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If you've got a user who can enter a long passphrase, you don't need a TPM, so this TPM bypass is moot. The evil maid attack on an encrypted disk with a passph
by michaelt 3y ago
If you've got a user who can enter a long passphrase, you don't need a TPM, so this TPM bypass is moot.
The evil maid attack on an encrypted disk with a passphrase is that the attacker installs a hardware keylogger, then comes back the next day and snatches your laptop, which the keylogger tells them the password for.
If you've got highly sensitive chassis intrusion detection that wipes your secrets at the drop of a hat, the evil maid triggers it in a way that looks like a false alarm, and uses a hidden camera in the ceiling to watch your recovery procedure.
And if you would never be so naive as to have a recovery procedure, the attack is to laugh their ass off because you needed that laptop to give the conference talk / client demo you came to this city for, and it also had your boarding pass on it, and now you're fired and you're stranded.
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- Aurornis 3y ago> If you've got a user who can enter a long passphrase, you don't need a TPM, so this TPM bypass is moot. That's a weird dismissal. This attack is a big deal because it provides a workaround to full desk encryption. I have no idea why so many people in this thread are trying to pretend it's not a big deal. This is a big deal. Full disk encryption is supposed to make sure your data is safe if the laptop is stolen. This attack makes your data vulnerable if your laptop is stolen.
- BenjiWiebe 3y agoIt's only a workaround for passwordless/unattended FDE, right? Regular password-protected FDE wouldn't be vulnerable this way.
- hollerith 3y agoLinux's full disk encryption (FDE) is probably good at discouraging evil-maid attacks if used with a passphrase that the user enters every boot. But you know how Linux is: anyone can add any feature, no matter how bad of an idea it is. What is probably going on is that Linux's secure-boot support is not good enough to allow secure TPM-based FDE, but someone implemented it anyway. (Or it is good enough if you use a unified kernel image, but most Linux installs do not do that: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_kernel_image https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_kernel_image) Fedora's installer offers me the chance to turn on full disk encryption, but it does not offer me the option of TPM-based FDE. >This attack is a big deal because it provides a workaround to full desk encryption. Security is complicated, and this statement simplifies the situation too much.