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I’m saying that many scientists would fundamentally disagree with you. I’m aware of the position that “science has explained” these things, but tend to agree wi

I’m saying that many scientists would fundamentally disagree with you. I’m aware of the position that “science has explained” these things, but tend to agree with the response that this is a position with no foundation. > I don't think there is any fundamental mystery here except the hard problem of consciousness That’s an astronomically large mystery that is the cornerstone of our understanding of existence. It’s the context through which any of this matters. e.g. if we’re brains in vats, all we’ve proven is that we’ve gotten really good at introspecting the simulation. This would obviously recontextualize everything we’ve discovered. I’m not saying I believe this hypotheses, but am pointing to the fact that the implications of understanding consciousness itself are enormous. The hard problem of consciousness can’t just be swept under the rug because we have no answers. And that’s all I’m really getting at. We should acknowledge the degree to which we do not and currently cannot explain base reality. I’m curious why you believe that understanding is somehow not intrinsically tied to consciousness, thereby making it just as mysterious as consciousness itself. It could be that we’re using different definitions. The scientific method is predicated on a kind of pre-existing intuition about the validity of the methods and findings of science. Whatever science is, our brains seem intrinsically capable of navigating towards better and better approximations of reality. And consciousness seems to be critical to the process.

nathan_compton 3y ago
Counterpoint: maybe the hard problem of consciousness is a nothing burger. Roughly speaking this is sometimes called anomalous materialism. My personal sense is that the observable correlations between physical activity in the brain on the one hand and conscious perception on the other is sufficiently well documented that it is reasonable to assert that for every conscious perception there is a one to one physical correlation. If that is the case then, regardless of how one resolves the question of consciousness per se, studying the physical activity is studying the mechanics of consciousness. And thus to say we now nothing about it is simply wrong. As to the question of why I think understanding per se isn't related to consciousness there are a few ways to think about this: 1) the philosophical zombie _understands_ without being conscious, 2) various parts of the brain are understood to participate in understanding without being critical to consciousness (eg, I used to wake up in the morning knowing how to solve a homework problem that I didn't know how to solve when I went to sleep) and 3) artificial neural networks and other machine learning approaches can reasonably be said to understand specific things without being conscious. I think that if it isn't totally obvious, it is at least reasonable to assert that very large language models understand some things but are not conscious in any way. Recall that what I object to here is the bald assertion that we know nothing about these phenomenon. This just isn't the case operationally, philosophically, ontologically, whatever way you want to look at it.

nathan_compton 3y ago

Counterpoint: maybe the hard problem of consciousness is a nothing burger. Roughly speaking this is sometimes called anomalous materialism. My personal sense is that the observable correlations between physical activity in the brain on the one hand and conscious perception on the other is sufficiently well documented that it is reasonable to assert that for every conscious perception there is a one to one physical correlation. If that is the case then, regardless of how one resolves the question of consciousness per se, studying the physical activity is studying the mechanics of consciousness. And thus to say we now nothing about it is simply wrong. As to the question of why I think understanding per se isn't related to consciousness there are a few ways to think about this: 1) the philosophical zombie _understands_ without being conscious, 2) various parts of the brain are understood to participate in understanding without being critical to consciousness (eg, I used to wake up in the morning knowing how to solve a homework problem that I didn't know how to solve when I went to sleep) and 3) artificial neural networks and other machine learning approaches can reasonably be said to understand specific things without being conscious. I think that if it isn't totally obvious, it is at least reasonable to assert that very large language models understand some things but are not conscious in any way. Recall that what I object to here is the bald assertion that we know nothing about these phenomenon. This just isn't the case operationally, philosophically, ontologically, whatever way you want to look at it.