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The probabilistic simulation argument ("we are probably in a simulation") actually requires you to reject that assumption (edit: not reject outright, but you ne
by breuleux 3y ago
The probabilistic simulation argument ("we are probably in a simulation") actually requires you to reject that assumption (edit: not reject outright, but you need the assumption that observers of the real and simulated universes cannot tell the difference, so no 6D stuff). People who raise the point that the universe doing the simulation could be very different from ours don't understand what is required for the argument to work.
The simulation argument is that if you observe a universe X, and you work out that a real universe X will simulate two universes just like it, then someone who observes that they are in a universe that looks like X is probably in a simulation. That is because for every real X you have two simulated X: even if you assume that there exists a truly real and physical X, it still follows that most observers of X are simulated. I don't think our universe will simulate more observers than there are real observers, but at least this is something we can meaningfully argue about.
If, in contrast, you say that there is a universe Y, and Y simulates X, there are no interesting conclusions you can draw from that. You are comparing "X is real" to "Y is real, and Y simulates X", but there's no reason to think Y is more likely to be real than X. It's possible, but a lot of things are possible. It's not interesting.
- rendall 3y agoIf I understand the argument, it seems that case is even more unlikely. Not only must one assume that the composition of our Universe just happens to be a super version of one of our own latest technological innovations, one must also take on faith that a computer could one day spin off multiple instantiations of entire Universes that are indistinguishable from the Universe the computer itself is within. Personally, I don't find the argument compelling because of its unexamined, embedded assumptions. What is meant by computer? What is meant by a simulation? What is meant by Universe? What is an observer? How is it falsifiable? By the time these terms are pinned down, the argument disappears in ontological haze.
- breuleux 3y agoIt's the kind of argument people conjure when they think, not consciously, but subconsciously, that computers are magic. I've been there. You view the world as simple and slow, and computers as this complex and magical technology that is getting twice as fast every five years. You don't properly understand the limits of physics, so you extrapolate the progress of technology well past them until you believe it will be possible for a computer the size of a fist to simulate an entire planet. In a nutshell, some people believe in Moore's law more than they believe in the laws of physics: the failure of the former would surprise them more than the failure of the latter. > What is meant by computer? What is meant by a simulation? These are especially interesting questions once you think about the low hanging fruits for optimizing a world simulator. If you want to simulate the interaction between two systems as efficiently as possible, you want the states for these two systems to be located as closely together as possible, in order to minimize communication overhead. And if you are trying to simulate a 3D universe, and calculate what would minimize internal communication delays, the best computer architecture to do this is, well... it's going to be isomorphic to what you are simulating. That is to say, if you travel around the planet in the most efficient computer simulator, an external observer would probably see a bunch of photons and electrons travelling in a physical circle inside the simulator. And the ensemble of transistors that simulate you at any given moment would probably physically look like you. When your simulator physically looks like the universe it is simulating, is it still a simulation? Or is it in the middle of some spectrum between real and simulated? Ontological haze indeed.
- rendall 3y agoThe conundrum reminds me of "On Exactitude in Science" by Borges: > …In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.