3 ms·
> There is an inherent risk of your vulnerabilities being broadcasted somewhere either on purpose or accidentally once that information is collected and organiz
by AnthonyMouse 3y ago
> There is an inherent risk of your vulnerabilities being broadcasted somewhere either on purpose or accidentally once that information is collected and organized by the researcher.
A legitimate researcher is going to promptly notify you of any vulnerabilities they discover and you as a large organization are going to promptly remediate them.
But the trouble isn't that the law might impose a $100 fine on a smug professor or curious adolescent to demonstrate that some audacious but mostly harmless behavior was over the line, it's that the existing rules are so broad and with such severe penalties that they deter people from saying anything when they see something that looks wrong.
- Buttons840 3y agoI once found a vulnerability. I pressed F12 and saw unintended information in the source of a webpage. I just closed the tab, I didn't report it. Our laws made it risky to do the right thing, so I didn't do the right thing.
- figassis 3y agoI once saw a vulnerability in the same way. Some website from a really powerful org presented masked info, but the info was completely unmasked in the api responses. I’ll never tell anyone. I’m not American and don’t want my payments to suddenly stop settling or visas denied for unknown reasons.
- EricMausler 3y agoI agree the laws are too broad. I think we need add layers of granularity to them. Create more of a framework for settling the rules on what is and isn't allowed. Maybe we settle on everything goes, but the company should be involved. A legitimate researcher should be notifying the company that they are going to be looking for vulnerabilities in the first place. That is part of the distinction in behavior that I am encouraging. This way if someone is caught poking around for things to abuse unsolicited, at least there's a little more merit to holding them accountable. We are able to treat it more like the threat it is. A good faith company can give researchers pointers on where to look. Maybe the company has a really good reason to prevent looking at certain things, and they are able to convince the researcher of that. I dk. Point is the framework for settling all that should be promoted rather than promoting people to act identical to criminals right up until they decide whether to sell / abuse the information illegally or notify the company and try to get a reward. Does that make more sense?
- screwturner68 3y agoso are you saying that I shouldn't be testing a product I purchased or a product that someone mandated I have in my house? I shouldn't have to notify anyone, I own it and I should be able to do with it whatever I please. In addition if I do find an exploit I am not obligated to notify the company nor should I be. A good faith company should be doing their due diligence and not releasing unprotected/poorly protected devices as is common today.
- EricMausler 3y agoYou don't own the inside of it. That's the core part of all this. Businesses decided to sell items with special conditions where you can own possession of the item as a whole but not the ability to dismantle it. That's just a contract with terms. If you are in the position being addressed by my points, then you have already agreed to those terms. your problem is with the ownership model, or something else. I am saying, since this model is already in existence and accepted by the public, we need to create some safeguards. We cannot bypass the fact that you do not own the thing you are testing. So if you want to test something you do not own, then yes I think involving the entity that does own it is reasonable
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago> A legitimate researcher should be notifying the company that they are going to be looking for vulnerabilities in the first place. That is part of the distinction in behavior that I am encouraging. This way if someone is caught poking around for things to abuse unsolicited, at least there's a little more merit to holding them accountable. We are able to treat it more like the threat it is. The issue is this. You have some amateur, some hobbyist, who knows enough to spot a vulnerability, but isn't a professional security researcher and isn't a lawyer. They say "that's weird, there's no way...," so they attempt the exploit on a lark, and it works. This person is not a dangerous felon and should not be facing felony charges. They deserve a slap on the wrist. More importantly, they shouldn't look up the penalty for what they've already done after the fact, find that their best course of action is to shut up and hope nobody noticed, and then not report the vulnerability. The concern that we will have trouble distinguishing this person from a nefarious evildoer is kind of quaint. First, because this kind of poking around is not rare. As soon as you connect a server to the internet, there are immediately attempts to exploit it, continuously, forever. But the malicious attacks are predominantly from outside of the United States. This is not a field where deterring the offenders through criminal penalties is an effective strategy. They're not in your jurisdiction. So we can safely err on the side of not punishing people who aren't committing some kind of overt independent crime, because we can't be relying on the penalty's deterrent regardless. We need the systems to be secure. Conversely, if one of the baddies gets in and they are in your jurisdiction, you're not going to have trouble finding some other law to charge them with. Your server will be hosting somebody's dark web casino or fraudulent charges will show up on your customers' credit cards and the perpetrators can be charged with that even "unauthorized computer trespass" was a minor misdemeanor.