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I agree that for low-level key operations (“wrap this key”, “sign that hash” etc.), there isn’t a lot of difference between trusting Thales or AWS/Google: If y
by lxgr 3y ago
I agree that for low-level key operations (“wrap this key”, “sign that hash” etc.), there isn’t a lot of difference between trusting Thales or AWS/Google:
If you just use them as glorified key derivation/unwrapping functions and expose the resulting keying material to your application servers, you don’t gain much from using either a hardware or cloud HSM (since your trusted domain includes your cloud-hosted application servers anyway).
But for high-level operations, e.g. “validate whether the CVC of card 1234 really is 987” or “generate a signed command to top up this stored-value smartcard by $5” (or the equivalent in your domain), I’m not aware of any alternative that is as secure as a physically managed HSM. And arguably, that’s where HSMs make most sense.
- beardedwizard 3y agoThanks for this - I have to admit I've never really seen an HSM doing the two operations you mention. The two cases I have seen are bulk crypto operations for SSL offload (costly, performance critical) and key wrap/unwrap/derive (less costly, less perf impact, but keys exposed to app). I guess the cases you mentioned are similar to bulk crypto in the sense you just get the answer back, rather than the ability to compute it yourself?