better.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
  - Cyphase 3y ago
    Why is Signal "irreparably" broken? What makes the phone number issue "irreparable"? As I understand it usernames and phone number privacy are in the pipeline. I'm a software engineer who does know; I'm aware that Signal is currently tied to phone numbers, and I'd love for it not to be, but I still use it, because it's E2EE and easy for non-technical people to use. When there's something that's easy to use like Signal that uses decentralized cryptographic identifiers and onion routes all traffic, I'll start trying to get people to use that. I'd be happy to hear any recommendations.

by orlp 3y ago

rightbyte 3y ago

Ye I find it somewhat amusing that sharing a private key with the government is technically impossible. I guess you could be philosophical about whether it is private though, in that case. Anyway, I am gladly surprised they seem to back off.

ncallaway 3y ago
The part that's technically impossible is _keeping that key secure_. https://www.pcmag.com/news/master-key-for-tsa-approved-locks-leaked-again https://www.pcmag.com/news/master-key-for-tsa-approved-locks... More importantly, the thing that's technically impossible is a scheme to detect that the key has become compromised before it is used maliciously.

glitchc 3y ago

well, by definition if the key is to be used, and to be used more than once, it cannot be kept safe. The key has to go through multiple hands on its way from the senior government official responsible for its safekeeping to the peon assigned to unlock a specific phone at a specific point in time. It could be copied at any one of those points. No amount of technology or cryptography can solve the master key problem. The social problem is the technical problem, they aren't distinct.

ChrisKnott 3y ago
Doesn't this problem exist throughout the tech industry though? Microsoft, Google, Apple etc are keeping the keys that allow you to push updates secret, aren't they?
- sebzim4500 3y ago
  Yeah, but if we're honest all three of those companies are more competent than the UK goverment. Source: sometimes interact with the UK government
  - Spivak 3y ago
    So you just make the three companies keep the keys then. People are out here like "a secure backdoor to encryption is impossible" and then don't even blink for the keys for root CAs which is the basis for the world's online security. Or the AWS managed S3 encryption keys. There's a lot of of hopium in this thread for people who I think want it to be more impossible in practice than it really is.
    - ChrisKnott 3y ago
      It was never even suggested that the government would have encryption keys. The government do not have access to SSL traffic, but companies are responsible for CSAM uploaded over SSL.
- aae42 3y ago
  Also public key certificate authorities
- skydhash 3y ago
  > Microsoft, Google, Apple etc are keeping the keys that allow you to push updates secret Governments can provide immunity, which companies can't do. Companies try not to do these kinds of stealing, governments don't care.
- owlbite 3y ago

Jigsy 3y ago

> The problem is keeping the government backdoor key safe. Not a problem. Just change the locks every week. [tapping head]

dwaite 3y ago

> There exist such cryptographic trapdoor constructions that are perfectly secure, if the government backdoor key is kept safe. A big problem with this statement is the term “the government”. If you give the private key to the UK - the US, India and China will want a copy as well. The UK might want to spy on foreign nationals only in the country and only for CSAM, but that doesn’t mean other nations won’t use it for more traditional espionage.

1letterunixname 3y ago
The ostensible reasoning is "think of the children" horseshit, but history proves such a powerful capability will be abused for unrestrained spying. Key escrow for the entire US and world was floated with the Clipper chip (1993-1996). That was strangled in its crib because trusting thousands of people at NSA or GCHQ to just not stalk people is sheer fantasy, just as the Snowden leaks revealed. iMessage stores the e2ee key in iCloud by default, which effectively makes all of a user's communications decryptable by governments and Apple at any time. To offer a centralized service with actual privacy without zero knowledge p2p constructions, then it falls victim to the Lavabit problem. If you want security and plausible anonymity across your own devices, not metadata, then use a fork of Signal such as Session. (Signal is irreparably broken by being tied to phone number, which is a universal tracking device. The only people who use Signal are drug dealers and software engineers who don't know any better.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
- Cyphase 3y ago
  Why is Signal "irreparably" broken? What makes the phone number issue "irreparable"? As I understand it usernames and phone number privacy are in the pipeline. I'm a software engineer who does know; I'm aware that Signal is currently tied to phone numbers, and I'd love for it not to be, but I still use it, because it's E2EE and easy for non-technical people to use. When there's something that's easy to use like Signal that uses decentralized cryptographic identifiers and onion routes all traffic, I'll start trying to get people to use that. I'd be happy to hear any recommendations.