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These attempts to rewrite history to fit a narrative happen all the time. For example, I see constant attempts to deny that the Wrights' 1903 Flyer was the firs
by WalterBright 3y ago
These attempts to rewrite history to fit a narrative happen all the time. For example, I see constant attempts to deny that the Wrights' 1903 Flyer was the first powered, controlled flight. The evidence presented is always a pile of fanciful conjecture.
This rewrite occurs with modern events, too. For example, the narrative on the 737MAX crashes. I've posted about it here many times. On a recent trip, I ran into a 737-800 captain on layover, and struck up a conversation. I chided him a bit about remembering the stab trim cutoff switch. Well, that opened the floodgates. He told me in no uncertain terms that those accidents would have never happened to him, because he knew how to fly the 737. He told me one way they could have recovered the airplane was the one I mentioned here many times - trim to normal and turn off the stab trim system. He said there was another way. The EA airplane was operating at full throttle. The overspeed warning could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder. The pilots ignored it. Overspeed is a very dangerous situation, as the air loads on the airplane exceed design limits. All the pilots had to do was just pull the throttle back. Then they could have manually retrimmed the stabilizer, which they tried to but could not because of the overspeed.
He added that all the 737 pilots he knew knew about this, but were afraid to speak up.
Remember all the narrative about the pilots could not have diagnosed stab trim runaway? This infuriated him, because when the trim runs, it spins two wheels right by the pilots' knees, making a loud and unmistakable clack-clacking sound. Something I was told about by Boeing engineers, but it was nice to hear it from a captain.
I suspect that the reason the single point of failure design of the MCAS went through is Boeing simply assumed that the pilots would just turn off the stab trim system if it misbehaved. And this is exactly what happened in the first MCAS incident - the crew turned it off, and continued the flight normally and landed safely.
- jncfhnb 3y agoAs someone who did not follow this in great detail, I don’t anyone claiming it was not possible to diagnose, merely that the signals towards it were very poor and that training for things was bad, and that the crews that experienced crashes had fewer safety features than typical western crews or something like that. Your position here seems zany to me. Clack clacking sounds are not sufficient. Assuming that pilots would just turn off the system is not sufficient.
- WalterBright 3y ago> I don’t anyone claiming it was not possible to diagnose I read many times that it was impossible to diagnose it as runaway stabilizer trim. > training for things was bad Stabilizer trim runaway is trained for. Pulling back the throttles for overspeed warning is trained for. > that the crews that experienced crashes had fewer safety features than typical western crews How would you explain not being able to handle runaway stabilizer trim, and ignoring overspeed warnings? How do you explain the Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, that reiterated what I'm writing here, yet the EA pilots either never received it, never read it, or forgot about it? > Clack clacking sounds are not sufficient 737 captains tell me it is. The wheels are also painted black & white so their movement is easily seen, as it's right there next to the pilot. How much more obvious do you require it to be? > Assuming that pilots would just turn off the system is not sufficient. Turning off misbehaving systems is the bulk of emergency procedure training. > seems zany to me It would seem zany to anyone who knows only about the popular media narrative. I've also gotten emails from pilots who told me I had it exactly right. As for myself, I worked on the 757 stabilizer trim gearbox design. At one point, I knew about everything there was to know about it. The 757 system is not identical to the 737 one, but the method of dealing with runaway trim is the same - turn the mofo off. It's why there's a switch prominently placed right there on the center console. Do you want to believe that pilots don't know what the switches on the center console are for? Do you want to fly with a captain who doesn't know what they're for? There's no excuse for a captain to not know what all the controls are for. P.S. Why would a 737 captain open up and tell me the truth? I let them know who I am, and back it up with details of how it works that an investigative journalist would never know. Then they're happy to chat with me.
- rectang 3y ago> I let them know who I am It's striking to see an argument from authority, against the dominant narrative, deployed in service of dismissing those who purportedly aspire to "rewrite history to fit a narrative".
- WalterBright 3y ago
- nukeman 3y agoDo you have links to pilot blogs/discussions about this? I’d be curious to give it a read.
- WalterBright 3y agoNo, sorry. I don't follow those blogs unless someone sends me a link to a particularly interesting one.
- tiahura 3y agoIsn’t one of the legit criticisms of the max is that the behavior of the cutoff switch and the thumb control was changed without announcing it? Update from YKW: Yes, the trim system behavior in the 737 MAX differed from that in older 737 models like the 737NG (Next Generation). In older models, manually adjusting the trim using the thumb switch would generally interrupt and disable automatic trim adjustments, including those by the Speed Trim System, a predecessor to MCAS. In the original 737 MAX design, using the thumb switches to adjust the trim didn’t necessarily disable the MCAS, which could re-activate and adjust the trim again. This was a significant point of contention and contributed to difficulties pilots faced in maintaining control of the aircraft during the two fatal crashes.
- WalterBright 3y agoThe MCAS system could be overridden with the electric thumb switches, and both crews did just that. What they didn't do is then turn it off. The stab trim cutoff switch turns it off. When the MCAS reactivated, then it was time to cut it off. The LA crew restored trim to normal with the thumb switches 25 times.
- ggm 3y agoThe Wright brothers story is well worth reading up on. The director of the Smithsonian refused to believe them, and championed an alternate "first powered flight" for a long time. This is why at least one Wright flyer wound up in the Science Museum in London. It only got fixed after he died/retired. The lack of history on display in the Air & Space Museum on this, is quite interesting: it's like the whole "tell the truth, the whole truth" thing completely passed them by (Admittedly I was last there 15 years ago, it may be fixed now)
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- cpitman 3y agoAir and Space has been undergoing a massive renovation, and reopened the first half last year. That includes a very good Wright brothers exhibit, easily better (IMO) than the one at Kitty Hawk. Beyond that, all the new exhibits are great. Highly recommended for anyone that has not been back since they reopened!
- ggm 3y agoA visualisation I particularly like, is that the first flight on record they made would fit inside the length of a Jumbo Jet. It really brought home how "one small step, one giant leap" can work out.
- WalterBright 3y agoI've seen many current attempts on HackerNews to elevate one or another claimant to the first flight throne. It's not just the Smithsonian a century ago!
- ggm 3y agoYep: we've got one down here: https://www.australiangeographic.com.au/topics/history-culture/2023/08/defining-moments-in-australian-history-australias-first-piloted-flight https://www.australiangeographic.com.au/topics/history-cultu...
- cameldrv 3y agoAs far as is publicly known, the failure has occurred three times, and has led to two crashes. It is possible to recover from if you know what you're looking for and you act promptly. However, Boeing did not tell pilots what to look for. The pilots did not diagnose it as stab trim runaway because it's not stab trim runaway. When MCAS is malfunctioning in this way, it engages nose down trim for 9.3 seconds, and then pauses for 5 seconds. A runaway trim is where you have a stuck trim microswitch or relay or some sort of short circuit. You're expecting a continuous trim input. The confusing thing about MCAS is that it appears to resolve itself, but then waits 5 seconds and comes right back. By the way, the wheels going clack clack is a normal thing at that phase of flight. The 737 has something called Speed Trim and another thing called Mach Trim that automatically adjust the trim as the speed of the aircraft changes. In the initial climbout, this will be running constantly. Both the speed trim and mach trim systems are documented in the 737 manual and pilots are required to know how they work to get a type rating. The workings of MCAS were deleted from the manual before it was released because Boeing was concerned that the FAA would require more training on the system, which would cause Boeing to have to pay a contractual penalty to Southwest Airlines. edit: Also, Boeing's own test pilots failed to respond promptly to this failure in the simulator: https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/aircraft-propulsion/boeing-aware-pilot-response-issues-during-max-certification https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/aircraft-propulsion/b... It's very easy as a pilot to say that you would do a better job and something like this would never happen to you. The earth is pockmarked with the smoking holes of these people's airplanes.
- WalterBright 3y ago> The pilots did not diagnose it as stab trim runaway because it's not stab trim runaway Runaway stab trim is uncommanded movement of the trim. MCAS failure exhibits as exactly this. The most likely cause of uncommanded movement is an electrical fault of some sort. Electrical faults are often intermittent. When you don't know why an intermittent fault is happening, you turn it off. This is not rocket science. In the first LA crash, the crew restored normal trim 25 times. The uncommanded trim happened twenty five times. In what universe is this not runaway trim? From what I've seen the definition you're using is one invented after the fact by parsing word meanings like a lawyer. If it's your butt in the pilot's seat, I recommend thinking like a pilot, not like a lawyer. From your link: "in at least one simulator session, Boeing pilots took more than 10 sec. to react to a runaway stabilizer" First off, they don't seem confused about what a "runaway" is. Secondly, 10 seconds was plenty of time, as in both incidences the crew battled it for several minutes. "Aerodynamic loads on the mis-trimmed aircraft made the trim wheel hard to turn" The loads were too high because the pilots were at full throttle and ignored the overspeed warning horn. > It's very easy as a pilot to say that you would do a better job and something like this would never happen to you. And in the first incident, that's what the crew did. They just turned it off and continued to their destination. > the wheels going clack clack is a normal thing at that phase of flight When the wheels are clack clacking and the nose suddenly pitches sharply down, there's the clue that the stab trim is running away. > The earth is pockmarked with the smoking holes of these people's airplanes It sure is, and that's why airline pilots are supposed to know things like what the switches in the cockpit are for and what stabilizer trim runaway is and read and understand all Emergency Airworthiness Directives. Flying an airplane is not a joke and you'd better pay attention in training. My dad flew 23 years in the AF, including combat) and anything less than 100% proficiency was unacceptable.
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