5 ms·
I'm not a lawyer, but I am professionally interested in this weird branch of the law, and it seems like EFF's staff attorney went a bit out on a limb here: * F
by tptacek 3y ago
I'm not a lawyer, but I am professionally interested in this weird branch of the law, and it seems like EFF's staff attorney went a bit out on a limb here:
* Fizz appears to be a client/server application (presumably a web app?)
* The testing the researchers did was of software running on Fizz's servers
* After identifying a vulnerability, the researchers created administrator accounts using the database activity they obtained
* The researchers were not given permission to do this testing
If that fact pattern holds, then unless there's a California law governing this that I'm not aware of --- and even then, federal supremacy moots it, right? --- I think they did straightforwardly violate the CFAA, contra the claim in their response.
At least three things mitigate their legal risk:
1. It's very clear from their disclosure and behavior after disclosing that they were in good faith conducting security research, making them an unattractive target for prosecution.
2. It's not clear that they did any meaningful damage (this is subtle: you can easily rack up 5-6 figure damage numbers from unauthorized security research, but Fizz was so small and new that I'm assuming nobody even contemplating retaining a forensics firm or truing things up with their insurers, who probably did not exist), meaning there wouldn't have been much to prosecute.
3. Fizz's lawyers fucked up and threatened a criminal prosecution in order to obtain a valuable concession fro the researchers, which, as EFF points out, violates a state bar rule.
I think the good guys prevailed here, but I'm wary of taking too many lessons from this; if this hadn't been "Fizz", but rather the social media features of Dunder Mifflin Infinity, the outcome might have been gnarlier.
- kjjw 3y ago[flagged]
- hnav 3y agoI think intent matters for actually securing an indictment and conviction, if for example they can prove that you exfiled their user data (this happened to Weev who noticed an ordinal ID in a URL and enumerated all possible URLs) they could actually get the feds to bust you. But you're right, if they're big enough they could try to come after your regardless at the risk of turning the security research community against them.
- emilecantin 3y agoI presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscriber data just sitting there on an unlisted webpage. Don't remember which way it went, but I think the guy went out of his way there to get all the data he could get, which isn't the case here.
- xeromal 3y agoWhat's with the _ in your sentences?
- oidar 3y agoNot the GP, but that is a common way of bolding words between the underscores in markdown syntax.
- jjtheblunt 3y agoi think it's supposed to look like start and stop of underlines.
- wpietri 3y agoThey represent underlining.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- rictic 3y agoAscii convention to emphasize text, similar to doing the same thing with asterisks. Markdown later used this syntax for italics and bold, which popularized it further.
- dahfizz 3y agoIANAL, but the law does not require you to "circumvent" anything[1]. Simply, anyone who "accesses a computer without authorization ... and thereby obtains ... information from any protected computer" is in violation of the CFAA. If the researchers in question did not download any customer data, nor cause any "damages", I am not sure they are guilty of anything. BUT, if they had, "the victim had insufficient security measures" is not a valid defense. These researchers were not authorized to access this computer, regardless of whether they were technically able to obtain access. Leaving your door unlocked does not give burglars permission to burgle you. [1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030
- bawolff 3y ago> After identifying a vulnerability, the researchers created administrator accounts using the database activity they obtained Ignoring the legalities of it all, this step crosses a line morally imo.
- epoch_100 3y agoReally what happened is we checked whether we could set `isAdmin` to `true` on our existing accounts, and... we were able to. Adi's more technical writeup has details: https://saligrama.io/blog/post/firebase-insecure-by-default/ https://saligrama.io/blog/post/firebase-insecure-by-default/
- tptacek 3y agoYeah, Firebase makes this much more of a gray area than a SQL database would, where you'd know instantly as soon as you issued an INSERT or an UPDATE that you were doing something unauthorized. The writeup is solid, you seem like you took most of the normal precautions a professional team would. The story has the right ending!
- adolph 3y agoDid you check with the target before you "checked whether we could set `isAdmin` to `true` on our existing accounts?" If you did not get consent from a subject, you are not a researcher. If you see a door and check to see if it is unlocked without its owner authorizing you to do so, you are on the ethical side of burglary even if you didn't burgle. Helpfully the "technical writeup" post links to "industry best practices" [0] which include: If you are carrying out testing under a bug bounty or similar program, the organisation may have established safe harbor policies, that allow you to legally carry out testing, as long as you stay within the scope and rules of their program. Make sure that you read the scope carefully - stepping outside of the scope and rules may be a criminal offence. The ethically poor behavior of Fizz doesn't mitigate your own. 0. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Vulnerability_Disclosure_Cheat_Sheet.html#responsible-or-coordinated-disclosure https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Vulnerability...
- shkkmo 3y agoI don't think you have the pattern of facts correct (unless you have access to more information than what is in linked the Stanford Daily article). > At the time, Fizz used Google’s Firestore database product to store data including user information and posts. Firestore can be configured to use a set of security rules in order to prevent users from accessing data they should not have access to. However, Fizz did not have the necessary security rules set up, making it possible for anyone to query the database directly and access a significant amount of sensitive user data. > We found that phone numbers and/or email addresses for all users were fully accessible, and that posts and upvotes were directly linkable to this identifiable information. It was possible to identify the author of any post on the platform. So AFAICT there is no indication they created any admin accounts to access the data. This is yet another example of an essentially publicly accessible database that holds what was supposed to be private information. This seems like a far less clear application of the CFAA than the pattern of facts you describe.
- adolph 3y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37297823#37298972 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37297823#37298972 Really what happened is we checked whether we could set `isAdmin` to `true` on our existing accounts, and... we were able to. Adi's more technical writeup has details: https://saligrama.io/blog/post/firebase-insecure-by-default/ https://saligrama.io/blog/post/firebase-insecure-by-default/
- theptip 3y agoGood analysis. I’m really confused why in the 2020s anybody thinks that unsolicited pentesting is a sane or welcome thing to do. The OP doesn’t seem to have a “mea culpa” so I hope they learned this lesson even if the piece is more meme-worthy with a “can you believe what these guys tried to do?” tone. While their intent seems good, they were pretty clearly breaking the law.
- marcod 3y agoWhile what you say is true, I feel strongly that it shouldn't be. It is morally right to show if a product that is used by many fellow students is marketed as "100% secure"* is in fact very vulnerable. If some less ethical hackers got a hold of that data, much worse things could have happened. * that's the biggest red flag. A company saying 100% obviously has very little actual security expertise. PS: I'm a big fan of Germany's https://www.ccc.de/en/ https://www.ccc.de/en/ who have pulled many such hacks against some of the biggest tech companies.
- skshfksjdj 3y agoIncentives usually have unintended consequences. The laws that would apply to unsolicited pentesting make it undesirable to perform it. Thus, society as a whole is less secure because someone wants to protect companies from hacking.
- marcod 3y agoYes, same with the more general "whistleblowers". Unethical companies will always try to punish those who expose them.
- dahwolf 3y agoDevil's advocate: I get into your home by bypassing (poor) security. I take pictures and make copies of anything inside. Then I publicly announce the breach and demand that you fix your security based on a deadline I made up. Then I say "trust me, bro" when I promise to never reveal the data I stole. Nobody would find any of that moral. The analogy breaks down because your home is not a place where sensitive data of lots of people is stored. But even then if you'd do the same thing in a physical place where this would be the case, you'd simply be arrested, if not (accidentally) shot. I do agree that these security researchers are ultimately doing a good thing, but they should not be this naive and aggressive about it.
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago> this is subtle: you can easily rack up 5-6 figure damage numbers from unauthorized security research, but Fizz was so small and new that I'm assuming nobody even contemplating retaining a forensics firm or truing things up with their insurers, who probably did not exist This seems like a problem with the existing law, if that's how it works. It puts the amount of "damages" in the hands of the "victim" who can choose to spend arbitrary amounts of resources (trivial in the scope of a large bureaucracy but large in absolute amount), providing a perverse incentive to waste resources in order to vindictively trigger harsh penalties against an imperfect actor whose true transgression was to embarrass them. And it improperly assigns the cost of such measures, even to the extent that they're legitimate, to the person who merely brought their attention to the need for them. If you've been operating a publicly available service with a serious vulnerability you still have to go through everything and evaluate the scope of the compromise regardless of whether or not this person did anything inappropriate, in case someone else did. The source of that cost was their own action in operating a vulnerable service -- they should still be incurring it even if they discovered the vulnerability themselves, but not before putting it in production. The damages attributable to the accused should be limited to the damage they actually caused, for example by using access to obtain customer financial information and committing credit card fraud.
- tptacek 3y agoA forensics investigation is usually required by insurers. It's not an arbitrary amount of money, it's just an amount you're not happy with. I understand why you feel that way, but it's not the way the law works.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoServices can negotiate the terms of their insurance contract or even choose whether or not to carry insurance. They agree to these terms and know the implications, and again, if the need for the investigation is legitimate then they should be conducting it regardless of how the vulnerability is uncovered. > it's not the way the law works. Which is problematic.
- woah 3y ago
- mewse-hn 3y agoIf that fact pattern holds, then unless there's a California law governing this that I'm not aware of --- and even then, federal supremacy moots it, right? --- I think they did straightforwardly violate the CFAA, contra the claim in their response. I am extremely not a lawyer but the pattern of legal posturing I've observed is that some lawyer makes grand over-reaching statements, the opposing lawyer responds with their own grand over-reaching statements. "My clients did not violate the CFAA" should logically be interpreted as "good fucking luck arguing that my good faith student security researcher clients violated the CFAA in court".
- tptacek 3y agoA friend points out that the limb EFF was out on was sturdy indeed, since DOJ has issued a policy statement saying they're not going after good-faith security research. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-new-policy-charging-cases-under-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-...
- doctorpangloss 3y agoSo then you’d concede that all that’s left is these Fizzbuzz people are liars and are bad people, and that their product is crap and should not be used, and you don’t need to have personally used the app nor met them personally to know any of that, since it’s all clear from their extremely obnoxious, self destructive conduct, and that that’s just an opinion and not a forecast on whether or not their useless investors will get a return?
- tptacek 3y agoPerhaps you missed this line from my original comment: I think the good guys prevailed here.
- doctorpangloss 3y agoYeah definitely. It’s just to say that the security researchers, these classmates, didn’t get lucky. Like if I were a Stanford student, and I heard about this shitty website, you know, if I were generalizing, I wouldn’t be wrong to guess it was run by obnoxious people and that the technology was a big lie. And this website, this forum, it has a maligned love affair with the anti establishment characters, and it can’t really figure out this one because it’s dropouts v. hackers on the face of it. Most of the comments are litigating the law, by non lawyers and even when by lawyers, by people who absolutely could not predict the future of a legal decision. Why not just trust your gut? What I want to hear - what I want to be the #1 comment forever and for all time, which is just my opinion - is like, this research never needed to happen to know that Fizz or whatever is absolute trash. Do you see what I am saying? There are a lot of 18-22 year olds pursuing entrepreneurship out of college aged vengeances. Y Combinator funds many such founders! And here we see the double edged sword: if you’re at Stanford touting yourself an entrepreneurial genius with your app about antagonizing your classmates, you had better actually bring the bacon to your supposed technology. Because you have more than your founding team’s worth of classmates who hate your guts, but can actually program.
- gsdofthewoods 3y agoGood analysis. One important caveat is that, while this may technically have been a CFAA violation, it's almost certainly not one the Department of Justice would prosecute. Last year, the department updated its CFAA charging policy to not pursue charges against people engaged in "good-faith security research." [1] The CFAA is famously over-broad, so a DOJ policy is nowhere near as good as amending the law to make the legality of security research even clearer. Also, this policy could change under a new administration, so it's still risky—just less risky than it was before they formalized this policy. [1] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-new-policy-charging-cases-under-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-...
- whimsicalism 3y agoAll that matters is whether it’s a prosecutable charge
- jmholla 3y agoI'm not a lawyer, so I'm pretty sure what I'm about to say wouldn't hold up in a court of law, but if you claim your system is 100% secure, then someone hacks it, I think by definition your are allowed to be there and not subject to the CFAA. In a 100% secure system you can't get into anything you're not allowed to, so if you're accessing something, you by definition, are allowed to. We all here no, there is no such thing as something 100% secure, but if you're gonna go making wild claim, you should have to stand by them.
- tptacek 3y agoNo, definitely not, this doesn't work at all.
- singleshot_ 3y agoFederal supremacy preempts, rather than moots. Fizz may have violated more than a state bar rule; this could very well be extortion (depending). I would tend to agree with the balance of your comments.
- TheNewsIsHere 3y agoTo your point in #2: this can create a murky and risky situation for the party being reviewed. Particularly if you’re small and you are trying to land your first big client that asks questions like “have you previously been compromised?” then your answer now depends on the definition of compromised. Even if you are engaged in legitimate security research, it is highly unethical and unprofessional to willfully exceed your engagement limits. You may not even know the full reasoning of why those limits are established.