4 ms·
Right to repair eventually runs head first into security and encryption--how do you allow right to repair and TLS, encryption, secure computing, etc to coexist?
by candiddevmike 3y ago
Right to repair eventually runs head first into security and encryption--how do you allow right to repair and TLS, encryption, secure computing, etc to coexist? Get rid of IoT black boxes like Google Homes? Allow Linux on Xbox?
How do you create secure platforms while also giving consumers the keys to their devices?
(FWIW I'm not advocating against right to repair, I actually hope it helps to get rid of black box IoT devices. My device, my keys, etc)
- prepend 3y agoThis is pretty simple to engineer. With TLS it’s just authing the server, accept any income connections. Support basic authentication. For home devices don’t require TLS. I don’t run TLS on my home network. I’m remote, I get devices, I accept that risk. TLS is not required for security. For encryption just design so customers can swap out keys. The biggest problem is designing cloud in the loop so they can mine data. This needs to stop.
- FloatArtifact 3y agoThink of it as like Android and unlocking the bootloader. There's a warning that it's running on modified system.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ceejayoz 3y agoExcept this Android can mow down a farmers market full of people if you get things wrong.
- prasadjoglekar 3y agoFor which we already have laws to deal with. Even without modification, the car can be used to mow people down.
- wizee 3y agoPeople have been repairing their own cars for a century, and the world functioned just fine with it. This locking down is a recent phenomenon. Your car is not going to mow down people just because someone other than the dealer serviced it.
- ceejayoz 3y agoHow many of those were capable of self-driving?
- FloatArtifact 3y agoSorry but still doesn't hold water. A user accepts risk modifying their vehicle. However, The burden of proof would be on the manufacturer to show that they modified something that had an impact on the automated systems. To my knowledge there's not a single case of an automated tractor or car due to end user modification related to the automated systems that's caused injury. So right now your argument is by and large hypothetical. John Deere and the right to repair will be the proving ground for a end user modifications of personal vehicles.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoWhich is another reason right to repair is so important, because carmakers can go out of business without all their cars ceasing to to exist. Someone finds an exploitable bug in a million cars after the only systems with the documentation and signing keys have been wiped and sold at auction, and what then?
- ceejayoz 3y agoThat situation calls for an entirely separate set of legislation.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoIt calls for the ability of the general public to be able to repair their vehicles, so that anyone with such a vehicle can fix such problems. What alternative would you even propose? The only entity with the ability to feasibly fix the bug is defunct and bankrupt, leaving them both judgment proof and with no resources to develop a patch. The only people with the incentive to spend resources fixing it are the people who own the vehicles. So the owners need the ability to repair their vehicles. Which you can solve by just doing that to begin with, requiring no separate legislation.
- ceejayoz 3y agoI’d propose something like the FDIC. Every car sold pays into an insurance fund that, if a company collapses, takes over to maintain access to software updates for the reasonable lifespan of the vehicles. I don’t think people should be forced to self-manage software updates on multi-ton machinery.
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago> Every car sold pays into an insurance fund that, if a company collapses, takes over to maintain access to software updates for the reasonable lifespan of the vehicles. That's still a third party. Where are they supposed to get parts or source code after the company fails? It could be a car company in Asia with no engineering team in your country. The reason they failed could be a natural disaster that wiped out their facility. The ability to make repairs has to be in the hands of the public before something happens to them. And it has to be the public and not some government filing cabinet to demonstrate that whatever they provide actually allows it to be done. A clear example would be that they rotate the signing keys without providing the new ones to anyone else. Third party mechanics would notice this immediately; government bureaucrats may not. > I don’t think people should be forced to self-manage software updates on multi-ton machinery. They're not forced to do it any more than they are now. They can have someone else do it for them -- anyone else, in fact. The problem right now is that the one someone else is trying to keep a monopoly on being able to do it, which creates a single point of failure in the event that anything happens to them.
- josefx 3y agoSo can any vehicle that runs without software.
- ceejayoz 3y agoNot at scale. You could perform phone phreaking in the 1960s, but a million phones in a botnet provides different challenges even if both are technically just a compromised phone.
- bonestamp2 3y agoIn automotive, we've had to conform to Right to Repair laws for 10+ years. We handle encryption by facilitating access to tools that allow users to encrypt/unencrypted the data so they can make the repairs, but without exposing how the data is encrypted/unencrypted.
- gnfargbl 3y agoI don't see the conflict. If it important that the device can prove its authenticity to some centralised service then yes, it is likely that the consumer can't also modify that device. But how many devices really need that level of attestation? Does a tractor need to be able to prove to John Deere that it is a genuine unmolested vehicle, or does it just need to prove to JD that an active subscription is in place for whatever remote service is being used? If just the latter, then we can still have encryption, no problems. That's just username & password over TLS, same as we have been doing for decades on untrusted endpoints.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]